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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
MODELING SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN WIRELESS NETWORKS USING 
GAME THEORY 
by 
Charles Alexandre Kenmogne Kamhoua 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Niki Pissinou, Co-Major Professor 
Professor Kia Makki, Co-Major Professor 
This research involves the design, development, and theoretical demonstration of 
models resulting in integrated misbehavior resolution protocols for ad hoc networked 
devices. Game theory was used to analyze strategic interaction among independent 
devices with conflicting interests. Packet forwarding at the routing layer of autonomous 
ad hoc networks was investigated. Unlike existing reputation based or payment schemes, 
this model is based on repeated interactions. To enforce cooperation, a community 
enforcement mechanism was used, whereby selfish nodes that drop packets were 
punished not only by the victim, but also by all nodes in the network. Then, a stochastic 
packet forwarding game strategy was introduced. Our solution relaxed the uniform traffic 
demand that was pervasive in other works. To address the concerns of imperfect private 
monitoring in resource aware ad hoc networks, a belief-free equilibrium scheme was 
developed that reduces the impact of noise in cooperation. This scheme also eliminated 
the need to infer the private history of other nodes. Moreover, it simplified the 
computation of an optimal strategy. The belief-free approach reduced the node overhead 
 viii 
 
and was easily tractable. Hence it made the system operation feasible. Motivated by the 
versatile nature of evolutionary game theory, the assumption of a rational node is relaxed, 
leading to the development of a framework for mitigating routing selfishness and 
misbehavior in Multi hop networks. This is accomplished by setting nodes to play a fixed 
strategy rather than independently choosing a rational strategy. A range of simulations 
was carried out that showed improved cooperation between selfish nodes when compared 
to older results. Cooperation among ad hoc nodes can also protect a network from 
malicious attacks. In the absence of a central trusted entity, many security mechanisms 
and privacy protections require cooperation among ad hoc nodes to protect a network 
from malicious attacks. Therefore, using game theory and evolutionary game theory, a 
mathematical framework has been developed that explores trust mechanisms to achieve 
security in the network. This framework is one of the first steps towards the synthesis of 
an integrated solution that demonstrates that security solely depends on the initial trust 
level that nodes have for each other. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The widespread nature of wireless communication networks nurtures the dream of 
interconnection between any device, anytime, anywhere in the world. The fulfillment of 
this vision requires the participation of several nodes, from multiple network domains 
with different objectives and preferences. With the rapid advances in computer and 
wireless communications devices and associated techniques, mobile sensor networks are 
becoming feasible and attracting more and more research attention recently. This is 
because future wireless communication will entail autonomous devices, such as sensors, 
smart phones, and computers, to be interconnected in an ad hoc manner and without any 
underlying networked infrastructure. An ad hoc network is a temporary, on the fly, 
connection between typically autonomous devices where each device decides whether 
and to what extent it wishes to participate in the network. In the pursuit of their own 
interests, the participating devices could therefore misbehave – either by being selfish or 
by being malicious [1-20]. Selfish nodes attempt to save scarce resources such as battery 
power, bandwidth, memory spaces, and computational power. As a consequence, each 
node will strive to save its limited supply while competing to gain access to others’ 
resources with the goal of maximizing their own capacity. 
In such an autonomous ad hoc network, each node could misbehave. We can distinguish 
at least three types of misbehaving nodes: faulty, selfish and malicious nodes. Faulty 
nodes do not follow the recommendations of the protocol because they are damaged. 
Selfish nodes strive to maximize their individual outcome. A selfish node will misbehave 
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if the protocol recommendation is not consistent with its self-interest. Malicious nodes 
attempt to destroy the network. They launch various attacks such as Denial of Service 
and selective forwarding.  
The primary function of a network is to guarantee a secure connection between different 
nodes. Therefore, the primary issue that would arise in autonomous ad hoc networks 
would be about packet forwarding. In our targeted scenarios, nodes are selfish and there 
is no infrastructure. When the sender is not in the communication range of the 
destination, the packets go through multi hop communication. Intermediate nodes 
between the sender and the destination are requested to forward the packet for others. 
But, there is a cost in battery power and bandwidth associated with forwarding packets 
and therefore, it is not in the best interest of an intermediate node to forward packets. Yet, 
if all nodes refuse to forward packets for others, the network collapses. However, no node 
is interested in this outcome. This situation is similar to the n persons Prisoners’ Dilemma 
Game (PDG) found in game theory. Therefore, in our work we use the repeated PDG to 
model the packet forwarding game in a network [1-4]. 
As we can see, selfish node behavior may result in, at the least, network performance 
degradation. Thus, efficient mechanisms need to be designed to enforce node cooperation 
at all layers. In fact, aside from the selfish behavior at the routing layers that we describe 
above, selfishness and conflicting interests can also cause several types of misbehaviors 
in other layers of networks without central managers. For instance, at the physical layer, a 
node can selfishly increase its power to successfully transmit its packets. The natural 
response of other selfish nodes would be to also increase their power. The result would be 
 3 
 
an unacceptable interference level that deteriorates the network operation. Looking at the 
MAC layer, some nodes may disregard the back off period in an attempt to send more 
packets. Instead of waiting for other nodes to finish sending their packet, each node may 
attempt to quickly send its own packets. As a consequence, there may be an increase in 
collision that could dramatically affect the network performance. Let’s also consider the 
transport layer; the most widely used protocol in this layer is the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP). The flow allocation achieved by TCP is almost fair as a result of the 
additive increase and multiplicative decrease of the window size at each end point. The 
window size is the number of packets a node sends at once. A node using TCP must cut 
the window size in half after packet loss due to congestion. A selfish node may be 
reluctant to decrease its window size during congestion to maximize its own flow 
allocation. If all nodes adopt such behavior, congestion will be aggravated. 
Alongside selfish behavior, the research in this dissertation examines autonomous 
network security. Security mechanisms in traditional networks rely on trusted systems 
like certificate authorities to operate. In the absence of such an authority, nodes are 
required to trust each other to secure the network and protect their privacy. Trust, in this 
context, can be understood as the belief or the confidence a node has about the 
appropriate participation of others in the security mechanism. Without trust, no intelligent 
node will participate in any security mechanism that involves the collaboration of several 
nodes to be successful. Absolutely, numerous security mechanisms require some level of 
trust in their design and implementation [21-26]. 
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In addition to autonomous ad hoc networks, we looked into traditional wireless networks. 
We considered a service provider with a multitude of users. Upgrading the network 
infrastructure to accommodate the exponential increase in bandwidth demand observed in 
recent years is costly for the service providers. A provider would prefer to minimize their 
investment in upgrading the network while maximizing the number of customers using 
the product. On the other hand, without regular upgrades to the network from the 
provider, there may be more congestion, more delays, and generally, a low Quality of 
Service (QoS). One option available to unsatisfied users is to quit their provider. Surely, 
there is a conflict of interest between a service provider and its users. The optimum 
behavior of the provider will be connected to the users’ strategies and organization. 
We can see that independent nodes are involved in strategic interactions at all protocol 
layers to secure the network or when interacting with their provider. The success of one 
node behavior will depend on the behavior of other nodes. Game theory is the unifying 
mathematical framework able to model the conflict faced by the different nodes in each 
situation mentioned above and scrutinize the possible solutions with a precise 
characterization of their properties. This justifies the use of game theory as the main 
method employed in our investigation. In addition, when appropriate, we relaxed the 
assumption of node rationality used in the game theory model to advance a framework 
based on Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) [4-5]. 
It becomes evident that the realization of the ideal of interconnection between any device, 
anytime, anywhere in the world and other computing paradigms is not possible if 
efficient mechanisms were not designed to stimulate nodes’ participation or provide 
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adequate compensation to all network entities. Clearly, a network protocol at all layers 
must take into account the self-interest of independent nodes performing 
separate optimization.  Cooperation among ad hoc nodes can also protect a network from 
malicious attacks. In the absence of a central, trusted entity, new classes of distributed 
security mechanisms and privacy protections require cooperation among several ad hoc 
nodes to protect a network from malicious attacks [21-23]. This dissertation specifically 
addresses selfish and malicious nodes. The interconnection among selfishness, 
cooperation, and network security is investigated. 
1.1 Research Objective  
The main objective of this dissertation is to use game theory and EGT to model and 
analyze strategic interactions in wireless networks with selfish and malicious users. Our 
objective for this research is threefold: 
1. Design distributed game theoretic and EGT algorithms using only local 
information to enforce nodes cooperation at the routing layer of the network and 
optimize network performance with autonomous nodes, incomplete information, 
and imperfect monitoring. 
2. Use game theory and EGT to analyze new security mechanism for networks with 
autonomous nodes without a central manager or a trusted authority. 
3. Investigate and propose adequate game theoretic solutions to the tremendous 
increase in bandwidth demand due to an expansion of the number of smart 
phones, iPhones, PDAs, and other mobile devices. 
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Specially, our work focuses on:  
• The study of various techniques for incorporating imperfect monitoring, imperfect 
information, incomplete information into the game model for networks using both 
game theory and EGT. 
• Comparing the performance of models developed using game theory and EGT 
and investigating the underlying assumptions of those theories in the context of ad 
hoc networks with mobile nodes and dynamic change in the network topology. 
• Designing game theoretic and EGT algorithm for autonomous networks that 
achieve performance similar to those of cooperative networks with a central 
authority. 
• Providing a detailed mathematical analysis of autonomous network security 
models to capture in a general contest the equilibrium conditions in the network. 
• Predicting the user and provider behaviors under diverse noise levels and different 
monitoring schemes. 
1.2 Significance 
This research has significant impact in several areas. First, our work on enforcing 
cooperation at the routing layers provides significant insight into the problem of 
distributed decision-making, self-adaptation, self-management, random interactions, and 
the resource efficiency needed to cope with rapid changes in network topology. Our 
approach leads to a precise characterization of the properties of cooperation in ad hoc 
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networks. Second, this research establishes one of the first solid frameworks for 
integrating realistic network conditions into autonomous network models. By realistic, 
we mean incorporating noise, private monitoring, and private information into the model. 
This work allows the self-interest of individual nodes to be in agreement with the 
common interest or better network performance. Further, as with traditional networks, 
autonomous networks need to be secured to authenticate the nodes, prevent misuse, 
detect anomalies, and protect user’s privacy. Our research provides novel concepts and 
fundamental knowledge concerning the modeling, analysis, design, and robust control of 
complex real-time dynamic systems, including distributed autonomous network security. 
This work evaluates distributed security mechanism adequate for ad hoc networks. 
Clearly, this research facilitates the secure interconnection of autonomous devices in the 
cyberinfrastucture for the good of each user.  
1.3 Organization and Contribution 
This dissertation is divided in nine Chapters. Each Chapter presents specific research 
contributions and has been peer reviewed, presented at international conferences, and 
published. Chapter 2 is about the related works that provide a critical analysis of the 
contribution of other researchers.  
We start with the packet forwarding game. Initially, in Chapter 3 [1], we assumed 
perfect monitoring and rational nodes. We analyzed the consequences of traffic load 
inequality on the packet forwarding game. Unequal traffic loads arise in the network 
because existing routing protocols in multi hop networks are designed to choose the 
shortest available path between the sender and the destination. As a consequence, the 
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traffic load at the center of the network is significantly higher than at the border. A 
community enforcement mechanism is used to compel all nodes to cooperate. The 
defectors are punished not only by the victim, but also by any node that observes that 
defection. The set of individually rational and feasible payoffs is precisely characterized. 
This is the first work to derive the exact utility function of each node according to its 
position in a static network. Then, we show that if a load balancing algorithm is not used 
in a distributed static network, cooperation ultimately breaks down as the number of 
nodes increases. 
Subsequently, in Chapter 4 [2], the packet forwarding game model is a stochastic PDG. 
A stochastic dimension is introduced to eliminate the unrealistic assumption in other 
works that each node has packets to send in each time slot or that any two neighbors have 
uniform network traffic demands. A game theoretic algorithm, sequential equilibrium of 
the packet forwarding game able to enforce cooperation with a limited number of 
punishments is developed.  
Thereafter, in Chapter 5 [3], noise and imperfect monitoring are considered. Congestion, 
interference, and noise create inconsistency between observed actions and the true actions 
of a node in a distributed network. We use a belief-free equilibrium approach because it is 
easily tractable. The need to infer other nodes’ private history is eliminated and the 
computation of optimal strategy is simplified. Nodes are indifferent between cooperation 
and defection at all histories. The simple strategy designed works with all types of 
monitoring technology: perfect monitoring, imperfect public monitoring, and imperfect 
private monitoring. 
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Ultimately, in Chapter 6 [4], we relax the assumption of rationality used in game 
theoretic models and use the framework of EGT. Nodes do not choose strategies 
themselves but are pre-programmed to play a pure or mixed strategy. Pavlov and its 
variant pPavlov are proposed to enforce node cooperation. Both Pavlov and pPavlov are 
Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) and are stable in the replicator dynamic. It is shown 
that pPavlov is more appropriate than Pavlov if the discount factor is low. 
The second part of my dissertation is presented in Chapter 7 [21] and involves 
autonomous network security. As with traditional networks, these networks need to be 
secured to authenticate the nodes, prevent misuse, detect anomalies, and protect user 
privacy. Network security and privacy protection without a central manager is 
challenging. In autonomous networks, many security mechanisms and privacy 
protections require the cooperation of several nodes to defend the network from 
malicious attacks. For instance, new researches have presented a light weight 
cryptographic technique for distributed network based on hierarchical multi-variable 
symmetric functions. However, those algorithms use a polynomial of degree k and are 
therefore k-secure. This means that if k nodes do not protect their key, an attacker can 
break the security mechanism and have access to all encrypted communication. If that 
happens, there is no need for a node to encrypt the message because they can easily be 
decrypted. A rational node may even prefer not to encrypt because encrypting a message 
will have no other purpose than creating a useless and costly message overhead. 
Therefore, we particularly investigated when, for each node, it is cost-effective to freely 
participate in the security mechanism or protect its privacy depending on whether that 
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node believes or trusts that all other nodes or at least a minimum number of other nodes 
will do the same. In this case, each node is involved in a trust dilemma that we also 
model using the mathematical framework of game theory and EGT. We demonstrate that 
the end result (secured or unsecured network) solely depends on the initial trust level that 
the nodes have for each other. Consequently, it is not possible for the nodes to move from 
the low trust equilibrium (unsecured network) to the high trust equilibrium (secured 
network). This is the first work to model the connection between security and trust in 
autonomous ad hoc network. 
Chapter 8 [27] presents the last part of this work. The demand on mobile data usage has 
exponentially increased since the introduction of iPhones in 2007. The network became 
congested as millions of users tried to browse websites and social networks, send e-mails, 
stream multimedia, and transfer files simultaneously. An immediate solution for the 
providers would be to change their pricing strategy with the goal of slowing down heavy 
users and decreasing the bandwidth demand. From the users’ standpoint, network 
providers must constantly upgrade their infrastructure to accommodate new applications 
and devices. However, upgrading the infrastructure will be costly for the provider. A 
provider goal is to maximize its revenues by attracting the maximum number of 
customers while minimizing the infrastructure cost. On the other hand, the users would 
prefer a regular upgrade of the network to have less congestion, less delays and a high 
QoS. Moreover, users that experience bad connection will be tempted to switch 
providers. The dynamic communication market and the users’ and provider’s interaction 
are analyzed in the framework of repeated game theory. Noise in users’ monitoring is 
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considered. Two scenarios are compared: individual and independent actions of users as 
opposed to the collective actions of users. The result indicates that collective actions 
achieve a higher welfare to users compared to independent actions. 
As you can see, this research investigates multiple network functions and takes into 
consideration the self-interest of autonomous agents while at the same time achieving a 
system performance close to that of traditional networks with unconditionally cooperative 
nodes. Independent nodes perform separate optimizations and reaches efficient 
equilibrium under our proposed models. Chapter 9 concludes this dissertation and 
proposes several directions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
RELATED WORK 
In this Chapter, we give a brief survey of related research in three areas: packet 
forwarding games, network security games, and user provider games. Also, before 
discussing related work in packet forwarding games, we will present two other 
approaches used to induce autonomous node cooperation, namely the virtual currency 
system and the reputation mechanism. We will summarize each approach and identify 
their problems and limitations. 
2.1 Virtual Currency System 
Nuglets and Sprite are the two most popular approaches that use the virtual currency 
system to address cooperation. Both offer direct incentives to cooperating nodes. We first 
present Nuglets followed by Sprite. 
Buttyan and Hubeau [28], use an economic approach to propose Nuglets, a virtual 
currency system. The authors present two models to pay the packet forwarding service: 
the packet trade model and the packet purse model. In the packet trade model, the sender 
does not pay to send a packet. The next hop buys the packet and sells it for more Nuglets 
until the destination that pays the total cost of forwarding the packet. The intermediate 
nodes have some incentives to forward the packet and earn Nuglets. This model is 
vulnerable to network overload because senders can send unimportant messages through 
the network and do not have to pay. The Packet purse model solves the network overload 
problem. In this model, the senders pay to send a packet by loading some Nuglets in the 
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packet. Each intermediate node acquires some Nuglets from the packet before forwarding 
it. If a packet does not have enough Nuglets, it is dropped. Both models require tamper 
resistant software and hardware to store the correct amount of Nuglets. In addition, nodes 
at the periphery of the networks do not have the same opportunity to accumulate the 
virtual currency. Another serious difficulty includes the per-hop charge to forward a 
packet or the possibility of collusion in case of auction to find the cheaper next hop. 
In [28], Zhong et al. propose Sprite. Sprite focuses on selfish nodes and does not address 
the case of malicious and faulty nodes. Sprite relies on a central authority: the Credit 
Clearance Service (CCS). Nodes keep a receipt of each message they receive. They 
submit those receipts to the CCS to claim payment. The CCS determines the credit to 
each intermediate node and charges the sender. This system does not target a balanced 
payment but motivates nodes to cooperate. Also, Sprite cautiously computes payment to 
prevent cheating and collusion among nodes. Unlike Nuglets, Sprite does not require 
tamper proof hardware. However, the fact that the CCS is a central authority violates a 
premise of ad hoc networks which are distributed in their nature. 
2.2 Reputation System 
Unlike the virtual currency system, which provides direct incentives to cooperating 
nodes, reputation systems punish non-cooperating nodes. Many models have been used to 
model reputation, in particular, the Beta reputation system [24, 30-31] which has a strong 
foundation in statistics. Here, a watchdog mechanism, in each node, is used to monitor 
the behavior of its neighbors. After sending a packet, the node listens and observes if the 
packet has been forwarded or not, and records the result in a reputation table. Those 
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models assume that omnidirectional antennas are used. A second assumption is the 
promiscuous mode of the wireless interface. Models differ on whether to share reputation 
information or not. First hand information is obtained by a node itself. Second hand 
information is reputation information that the node receives from other nodes. Second 
hand information helps to accelerate the convergence time of the algorithm. However, 
propagating second hand information creates traffic load in the network. Models also 
differ in weight given to new and old information. When giving more weight to new 
information, cooperating nodes can lose their reputation in low network activity. On the 
other hand, when giving more weight to old information, a malicious node can 
accumulate a good reputation and start dropping packets with impunity. Another common 
assumption is that all packet loss is due to misbehavior. Thus, packet losses due to 
congestion or noise are not taken into account.  
Marti et al [32] proposed a system with two tools. A watchdog that listens to the its 
neighbors and identifies misbehaving nodes; and a pathrather, that selects the best route 
to avoid malicious nodes. The system achieves an acceptable throughput in the presence 
of misbehaving nodes. However, this system does not eliminate misbehaving nodes. 
Misbehaving nodes can send their own packets in the network even though they do not 
forward packets from other nodes. 
Michiardi and Molva [33] develop CORE (Collaborative Reputation), a reputation 
mechanism for mobile ad hoc networks (MANET). The mechanism uses three types of 
reputation: subjective reputation from first hand information, indirect reputation from 
second hand information, and functional reputation calculated with respect to different 
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functions like routing and forwarding. Functional reputations are combined into the 
global reputation by giving accurate weight to each function. This combination is a 
problem in itself; combining reputation does not allow the mechanism to trust a node for 
a specific function and not for others. The weight to give to each function is also 
problematic. Moreover, only positive information is propagated to avoid DoS. However, 
malicious nodes can collude, propagate positive reputation of each other in the network, 
and gain longer access. Core is simulated using the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
protocol and shows adequate performance. 
Buchegger and Boudec [34], recommend Cooperation Of Nodes-Fairness In Dynamic Ad 
hoc NeTworks (CONFIDENT). CONFIDENT detects and isolates misbehaving nodes. 
The CONFIDENT protocol has four components: the monitor, the reputation system, the 
path manager, and the trust manager. The monitor is similar to the watchdog, the 
reputation system rates nodes, the trust manager issues ALARM messages, and the path 
manager makes decisions. Unlike CORE, CONFIDENT propagates only negative 
information. The authors argue that malicious behavior is the exception, not the norm. 
However, this allows misbehaving nodes, even without collusion, to mount false 
accusation attacks and then eliminate cooperating nodes from the network.  
Ganeriwal and Srivastava [31] introduce a Reputation-based Framework for Sensor 
Networks (RFSN). First and second hand information are used for reputation, but only 
first hand information is propagated. This prevents trust recommendations from looping 
back at the originating nodes. Moreover, only positive information is transmitted. This is 
to avoid bad-mouthing attacks. To combine direct information and second hand 
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information and obtain a new reputation value, Dempster-Shafer belief theory is used. 
This is to take into account the fact that reputation information from the most trusted 
nodes must have more weight. Nodes with low reputation are detected and eliminated 
from the networks. Aging is used to give more weight to fresh information. Thus, 
cooperating nodes can lose their reputation in low network activity. 
2.3 Game Theory 
Game theory is used to model strategic interaction among rational players. It cannot be 
used to model irrational misbehavior of faulty nodes. Nevertheless, it is adequate to 
mitigate selfishness and malicious behaviors. In ad hoc network, the players are the 
nodes. Each node wants to maximize its own utility (payoff). That means sending the 
most possible packets while forwarding the least packets and saving energy and 
bandwidth. The best objective in a network is to converge to a Pareto efficient Nash 
equilibrium [35]. However, the main challenge is that the allocations in the Nash 
equilibrium are not always Pareto efficient [35]. The following are some of the 
approaches using game theory. A survey on wireless ad hoc networks games is available 
in [20]. 
Srinivasan et al. [7], motivated cooperation in a network using Generous Tit For Tat 
(GTFT). The authors proved that GTFT is a Nash equilibrium of the forwarding game. 
However, to compute the equilibrium of the game, each node must know all nodes in the 
network, its own utility, and the utility of all the other nodes. This is a strong requirement 
for distributed networks. Our work in Chapter 3-5 presents distributed game theoretic 
algorithms able to enforce autonomous nodes’ cooperation. 
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Yan [10], and also Yan and Hailes [11-12] developed models for cooperation in wireless 
multi-hop networks. They used the Prisoners’ Dilemma game as the base of their model. 
They assumed that any two neighbors have uniform network traffic demand. We believe 
this is not always the case in a network. This assumption is relaxed in Chapter 3-5. 
Felegyhazi et al. [6] used game theory in combination with graph theory to investigate 
and prove the conditions under which cooperation can evolve in the network. The authors 
concluded that the probability of full network cooperation is very small. Nonetheless, as 
the authors point out, local subsets of cooperating nodes may exist. Actually, this model 
relies on a dependency loop. However, a node may not be able to know its dependency 
loop in a fully distributed network. Each node only knows its neighbors as opposed to the 
full network topology. Clearly, dependency loop will not be common knowledge among 
nodes. 
Jade et al. [9] combined virtual currency and Stochastic Game Theory (SGT) to 
formulate an optimal policy to forward packets towards route in peer-to-peer networks. 
When a source node requests data from the destination, each intermediate node is paid a 
virtual currency to relay the packet. Their optimal policy is achieved based on cost, free 
bandwidth, and service capacity. Their incentive-based routing protocol shows better 
performance compared to the DSR protocol. 
Sagduyu and Ephremides [8] used SGT to address the cross layer problem of joint 
Medium Access Control (MAC) and routing in ad hoc wireless networks. They used a 
simple network consisting of a transmitter, a relay node, and a common destination to 
present their model. At the routing layer, the transmitter can send its packet directly to the 
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destination or through the relay node, while the relay decides to accept packets from the 
transmitter or to send its own packets. At the MAC layer, the transmitter and the relay 
decide to transmit or to wait in each time slot. Each node selects the probability 
distribution of the available actions with the objective of optimizing their individual 
performance measure of throughput, delay, and energy consumption. Because the sender 
is in the communication range of the destination in this model, our outstanding problem 
of cooperation in multi-hop networks packet forwarding is not addressed. 
Srivastava and DaSilva [13] relax the assumption of perfect monitoring. They model the 
network packet forwarding game as a game of imperfect public monitoring. In such a 
game, past actions of nodes are imprecise and noisy, but it is assumed that nodes 
commonly observe a public signal about the actions of others. However, the availability 
of such signals in a distributed network is not always guaranteed.  
Ji et al. [14-15] use a game of imperfect private monitoring to model noise in the network 
packet forwarding game. A public signal is not needed. Nodes do not have common 
knowledge about the history of the game but each node has a private history of the game. 
Each node needs to infer the private history of other nodes based on their own imperfect 
observations. Those inferences become complicated in the long term. This is called a 
belief-based approach because the equilibrium strategy depends on the opponents’ private 
history. We present a simpler approach in Chapter 5, namely a belief-free equilibrium 
approach. A belief-based approach requires more computational power than our model. 
Next to the work of Ji et al, Yu and Liu [17] propose a game theoretic approach to a 
secure cooperation in ad hoc network.  
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Comparably, mechanism design has been used to enforce node cooperation and develop 
optimum and truthful routing mechanism. By definition, mechanism design is a field of 
game theory that investigates how privately known preference of several strategic players 
can be aggregated toward a desirable outcome. The desirable outcome is sometimes the 
maximization of some utility function or to have strategic players truthfully reveal their 
private information. 
Brahma [18] proposes a path auction based routing to enforce node cooperation. Each 
node announces their privately known capacity and cost. His scheme ensures that each 
node maximizes its profit by truthfully reporting their cost and capacity. His model is 
supported by theoretical demonstration as well as simulation. However, to prevent selfish 
nodes from dropping packets after collecting the payment, he proposes that the 
destination make the payment. Consequently, as mentioned before, malicious nodes can 
freely send useless packets to saturate the network. 
Finally, Neely [36] suggests free market to induce node cooperation. A different market 
model is proposed in [37]. 
2.4 Evolutionary Game Theory 
Researchers have also used EGT to motivate cooperation in multi-hop networks. Unlike 
game theory, EGT does not assume rational nodes. EGT derives from game theory and 
evolutionary biology. EGT can be used to analyze the evolution of strategies in a 
network. Specifically, EGT can describe how the frequencies of strategies change over 
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time depending on their relative success. Moreover, EGT helps identify which strategies 
will resist random mutation in the long term. 
Crosby and Pissinou [5] used EGT in multi-domain Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) to 
develop a new protocol: Patient Grim Strategy (PGS). A player following PGS 
cooperates and continues cooperating until the other player defects N times and then 
defects forever. A drawback of PGS is its inability to cooperate again after N defections. 
Thus, in case of network congestion or noise, cooperating nodes can be punished or 
eliminated from the network forever. The result can be the collapse of the network when 
all nodes defect. 
Komathy and Narayanasamy [19], used Tit For Tat (TFT), Pavlov, and generic 
algorithms to improve the Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector algorithm (AODV). Their 
results show that AODV-Pavlov and AODV-TFT achieve a higher packet delivery ratio 
than the normal AODV. Chapter 6 proposes a packet forwarding game based on EGT. 
2.5 Network Security Game 
The interest of using game theory to address network security challenge has increased in 
recent years. In general, the main objective of the attacker is to intelligently choose its 
strategy to maximize the damage to the network while the manager tries to minimize the 
damage. The attacker’s and the defender’s objectives are strictly opposed. This justifies 
the use of a zero-sum game to model network security [38]. When each player applies the 
best response to its opponent strategy, the game reaches the well known Nash 
equilibrium. Neither the attacker nor the manager can unilaterally make a profitable 
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deviation from the Nash equilibrium. Other models relax the assumption of rationality 
used in game theory and use the mathematical framework of EGT to model network 
security [39]. 
In the game presented in [40], the strategy and the payoffs are assumed to be common 
knowledge. In this case, the network security game is a game of complete information. 
Otherwise, we have a game of incomplete information that can be formulated as a 
Bayesian game as in [41]. The network security game can also be modeled as a static 
game [40-41], a repeated game, or more generally as a stochastic game [38, 42]. A 
stochastic game is a generalization of a repeated game. In a repeated game, players play 
the same stage game in all periods, whereas in a stochastic game, the stage game can 
randomly change from one period to the next. Game theory also provides a solid 
framework to model intrusion detection in a network [41, 43]. A survey of game theory 
as applied to network security is provided in [44]. A detailed presentation of game theory 
and EGT is found in [35] and [45] respectively. Our approach to network security game 
is presented in Chapter 7. 
2.6 User Provider Game 
There is a rich literature on game theoretic modeling of user-provider interactions. 
Hassan et al [46] show that the user can use a brinkmanship technique to provide credible 
threats to the provider and therefore constraint the provider to allocate more resources to 
users. Sengupta et al [47] investigate a market in which multiple service providers 
compete to get a large portion of the spectrum and sell it to the maximum number of 
users. Other works analyzing provider’ price competition to attract users include [48-50]. 
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The work in [51] examines one provider’s Nash equilibrium price under asymmetric 
information. A comprehensive survey of wireless service providers and user’s 
interactions can be found in [52]. Chapter 8 analyzes the game between one service 
provider and its multitude of users. 
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CHAPTER 3 
GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF COOPERATION IN AUTONOMOUS 
MULTI-HOP NETWORKS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNEQUAL TRAFFIC 
LOAD 
Researchers have investigated non cooperative issues in wireless sensor networks and 
mobile ad hoc networks in the past decade. In particular, packet forwarding is of critical 
importance in such multi-hop networks. This is because there are no preexisting 
infrastructures. Each node must not only send and receive its own packets but also relay 
packets to other nodes. However, most works overlook the fact that the traffic load at the 
center of the network is significantly higher than at the border when using existing 
routing protocols. Therefore, a node at the center is requested to forward more packets 
than a node at the border of the network. This inequality in traffic load can break down 
many solutions proposed to motivate node cooperation. In this Chapter, we quantify the 
number of packets a node is requested to forward as a function of its position. We show 
that, if a load balancing algorithm is not used in a distributed static network, cooperation 
ultimately breaks down as the number of nodes increases. We support our result with 
mathematical proofs. 
3.1 Introduction  
Wireless ad hoc networks and WSN are distributed in their nature. They do not rely on a 
preexisting infrastructure. They are self configurable. They can promptly be deployed in 
case of disaster recovery. Packets go through a multi-hop communication route from a 
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sender to a destination if the destination is not in the communication range of the sender. 
Therefore, each node is at the same time a terminal and a router. As a terminal, a node 
sends and receives its own packets. As a router, a node is requested to relay packets from 
other nodes. Most routing protocols in multi-hop networks assume full cooperation of 
nodes to participate in route discovery, route maintenance, and packet forwarding. The 
assumption of full node cooperation is true when the nodes have the same managers. 
Only the collective interest of the global network is taken into consideration. Individual 
nodes follow all the recommendations of the routing protocols and so there is no conflict 
of interests in those networks.  
However, in a multi-hop network without a central authority, the decision to cooperate 
becomes decentralized and, in extreme cases, each node is autonomous and decides only 
for its own best interests. This creates conflict between self and collective interests. A 
selfish node is tempted to drop packets from other nodes to save energy and bandwidth. 
For instance, in Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET), each vehicle is equipped with a 
node to provide communication between nearby vehicles. Nodes in VANET are 
autonomous. In fact, many other applications in the future will require autonomous 
devices to interact, and cooperation will be the first problem to solve in such networks. 
There are several approaches to motivate cooperation in ad hoc networks. In models 
using virtual currency [28-29], the sender must pay intermediate nodes to relay packets. 
Intermediate nodes accumulate the virtual currency and use it in the future to send their 
own packets. Thus, nodes at the center of the network accumulate more virtual currency 
compared to nodes at the border. Thus, a border node may not have enough virtual 
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currency to send its packets. On the other hand, in models using a reputation system [31-
34], nodes must relay packets to maintain a good reputation. Nodes with bad reputation 
are eliminated [31, 33-34]. Therefore, maintaining a good reputation is more costly for a 
node at the center while being cheap for a border node. In fact, no reputation mechanism 
can guaranty full cooperation in the network if for some nodes, the cost to maintain a 
good reputation is higher than the benefit. Other approaches use game theory [1-3, 6-11, 
13-17] and evolutionary game theory [4-5] to model cooperation. However, the games 
designed and the strategies developed do not fully characterize the set of individually 
rational and feasible payoffs that directly depend on the traffic load distribution in the 
network. 
Unequal traffic loads arise in the network because existing routing protocols in multi-hop 
networks are designed to choose the shortest available path between the sender and 
destination. The result is a higher traffic load at the center compared to the border of the 
network [53-54]. When the nodes are moving according to the random waypoint (RWP) 
mobility model [55], the nodes are concentrated in the center of the network creating an 
increase of traffic inequality compared to static nodes [56-57]. Accordingly, we will 
scrutinize traffic load balancing algorithms in the context of cooperation. However, the 
goal is not to discuss a specific load balancing algorithm. 
The main contribution of this Chapter is to provide an analytical cost benefit analysis of 
cooperation in packet forwarding using game theory. We use a top down analytical 
approach starting from the global network level and translate the result to the local node 
level. Our analytical results allow for interpretation of selfish node cooperation in a 
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general context. To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper that takes the unequal 
traffic load in networks into account when evaluating the proposed solution to solve the 
problem of cooperation. Finally, we recommend a community enforcement mechanism to 
sustain node cooperation.  
The rest of the Chapter is divided as follows. In Section 3.2, we evaluate the exact traffic 
load at any node located at any point in a randomly deployed multi-hop network. Section 
3.3 is committed to the general assumptions of this Chapter as well as Chapter 4, 5 and 6. 
Section 3.4 presents our game model. After, we use the results of Section 3.2 to provide 
an analytical cost benefit analysis of cooperation for any selfish rational node in the 
network in Section 3.5. To do that, we use a game theoretic approach. Section 3.6 is 
dedicated to our theoretical results. Section 3.7 concludes the Chapter. 
3.2 Traffic Load Analysis 
In this analysis, we start by assuming that a shortest path routing algorithm is used as in 
most routing protocol. We will examine this assumption later in this Section. We also 
presuppose a dense ad hoc network such that the packets from the sender to the 
destination follow an almost straight line. We start to analyze the traffic load distribution 
in a straight line to determine that of a rectangle followed by the special case of a square. 
Then, we determine an exact value of the traffic relayed by a node depending on its 
position. We start our analysis with a static ad hoc network before taking into account 
node mobility for MANET. We also examine the special case of WSNs. 
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A. Traffic load distribution in a straight line 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Line segment 
Let us consider a straight line with center O, see Fig.3.1. Suppose that n static nodes are 
randomly and uniformly distributed on a segment [−𝑥𝑚, 𝑥𝑚] to form a dense ad hoc 
network. Consider point A on the line such that the Euclidean distance 𝑂𝐴 = 𝑥. The 
proportion of nodes to the left of A is  (𝑥𝑚+𝑥)
2𝑥𝑚
 . Similarly, the proportion of nodes to the 
right of A is (𝑥𝑚−𝑥)
2𝑥𝑚
. Let us consider a node i located in A. Node i is requested to forward a 
packet in multi-hop communication in the segment if the sender is located to the left of A 
and the destination is located to the right of A or vice versa. Therefore, the relative 
likelihood that node i is requested to forward a packet is proportional to 2 ∗ (𝑥𝑚+𝑥)
2𝑥𝑚
∗
(𝑥𝑚−𝑥)
2𝑥𝑚
 . This means that the probability density function of the number of packets 
forwarded by a node X is in the form 
𝑓𝑋(𝑥) = 𝑘 (𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥)(𝑥𝑚 − 𝑥)𝑥𝑚2 . 
k is a scaling factor. 
Moreover, we must have  
-𝑥𝑚 𝑥 +𝑥𝑚 
𝑂 𝐴 
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� 𝑓𝑋(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 = 1∞
−∞
⇒ � 𝑘
(𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥)(𝑥𝑚 − 𝑥)
𝑥𝑚2
𝑑𝑥 = 1𝑥𝑚
−𝑥𝑚
. 
Thus, 𝑘 = 3
4𝑥𝑚
. And finally, 
𝑓𝑋(𝑥) = 34𝑥𝑚3 (𝑥𝑚2 − 𝑥2).                                     (1) 
This result is consistent with the result obtained in [57] where the primary analysis is the 
spatial node distribution of the random waypoint mobility model.  
B. Traffic load distribution in a rectangle 
As in the straight line, suppose that n static nodes are randomly and uniformly distributed 
in the rectangle to form a dense ad hoc network. The traffic generated can be decomposed 
into two types, which are, a horizontal traffic and a vertical traffic. Consider again a node 
i located in A(x, y). Let us assume that the horizontal traffic is independent of the vertical 
traffic. Therefore, the joint probability density function 𝑓𝑋,𝑌(𝑥,𝑦) of the number of 
packets forwarded is given by: 
𝑓𝑋,𝑌(𝑥,𝑦) = 𝑓𝑋(𝑥) ∗ 𝑓𝑌(𝑦) ⇒ 
𝑓𝑋,𝑌(𝑥,𝑦) = 34𝑥𝑚3 (𝑥𝑚2 − 𝑥2) ∗ 34𝑦𝑚3 (𝑦𝑚2 − 𝑦2) ⇒ 
𝑓𝑋,𝑌(𝑥,𝑦) = 916𝑥𝑚3 𝑦𝑚3 (𝑥𝑚2 − 𝑥2)(𝑦𝑚2 − 𝑦2).                            (2) 
In WSNs, all data collected are transmitted to the sink. The sender destination pair of a 
packet is not random. The optimum position of the sink, to save energy and minimize end 
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to end delay, is the center of the network. If the sink is unique, static, and located at the 
center, a similar reasoning shows that: 
𝑓𝑋,𝑌(𝑥,𝑦) = (𝑥𝑚 − |𝑥|)(𝑦𝑚 − |𝑦|)𝑥𝑚2 .𝑦𝑚2 .                         (3) 
C. Expected Euclidean distance between two random nodes 
The average distance traveled by a packet in an ad hoc network deployed in a rectangle is 
equivalent to the expected Euclidean distance between two random points in a rectangle. 
The exact analytical solution to this problem is evaluated in [58]. The result is given in 
Theorem 1. 
Theorem 1: Let a and b be any positive real constants. Let 𝑅 = ([0,𝑎] × [0, 𝑏]) ∩ ℝ2 
designates a rectangle of dimension a and b. Let P and Q be independent random 
variables, each with uniform distribution over R. Let the Euclidean distance between P 
and Q be the random variable 𝐷 = 𝑑(𝑃,𝑄). The expected value of D is given by: 
𝐸[𝐷] = 𝑎5 + 𝑏5 − (𝑎4 − 3𝑎2𝑏2 + 𝑏4)√𝑎2 + 𝑏215𝑎2𝑏2  
+ 𝑎26𝑏 𝑙𝑛 �𝑏 + √𝑎2 + 𝑏2𝑎 � + 𝑏26𝑎 𝑙𝑛 �𝑎 + √𝑎2 + 𝑏2𝑏 � .     (4) 
Remember that in our rectangle, 𝑎 = 2𝑥𝑚 and 𝑏 = 2𝑦𝑚.  
In the special case of a square, 𝑎 = 𝑏 and 
𝐸[𝐷] = 2 + √215 + 𝑙𝑛�1 + √2�3 ≈ 0.521405𝑎 = 1.04281𝑥𝑚.                              (5) 
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The value of 𝐸[𝐷] is not exactly the same in WSNs. In fact, 𝐸[𝐷] is evaluated for a 
random sender and destination pair whereas the destination is the sink in WSNs. 
D. Number of packets under transmission in  the network 
Here we evaluate the total number of packets under transmission as in [56]. Let λ specify 
the average packet sending rate between any two nodes in the network. The total number 
of packets sent by a node i is(𝑛 − 1)𝜆. Thus, the total sending rate of packets is 𝛬 =
𝑛(𝑛 − 1)𝜆. Let d be the constant transmission range of all nodes. The average number of 
hops a packet travels from the sender to the destination in a dense multi-hop route 
is 𝐸[𝐷] 𝑑⁄ . Let 1 µ⁄  represent the transmission time of a packet. Thus, if the network is 
not congested or the queuing delay can be neglected, the average time a packet spends in 
the network is 𝐸[𝐷](𝑑 .µ). From Little’s law, the average number of packets under transmission 
in the network is:  
𝑁� = 𝛬.𝐸[𝐷](𝑑 . µ) = 𝑛(𝑛 − 1)𝜆𝐸[𝐷](𝑑 . µ) .                                       (6) 
E. Total traffic at a node 
In any time unit, the total number of packets transmitted by a node has two components. 
The packets generated by the node itself and the packets forwarded from other nodes. 
Clearly, we have: 
𝑃𝑇 = 𝑃𝐺 + 𝑃𝐹 .                                                                  (7) 
𝑃𝑇 is the total number of packets transmitted per time unit 
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𝑃𝐺  is the total number of packets generated per time unit 
𝑃𝐹 is the total number of packets forwarded per time unit 
𝑃𝐺 = (𝑛 − 1)𝜆.                                                               (8) 
𝑃𝐺  is the same for all nodes regardless of the node location. However, as explained 
before, the number of packets forwarded by a node 𝑃𝐹 depends of the node position. The 
value of 𝑃𝐹 is: 
𝑃𝐹(𝑥,𝑦) = 𝑁� ∗ 𝑓𝑋,𝑌(𝑥,𝑦) = 𝑛(𝑛 − 1)𝜆𝐸[𝐷](𝑑 . µ) 𝑓𝑋,𝑌(𝑥,𝑦).                               (9) 
F. Node mobility 
Node mobility has several effects on multi-hop network performance. The exact node 
mobility is approximated by a mobility model to facilitate analytical analysis and 
implementation in network simulators. There are many mobility models for MANET. 
However, starting with a uniform distribution of nodes over a domain as we assume in 
this Section, the node distribution over that domain does not always remain uniform in 
the long run. Therefore, the quantitative results about the probability density function of 
the number of packets forwarded by a node (1), (2), (3) and the expected Euclidean 
distance between sender and the destination nodes (4), (5), are modified according to the 
node mobility model. Nevertheless, all those results are preserved if the node mobility 
model maintains a uniform distribution of nodes.  
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The most commonly used mobility model is RWP first proposed in [55]. When the nodes 
move according to RWP, the node density at the center of the network is higher than the 
node density at the border [56-57]. As a result, the probability density function of the 
number of packets forwarded by a node is more condensed at the center of the network 
when compared to a uniform node distribution. Equivalently, the traffic load relayed by a 
node at the center of the network, when the nodes are moving according to RWP, is much 
higher than when the nodes are uniformly distributed. 
G. Load balancing algorithm 
Considering the result in this Section, obtained when using a shortest path routing 
algorithm, one clearly understands the importance of using a load balancing algorithm to 
reduce the traffic load at the center of the network. However, regardless of the approach, 
load balancing algorithms always increase the path length of packets and thus 𝐸[𝐷]. 
Certainly, there is a tradeoff between load balancing and path length. The main goal of 
load balancing algorithms in the literature is to reduce battery consumption, end to end 
delay, and network congestion. 
3.3 General Assuptions 
We assume that each node is autonomous. We model a wireless multi-hop network as an 
arbitrary connected undirected graph G (V, E). V is a set of n nodes. E is the set of edges. 
Node i and node j are elements of V. (i, j) is an element of E if and only if i is in the 
communication range of j. In this case, we also say that i is in the neighborhood of j. The 
nodes have the same communication range d. Therefore, the neighborhood relation is 
 33 
 
symmetric. We consider the communication channel to be bidirectional. We presume that 
nodes communicate via multi-hop communication if the sender is not in the 
communication range of the receiver. Thus, packets, from source to destination, are 
forwarded by intermediate nodes. When forwarding a packet, the total cost for a node in 
battery and bandwidth is β. When a node drops a packet as a result of defection, we 
suppose there is no cost or gain for that node. Packets are equal in size. We presume that 
the costs for receiving and listening are equally distributed in the network. Thus, those 
costs are ignored. No node trusts any other node but itself. Each node has only two 
choices: cooperate or defect. A node cooperates when it forwards a packet on time and 
defects when it does otherwise. We assume time is divided into time slots and that each 
time slot is just long enough to send and receive a packet if there is one to send or receive 
and to decide to cooperate or defect. Each node is equipped with an omnidirectional 
antenna and operates in promiscuous mode to monitor its neighbors using a mechanism 
similar to the watchdog [32]. These assumptions are valid for this Chapter as well as 
Chapter 4, 5, and 6. 
3.4 Game Model 
The number of nodes n is large enough to form a dense network. We neglect the traffic 
from direct communication between two neighbors. The value of the reward for the 
sender is ν. To be clear, if a packet is dropped by an intermediate node, there is no reward 
for the sender or any other node. We consider that future payoffs are discounted by a 
common discount factor δ after every time unit and nodes maximize the average δ-
discounted average payoff (19). 
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We assume that each node acts rationally. This means that each node is intelligent, 
selfish, and independently performs a cost benefit analysis to decide whether to forward a 
packet or not while interactively taking into account the decision of other nodes. Under 
this game model and the above assumptions, for a single interaction, we can see that the 
packet forwarding game generally has the following three properties: 
1. For any number of cooperating nodes, the payoff of defectors is higher than the 
payoff of cooperators. In other words, Defect is the dominant strategy. This is 
because cooperators spend their energy to forward packets whereas defectors use 
the network freely. 
2. The payoffs of cooperators and of defectors increase with the number of 
cooperating nodes. This is because more routes become available. 
3. Lastly, the total payoff obtained by summing all the individual payoffs increase 
with the number of cooperating nodes. As we will see in the next Section, this last 
property does not always hold. Forwarding all packets is not always globally 
efficient. 
This is an n persons Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Therefore, a rational node must defect in 
this game if the game is played one time. Moreover, if the game is repeated and the 
players know the end of the game, a backward induction argument shows that 
cooperation is impossible among rational players. However, if the interactions are 
repeated, cooperation can emerge if no player knows the end of the game. This is because 
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a defection will prompt a future defection from other nodes and taking the future 
discounted payoff into account can make defection unprofitable. 
3.5 Game Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation 
In this Section, we perform a cost benefit analysis of cooperation. We determine under 
which conditions cooperation can be supported as equilibrium in the packet forwarding 
game. We first evaluate the global network payoff before evaluating the individual 
payoffs of different nodes. 
A. Global Network payoff 
Let us consider the exceptional case where all nodes in the network fully cooperate to 
forward packets and where all packets sent reach the destination. This consideration is 
only to quantify the total payoff of full cooperation. The sender’s gain is ν when a packet 
reaches the destination. In the long run, the number of packets sent equal the number of 
packets reaching the destination. In a time unit, the gain G of each node is: 
𝐺 = 𝑃𝐺 . 𝜈 = (𝑛 − 1). 𝜆. 𝜈.                                             (10) 
This gain is common for all nodes regardless of their positions. The total gain𝐺𝑇 in the 
network will be:  
𝐺𝑇 = 𝑛𝐺 = 𝑛(𝑛 − 1). 𝜆. 𝜈 = 𝛬. 𝜈.                        (11) 
On the other hand, the cost to forward a packet is β. The total cost per time unit 𝐶𝑇 to 
relay all the packets is the total number of packets under transmission in the network 
times the cost to forward a packet. This means that: 
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𝐶𝑇 = 𝑁�.𝛽 = 𝑛(𝑛 − 1)𝜆𝐸[𝐷].𝛽(𝑑 . µ) = 𝛬.𝐸[𝐷].𝛽(𝑑 . µ) .              (12) 
The global network payoff 𝑈𝑇 will be the difference between the total gain and the total 
cost. Thus, 
𝑈𝑇 = 𝐺𝑇 − 𝐶𝑇 = 𝛬. 𝜈 − 𝛬.𝐸[𝐷].𝛽(𝑑 . µ) .                             (13) 
Instead of full cooperation, let us consider the case that all nodes defect. Obviously, the 
total cost to forward packets is zero and so is the total gain. Therefore, we have 𝑈𝑇 = 0. 
In summary, full cooperation in a network is globally better than full defection if and 
only if:  
𝑛(𝑛 − 1). 𝜈 − 𝑛(𝑛 − 1).𝐸[𝐷].𝛽(𝑑 . µ) > 0 or (𝑑 . µ)𝐸[𝐷] > 𝛽𝜈 .                           (14) 
Theorem 2: In a wireless multi-hop network, full node cooperation globally yields a 
higher payoff than full defection if and only if: 
𝑛(𝑛 − 1). 𝜈 − 𝑛(𝑛 − 1).𝐸[𝐷].𝛽(𝑑 . µ) > 0 or (𝑑 . µ)𝐸[𝐷] > 𝛽𝜈 .                        (14) 
Remark 1: This is a general result. It is true for ad hoc networks as well as WSNs and is 
indifferent to node mobility. This result is also independent of the average packet sending 
rate between two nodes 𝜆 and the number of nodes n. Clearly, full cooperation can be 
globally efficient regardless of the number of nodes.  
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Remark 2: When (14) does not hold, we do not have an n persons Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Game because the third condition specified in Section 3.4 is not respected. Surely, if (14) 
does not hold, no mechanism can permanently guarantee full cooperation among selfish 
nodes. This is because some individual nodes will find cooperation harmful. In other 
words, (14) is a necessary condition of full cooperation. 
B. Individual node payoff 
Suppose that all nodes cooperate. Let us consider a node i located in A(x, y) in a two 
dimensional area. The gain of node i is given in (10). The cost of cooperation for node i 
is: 
𝐶𝑖(𝑥,𝑦) = 𝑛(𝑛 − 1)𝜆.𝐸[𝐷].𝛽(𝑑 . µ) 𝑓𝑋,𝑌(𝑥,𝑦).                     (15) 
Note that those costs are not uniformly distributed in the network. The cost to forward 
packets is maximal at the center and is zero at the border. The payoff of node i is: 
𝑈𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦) = (𝑛 − 1). 𝜆. 𝜈 − 𝑛(𝑛 − 1)𝜆.𝐸[𝐷].𝛽(𝑑 . µ) 𝑓𝑋,𝑌(𝑥,𝑦).                     (16) 
Theorem 3: In a wireless multi-hop network, full node cooperation for a node i located in 
A(x, y) yields a higher payoff than full defection if and only if: 
 (𝑛 − 1). 𝜆. 𝜈 − 𝑛(𝑛 − 1)𝜆.𝐸[𝐷].𝛽(𝑑 . µ) 𝑓𝑋,𝑌(𝑥,𝑦) > 0 .            (17) 
Remark 3: If (17) holds for all nodes, full node cooperation has an individually rational 
and feasible payoff for all nodes.  
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Remark 4: We observe that (14) can hold, but (17) does not hold for some nodes because 
of traffic load inequality in the network. In this case, it is essential to design a load 
balancing algorithm that minimizes the maximum traffic load and as a consequence may 
allow (17) to hold for all nodes. However, if (17) holds for all nodes, (14) must also hold. 
Finally, if in a multi-hop network, (17) initially holds for all nodes, a load balancing 
algorithm to force node cooperation is optional.  
C. Strategy development 
The strategies we develop in this Subsection should be able to force self interested nodes 
to achieve full network cooperation. Those strategies should also be consistent with the 
following characteristics of our network: 
1. Autonomy: each node independently decides to cooperate or defect based on its 
self interest. 
2. Local views: each node can perfectly monitor the behavior of its neighbors using a 
watchdog mechanism [32]. In other words, a node does not have a global view of 
the network and can decide solely based on local information available in its 
communication range. An effective strategy should rely only on self observation. 
In fact, a mechanism using second hand information to allow each node to have a 
global view of the network may be manipulated. Also, packets containing second 
hand information are costly and can be dropped.  
3. Decentralization: there is no central authority. The network is distributed and self 
organized. 
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4. Mobility: nodes can be mobile or fixed. Node mobility reduces the discount factor 
in the game between two neighboring nodes because future interactions are less 
probable. Selfish nodes in MANET may avoid the center of the network, but if all 
nodes follow this strategy, it results in another dilemma. 
All together, those four characteristics make cooperative behavior hard to achieve. There 
are two main means to constrain selfish nodes to cooperate that capitalize on long term 
relationships. Using personal enforcement, only the node that is a victim of defection 
punishes the defector. However, using a community enforcement mechanism [59], 
defection is punished not only by the victim, but also by any other node that observes the 
defection. In our model, the victim of defection is the sender of a packet. A packet can be 
dropped a few hops away or outside the communication range of the sender. Therefore, a 
personal enforcement mechanism is not robust in a distributed network given the four 
characteristics above. Without any credible punishment, the essential feature that 
motivates cooperation is lost and thus, cooperation is impossible. 
A community enforcement mechanism to force node cooperation in the network is more 
robust. Each node should punish its neighbor after a defection regardless of whether or 
not that node is the victim. This way, each packet can be monitored hop by hop until the 
destination. Each node forwards the packet in fear of being punished by its own neighbor. 
This is even more effective if the nodes are static. In this scenario, one approach can be to 
analyze the network packet forwarding game as several two players game in each link (i, 
j). Each node i will be involved in as many games as neighbors it has. However, the 
different games involving node i will not be independent and analyzing the correlation 
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among those games will be an enigmatic problem. For instance, a node i with five 
neighbors can stop cooperation with three of those neighbors and continue to cooperate 
with the other two neighbors while sending the packets it generates through those two 
neighbors. This is one reason that makes the general equilibrium analysis of such network 
packet forwarding games complicated.  
To avoid this complication, let us consider another strategy also based on community 
enforcement. Suppose that the nodes have two types. A node is of type c if it has never 
observed a defection in the past, and otherwise, it becomes type d forever. Let us also 
consider a strategy that requires each node to play its type. Therefore, if all nodes use this 
contagious strategy, a single defection spreads like an epidemic in the whole network. 
The ultimate choice a selfish node has to make is between cooperating forever and a 
future network collapses where all nodes defect forever. Cooperation is enforced in the 
network because each node fears to start the contamination process and destroy its future 
gain. This strategy is valuable in a network if each node can perfectly monitor the 
behavior of its neighbors. Next, we prove that this strategy is Subgame Perfect Nash 
Equilibrium (SPE) of the packet forwarding game if full cooperation has an individually 
rational and feasible payoff. 
D. Equilibrium analysis 
Theorem 4:  The contagious strategy described above is a SPE if for all node i, (17) holds 
and,  
𝐶𝑖
𝑈𝑖
≤
𝛿(1+𝐻𝑚𝑎𝑥)1 − 𝛿 .                                   (18) 
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𝐻𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum number of hops between two nodes. 
𝐶𝑖 and 𝑈𝑖 are according to (15) and (16) respectively.  
Proof: when (17) holds for all nodes, full cooperation has a feasible and individually 
rational payoff. Assuming (17) holds for all nodes; let us check if a type c player has an 
incentive to defect when not observing any defection. Let σ be our contagious strategy. 
Since we assume that the nodes maximize the average δ-discounted average, node i's 
expected payoff is: 
𝑉𝑖(𝜎) = (1 − 𝛿)�𝛿𝑡𝑈𝑖(𝑎𝑡)∞
𝑡=0
.                                                 (19) 
at is the players’ action at time t 
Let σ’ be a strategy that deviates from σ only once. According to the one-shot deviation 
principle of dynamic programming,   σ is a SPE if and only if: 
𝑉𝑖(𝜎) ≥ 𝑉𝑖(𝜎𝑖′,𝜎−𝑖)                                                            
⇒ (1 − 𝛿)�𝛿𝑡𝑈𝑖(𝜎)∞
𝑡=0
≥ (1 − 𝛿)�𝛿𝑡𝑈𝑖(𝜎𝑖′,𝜎−𝑖)∞
𝑡=0
 
⇒  𝑈𝑖�𝜎𝑖′,𝜎−𝑖� − 𝑈𝑖(𝜎) ≤�𝛿𝑡𝑈𝑖(𝜎)∞
𝑡=1
−�𝛿𝑡𝑈𝑖(𝜎𝑖′,𝜎−𝑖)∞
𝑡=1
 
⇒  𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝛿𝑈𝑖1 − 𝛿 −�𝛿𝑡𝑈𝑖(𝜎𝑖′,𝜎−𝑖)∞
𝑡=1
.                           (20) 
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We can derive the maximum value of the second term in the right hand side of (20). To 
do that, we consider a scenario in which after deviation, the packets from the deviating 
node are not dropped until full network contamination. We assume a dense network and 
uniform contamination in all directions. We consider also a traffic load such that each 
node sends at least one packet to each of its neighbors in each time unit. Thus, the 
maximum number of time units until full network contamination is 𝐻𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑑 . 
(Assuming static nodes, but we have a similar result for mobile nodes)   
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum distance in the network. 
d is the communication range. 
Therefore,  
�𝛿𝑡𝑈𝑖�𝜎𝑖
′,𝜎−𝑖�∞
𝑡=1
≤ 𝑈𝑖(𝛿 + 𝛿2 + ⋯+ 𝛿𝐻𝑚𝑎𝑥) 
⇒�𝛿𝑡𝑈𝑖�𝜎𝑖
′,𝜎−𝑖�∞
𝑡=1
≤
𝑈𝑖𝛿(1 − 𝛿𝐻𝑚𝑎𝑥)1 − 𝛿 .                             (21) 
Combining (20) and (21), a type c player keeps cooperating if: 
𝐶𝑖 ≤
𝛿𝑈𝑖1 − 𝛿 − 𝑈𝑖𝛿(1 − 𝛿𝐻𝑚𝑎𝑥)1 − 𝛿 = 𝑈𝑖𝛿(1+𝐻𝑚𝑎𝑥)1 − 𝛿  
⇒
𝐶𝑖
𝑈𝑖
≤
𝛿(1+𝐻𝑚𝑎𝑥)1 − 𝛿 .                        (18)   
                                                                                                                                             ■ 
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We can see that (18) must hold for δ close enough to 1. 
3.6 Theoretical Results 
The utility function (16) of a node 𝑈𝑖(𝑥,𝑦)as a function of its coordinate (x, y) in a static 
ad hoc network is represented in Fig.3.2. We can see that 𝑈𝑖(𝑥,𝑦) has a minimum 
at 𝑥 = 𝑦 = 0, the center of the network. For the indicated parameters, 𝑈𝑖(𝑥,𝑦) > 0 for all 
nodes and full cooperation has an individually rational and feasible payoff. If we decrease 
the gain ν from 6 to 5, we will have 𝑈𝑖(𝑥,𝑦) < 0 for some nodes at the center and those 
nodes cannot cooperate. They will cause a massive traffic disruption in the network since 
a relatively greater number of routes go through those nodes compared to others. 
 
Figure 3.2. Ui(x,y): xm=ym=0.5; d=0.1; n=500; λ=1; β=1; ν=6; μ=1000. 
 44 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Ui(n): xm=ym=0.5; d=0.1; λ=1; β=1; ν=6; μ=1000. 
The utility function (16) as a function of the number of nodes in a static ad hoc network is 
represented in Fig. 3.3. 𝑓𝑋,𝑌(𝑥,𝑦) = 0 for a border node and makes 𝑈𝑖(𝑛)a linear and 
increasing function of n. However, for any other node, 𝑓𝑋,𝑌(𝑥,𝑦) > 0 and 𝑈𝑖(𝑛) is a 
second degree polynomial. Starting from one node, as the number of nodes increases, 
there is an optimum number of nodes that maximize the payoff followed by a decrease. 
Finally, we have a maximum number of nodes above which 𝑈𝑖(𝑛)becomes negative and 
cooperation will be impossible for node i. Therefore, in a static network without a load 
balancing algorithm, cooperation ultimately breaks down as the number of nodes 
increases. 
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3.7 Conclusion  
We have analyzed the consequences of traffic load inequality on cooperation in multi-hop 
networks. We specify the conditions under which cooperation has an individually rational 
and feasible payoff. We show that community enforcement mechanisms can compel 
selfish nodes to cooperate using only local information. We prove that, without a load 
balancing algorithm in a static network, cooperation breaks down in a large distributed 
network.  
We assumed perfect monitoring in our model. In Chapter 5, we will analyze cooperation 
under imperfect monitoring. In the future, we will also consider network congestion and 
queuing delay. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MITIGATING SELFISH MISBEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS WIRELESS 
MULTI-HOP NETWORK USING STOCHASTIC GAME THEORY 
Cooperation is a critical issue in autonomous multi-hop networks. This is because there is 
no infrastructure. Each node in the network is at the same time a terminal and a router. 
Moreover, cooperation to forward a packet from other nodes is costly. As such, it is not 
in the best interest of an individual node to cooperate. In this Chapter, we propose Punish 
Only n Times (PONT): a distributed algorithm based on SGT that can force intelligent 
selfish autonomous nodes to cooperate without a contract in a multi-hop network. 
4.1 Introduction 
Multi-hop wireless communication includes WSN, ad hoc networks, and peer-to-peer 
(P2P) networks. They are networks without infrastructure. Each node of the network is at 
the same time a router and a terminal. Therefore, communication between a sender and a 
receiver that are not in range of each other relies on the cooperation of intermediate nodes 
to forward packets. In many application domains, including some military applications, 
nodes have the same manager. 
However, this is not the case in other applications, where sensors are embedded in any 
device to form a ubiquitous computing environment, such as health monitoring networks 
and VANET. In the latter scenario, each vehicle is equipped with a sensor, but sensors 
from different vehicles are not managed by the same authority. Here, sensors are 
autonomous but still have to cooperate and forward packets from others. In this situation, 
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cooperation and trust can no longer be assumed as “de facto”. A node, especially a selfish 
node, could send its own packets and not forward packets from others. If all nodes adopt 
such a solution, it will be a costly one and the network will collapse because basic 
functions such as packet forwarding cannot be accomplished. 
In this Chapter, we present PONT, a model based on SGT. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is one of the first works that uses SGT to model cooperation in multi-hop networks. 
We believe that this is one of the most promising approaches. Especially since network 
interactions are random processes, nodes are becoming exceptionally intelligent and 
game theory formalizes rational nodes collaboration. We present the conditions under 
which autonomous selfish nodes cooperate and support our result by a mathematical 
proof and MATLAB plots. This Chapter deals only with selfish nodes and proposes an 
algorithm to force them to cooperate although any model able to detect and eliminate 
faulty and malicious nodes can be incorporated. 
The game model in this work is similar to those using the Prisoners’ Dilemma game [4-5, 
10-12]. However, we introduced a stochastic dimension to eliminate the unrealistic 
assumption that each node has packets to send in each time slot or that any two neighbors 
have uniform network traffic demand. Also, our model does not reward intermediate 
nodes. 
The next Section presents our stage game model. Section 4.3 contains the analysis of the 
repeated game. Section 4.4 exposes our theoretical results and Section 4.5 concludes the 
Chapter. 
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4.2 Stage Game Model 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Simple Network illustration. 
We use the simple bidirectional static ad hoc network in Fig. 4.1 to illustrate our model. 
The general assumptions of Section 3.3 apply here. The network consists of seven nodes 
in a straight line. We analyze the interactions between two nodes, node i and node j. 
Node i needs the cooperation of node j to relay its packets to node 4 and node 5. On the 
other hand, node j needs the cooperation of node i to relay its packets to nodes 1, 2 and 3. 
In general, each node in a network is involved in a packet forwarding game with each of 
its neighbors.  
In some peer-to-peer applications, such as file downloading, the destination is interested 
in receiving packets from the sender. However, in other applications, such as 
advertisement, the sender is interested in having its packets reach the destination. In both 
cases, the intermediate nodes are not rewarded but are required to spend energy to relay 
packets. For this reason, this model does not reward intermediate nodes in multi-hop 
communication but punishes defecting nodes. We present the case of applications in 
which only the sender is rewarded, but all results can easily be transposed to the cases 
that reward only the destination or both the sender and the destination. The cost to relay a 
packet is β.  
 j  i  3  2  1  4  5 
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 Node i requests node j to relay two types of packets. The first type are packets from node 
i itself and the second type are from nodes 1, 2 and 3. When node i sends a packet 
originating from node 1, 2 or 3 to node j and node j relays that packet, node i is not 
rewarded because node i is a relay node in this scenario. However, if node j relays a 
packet from node i to node 4 or 5, node i is rewarded and we can distinguish two cases. 
In the first case, where the destination is node 4, node i gets the full reward price λ. 
However, in the second case, where the destination is node 5, node i gets a partial reward 
price γ. In this second case, a packet from node i needs to be relayed by both node j and 
node 4 to reach the destination node 5 to give the full reward price λ to node i. The partial 
reward γ represents the increase in the expectation to get the reward price λ if node j and 
all the other intermediate nodes relay the packet until the destination.  
A node cooperates if it relays a packet on time regardless of the type of packet, this 
means regardless of if the node that observes the packet being forwarded originated the 
packet or not. A node defects otherwise. We assume that time is divided into time slots. 
Each time slot is just long enough to send and/or receive one packet. We presuppose that 
sending or receiving a packet in a time slot is a Bernoulli process. The probability that 
node i requests node j to relay a packet in a time slot is 𝑝𝑖 and vice versa. The probability 
that node i is the originator of a packet given that node i requests node j to relay a packet 
in a time slot is  𝑞𝑖 and vice versa. Note that the possibility that node i can request node j 
to relay a packet that originates from node 1, 2 or 3 will impact 𝑞𝑖. Moreover, note that 𝑞𝑖 
is generally small for center nodes compared to border node. Our model can easily 
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capture the consequences of unequal traffic load on cooperation as developed with more 
details in the last Chapter [1]. 
There will be three possibilities for each node in each time slot. For instance, the 
possibilities for node i will be: 
1- Send its own packet to node j which happens with probability 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 
2- Forward a packet from another node (node 1, 2, 3) to node j with probability 
𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝑞𝑖) 
3- Not have any packet to send which happens with probability (1 − 𝑝𝑖) 
There are nine (32) possible interactions between nodes i and j in a time slot. Each 
possibility will constitute a state of our stochastic game. The nine states are shown in 
Table 4.1. The 1 and 0 in Table 4.1 represent the Success or Failure in a time slot of the 
Bernoulli process. We have 16 lines to represent all the 24 combinations of events from 
𝑝𝑖,𝑝𝑗 , 𝑞𝑖, 𝑞𝑗 . Note that two or four lines can give us the same state. Also, when a node 
does not have a packet to send in a time slot, there is no need to differentiate if that node 
is a sender or a forwarder.  
Since we have a Bernoulli process, the state in the next time slot is independent of the 
current or past state. Moreover, the states are not defined by the action of the players but 
by discrete events (𝑝𝑖,𝑝𝑗 , 𝑞𝑖, 𝑞𝑗) independent from one time slot to the next. 
Consequently, our game model will be a repeated asymmetric game with random states.  
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Figure 4.2: Stage game model in extensive form 
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TABLE 4.1: PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF THE STOCHASTIC GAME 
STATES 
Line  𝑝𝑖 𝑝𝑗 𝑞𝑖  𝑞𝑗 Probability state 
1 1 1 1 1 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑞𝑖𝑞𝑗 𝑧1 1 
2 1 1 1 0 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑞𝑖(1 − 𝑞𝑗) 𝑧2 2 
3 1 1 0 1 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑗(1 − 𝑞𝑖)𝑞𝑗 𝑧3 3 
4 1 1 0 0 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑗(1 − 𝑞𝑖)(1 − 𝑞𝑗) 𝑧4 4 
5 1 0 1 1 𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝑝𝑗)𝑞𝑖 𝑧5 5 
6 1 0 1 0 
7 1 0 0 1 𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝑝𝑗)(1 − 𝑞𝑖) 𝑧6 6 
8 1 0 0 0 
9 0 1 1 1 (1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑝𝑗𝑞𝑗 𝑧7 7 
10 0 1 1 0 (1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑝𝑗(1 − 𝑞𝑗) 𝑧8 8 
11 0 1 0 1 (1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑝𝑗𝑞𝑗 𝑧7 7 
12 0 1 0 0 (1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑝𝑗(1 − 𝑞𝑗) 𝑧8 8 
13 0 0 1 1 (1 − 𝑝𝑖)(1 − 𝑞𝑗) 𝑧9 9 
14 0 0 1 0 
15 0 0 0 1 
16 0 0 0 0 
 
The stage game in extensive form is shown in Fig. 4.2. Table 4.1 shows the probability 
distribution of the game states. The state of the game in a time slot is random.  We 
characterize that by a nature player in decision node 0.  From that decision node, each 
branch corresponds to a state with the associated probability. 
When the two nodes have a packet to send, they make decisions simultaneously. This is 
represented in the first four states of Fig 4.2 by the dotted line between the two decision 
nodes of node j. In states 5, 6, 7 and 8, only one node has a decision to make because the 
other node does not have any packet to forward and therefore does not decide to 
cooperate or defect. 
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Let us transform the game into its strategic form for further analysis. Table 4.2 shows the 
result after all calculations. In fact, in each time slot, the payoffs have two parts. For node 
i those parts are: the expected reward from node j cooperation 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖𝛾𝑖 and the expected 
cost  𝑝𝑗𝛽𝑖 to relay a packet from node j. If node j decides to cooperate in a time slot, the 
probability that node i sends its own packet to be relayed is 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 and therefore, the 
expected gain in that time slot for node i is 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖𝛾𝑖. Also, if node i decides to cooperate, 
the probability that node j sends a packet to node i is 𝑝𝑗. Thus, node i’s expected cost 
is 𝑝𝑗𝛽𝑖. All the payoffs can be evaluated this way. 
The strategic form of the game confirms the result from the extensive form. Defect is the 
dominant strategy of the stage game. Mutual cooperation is Pareto efficient if we have: 
𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖𝛾𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗𝛽𝑖 > 0,                                                                                                                           (1) 
And  
𝑝𝑗𝑞𝑗𝛾𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖𝛽𝑗 > 0.                                                                                                                          (2) 
TABLE 4.2: STAGE GAME IN STRATEGIC FORM 
 Node j 
Cooperate Defect 
Node i Cooperate {𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖𝛾𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗𝛽𝑖;  𝑝𝑗𝑞𝑗𝛾𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖𝛽𝑗} {−𝑝𝑗𝛽𝑖;  𝑝𝑗𝑞𝑗𝛾𝑗} 
Defect {𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖𝛾𝑖;  −𝑝𝑖𝛽𝑗} {0; 0} 
We can say that the stage game in strategic form is a Prisoners’ Dilemma game with 
random payoffs or a Stochastic Prisoners’ Dilemma (SPD) game. 
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A recurrent and important parameter of this model is the expected cost over gain ratio. 
Let us call this ratio x. We have for any node i of the network: 
𝑥𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖𝛾𝑖 .                                                                          (3) 
When we normalize the payoff with that of mutual cooperation, we have the game in 
Table 4.3. We suppose that 𝑔𝑖,𝑔𝑗 > 0 since otherwise, mutual cooperation is not Pareto 
efficient. An allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no other allocation that can make at 
least one individual better off without making any other individual worse off. Fig. 4.3 
gives the high level description of PONT for node i playing against an opponent, node j. 
The next Section illustrates this algorithm and shows that it is a Nash equilibrium.  
TABLE 4.3: STAGE GAME WITH NORMALIZED PAYOFF 
 Node j 
Cooperate Defect 
Node i Cooperate {1;1} {−𝑔𝑖; 1 + 𝑔𝑗} 
Defect {1 + 𝑔𝑖;−𝑔𝑗} {0; 0} 
𝑔𝑖 = 𝑝𝑗𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖𝛾𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗𝛽𝑖 > 0 and 𝑔𝑗 = 𝑝𝑖𝛽𝑗𝑝𝑗𝑞𝑗𝛾𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖𝛽𝑗 > 0.                                     (4) 
4.3 Repeated Game Analysis 
The last Section shows us that the only equilibrium of our stage game is when both 
players defect. This is not beneficial in a multi-hop network. The ultimate result will be 
the collapse of the network. In this Section, we will analyze the conditions under which 
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Start by cooperation, Ci 
If (Ci, Cj) then 
Ci in the next time slot node i decides (state 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8) 
Else 
If (Ci, Dj) then 
Play Di n times in state 1, 3, 7 and Ci in states 2, 4, 8 then 
While playing Di,  
Count the number b of Dj 
End 
If b=0 
Play Ci 
Else 
Play Di forever 
End  
End  
If (Di, Cj) then 
While node j play Dj n times in state 1, 2, 5 and Cj elsewhere  
Node i play Ci in all states it can decide 
End 
End 
If (Di, Dj) then 
While node i play Di n times in state 1, 3, 7 and Ci elsewhere 
Node j plays Dj n times in state 1, 2, 5 and Cj elsewhere 
End 
End 
End 
repeating this stage game indefinitely will yield the nodes that will always cooperate just 
from the expectation of future gain. We assume that each node has a unique identity that 
cannot be falsified. We also assume that the “sender address” of a packet cannot be 
falsified.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: High level description of PONT for node i playing against j 
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We assume perfect monitoring, no error in perception and no error in implementation. 
This means for instance that when node i defects; node i knows that it defected and its 
neighbor node j knows that node i defected with no ambiguity. We will relax this 
assumption in the next Chapter. We consider that sending or receiving a packet is a 
Poisson process and we use its discrete time version, namely the Bernoulli process. Each 
node is autonomous, selfish, and rational. This means that each node acts only for its own 
self-interest. Lastly, we suppose that all nodes discount future payoff by a common 
discount factor δ with 0 ≤ 𝛿 < 1 and want to maximize the expected δ-discounted 
average of their sequence of payoffs (8). We will first present our distributed algorithm, 
PONT. Then, we will show that PONT is a SPE of the game. 
4.3.1 PONT Algorithm and Description 
PONT starts playing cooperate and continues playing cooperate until the opponent 
defects. If the opponent defects, PONT defects n times in the states that the opponent is 
the originator of the packet, but PONT cooperates in the other states where the opponent 
is the forwarder. After the n defections, PONT resumes cooperation. Any subsequent 
defection of the opponent when PONT is still punishing a previous defection causes 
PONT to punish forever. However, PONT can be extended to not punish subsequent 
defections forever but for a limited number of time slots. The number of punishments n is 
a parameter that can be adapted. It must be common knowledge among players. As we 
will see later, an increase in the value of n makes punishment more severe, discourages 
opportunistic deviation, but also decelerates or discourages the return to mutual 
cooperation in case of an unavoidable defection caused by network congestion. We 
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present here the general case when n can be any natural number but in practice, the 
optimum number of punishments n must be the smallest number large enough to 
discourage opportunistic deviations taking into account different parameters such as 
𝑝𝑖,𝑝𝑗 , 𝑞𝑖, 𝑞𝑗 , 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 , and 𝛿. Note that PONT does not randomize and is therefore a pure 
strategy.  
Let us mention three important properties of PONT here. First, PONT defects by 
dropping only the packets originating from the opponent. This guarantees that the 
opponent, after a defection, will not send n packets for which it is the forwarder, knowing 
they will be dropped, and then not directly lose anything after a defection. This attribute 
makes the cooperative equilibrium more stable because it assures that the network 
packets from other nodes are not affected by the punishment. Second, PONT guarantees 
that two players come back to mutual cooperation after an imperative defection. A node 
can be imposed to defect during network congestion, for instance. When that happens, the 
defecting node is aware of it, accepts the n punishments and then the two nodes resume 
mutual cooperation. If both PONT players defect simultaneously, they punish each other 
and come back to mutual cooperation. Third, a node that is playing PONT must punish 
after a defection even though it is not the originator of the dropped packet. Since 
punishment consists of dropping n packets originating from the defecting node, and since 
dropping a packet is not costly, selfish nodes would not withhold punishment regardless 
of whether they originated the packet or not. This feature is particularly interesting in a 
distributed multi-hop network for two reasons. First, no node can monitor its own packets 
until a destination located several hops away. Second, even if it was possible for a node 
 58 
 
to monitor its own packets until the destination, the opportunity for that node itself to 
punish the node that dropped the packet a few hops away will be rare and make 
cooperation among nodes more difficult. 
4.3.2 Proof of PONT Cooperative Equilibrium 
Theorem 1:  PONT is a SPE of the stochastic packet forwarding game if for any two 
neighbor nodes in the network, node i and node j, we have: 
p𝑖q𝑖pj > 𝑥𝑖,                                                                                                                                         (5) 
And  
p𝑗q𝑗p𝑗 > 𝑥𝑗 .                                                                                                                                        (6) 
And for any node i in the network, we have: 
�
𝛿𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)��1 − � 𝛿𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)�
𝑛
1 − � 𝛿𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)� � ≥ 𝑥𝑖 .                      (7) 
Proof: 
According to the Folk Theorem and the stage game in strategic form in Table 4.2, we can 
support (Ci, Cj) as equilibrium if and only if the expected utility of (Ci, Cj) for each node 
is higher than the expected utility of (Di, Dj). This means (1) and (2) are respected and 
therefore (5) and (6) hold. 
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Considering that (5) and (6) are respected, cooperation is then Pareto efficient. We use 
the one-shot deviation principle [60] to show that PONT is a SPE when inequality (7) is 
true. In fact PONT is a SPE if and only if there is no profitable one-shot deviation. We do 
not need to check all alternative strategies. We need only compare the equilibrium payoff 
to that of an alternative strategy that deviates only once and comes back to the 
equilibrium strategy [60]. 
Let σ be our strategy, PONT. Since it is assumed that the players maximize the expected 
δ-discounted average, player i's expected payoff is: 
𝑈𝑖(𝜎) = 𝐸𝜎{(1 − 𝛿)�𝛿𝑡𝑢𝑖(𝑠𝑡,𝑎𝑡)}∞
𝑡=0
.                                     (8) 
st is the state at time t 
at is the players’ action at time t 
Eσ represents the expected gain of strategy σ. 
Let σ’ be a strategy that deviates from σ only once. 
σ is a SPE if and only if: 
𝑈𝑖(𝜎) ≥ 𝑈𝑖�𝜎𝑖′,𝜎−𝑖�                                                 (9) 
⇒ 𝐸{(1 − 𝛿)�𝛿𝑡𝑢𝑖(𝜎)}∞
𝑡=0
≥ 𝐸{(1 − 𝛿)�𝛿𝑡𝑢𝑖(𝜎𝑖′,𝜎−𝑖)}∞
𝑡=0
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⇒ 𝐸{(1 − 𝛿)𝑢𝑖(𝜎) + (1 − 𝛿)�𝛿𝑡𝑢𝑖(𝜎)}∞
𝑡=1
≥ 𝐸{(1 − 𝛿)𝑢𝑖�𝜎𝑖′,𝜎−𝑖� + (1 − 𝛿)�𝛿𝑡𝑢𝑖(𝜎𝑖′,𝜎−𝑖)}∞
𝑡=1
 
⇒  𝐸{�𝛿𝑡𝑢𝑖(𝜎)∞
𝑡=1
−�𝛿𝑡𝑢𝑖(𝜎𝑖′,𝜎−𝑖)}∞
𝑡=1
≥ 𝐸{𝑢𝑖�𝜎𝑖′,𝜎−𝑖� − 𝑢𝑖(𝜎)} 
⇒ 𝐸 � 𝛿𝑡�𝑢𝑖(𝜎) − 𝑢𝑖�𝜎𝑖′,𝜎−𝑖��∞
𝑡=1
� ≥ 𝐸{𝑢𝑖�𝜎𝑖′,𝜎−𝑖� − 𝑢𝑖(𝜎)}.                    (10) 
The first term of inequality (10) represents the expected future loss and the second term is 
the current gain from deviation of the equilibrium or defection. Inequality (10) is intuitive 
and simple. From (10), a strategy of the stochastic game is a SPE if the expected future 
loss exceeds the current gains from opportunistic deviation. 
From the extensive form game of Fig. 4.2, in any state that node i can make a decision 
and deviate from cooperate to defect, the associated gain is βi. Thus, 
𝐸{𝑢𝑖�𝜎𝑖′,𝜎−𝑖� − 𝑢𝑖(𝜎)} = 𝛽𝑖.                                                 (11) 
Now, let us evaluate the future loss from the time of defection. In fact, in (10) 
𝑢𝑖(𝜎) − 𝑢𝑖�𝜎𝑖′,𝜎−𝑖� = �𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑓 𝑗  𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑖0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                        (12) 
As explained in the game model, a node i originates a packet in a time slot with 
probability 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖. Then, the opponent node j will drop the packet successfully in a time 
slot with probability 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖. The probability distribution of the number of trials in a 
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sequence of Bernoulli trials needed to get a specified number (integer-valued) of success 
is a Pascal distribution. After a defection, a PONT player drops only the next n packets 
originating from the defecting node. Thus, dropping n packets is a 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙(𝑛,𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖) 
process. Specifically, the probability mass function of this Pascal distribution will be: 
𝑓(𝑡) = Pr(𝑋 = 𝑡) = 𝐶𝑡−1𝑙−1(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑡−𝑙(𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑙.                                  (13) 
X is the total number of time slots needed to drop l packets. 
Therefore, 
𝐸 � 𝛿𝑡�𝑢𝑖(𝜎) − 𝑢𝑖�𝜎𝑖′,𝜎−𝑖��∞
𝑡=1
� = ��𝛿𝑡∞
𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑙=1
𝛾𝑖𝐶𝑡−1
𝑙−1(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑡−𝑙(𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑙              (14) 
= 𝛾𝑖� (𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑙(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑙�𝛿𝑡𝐶𝑡−1𝑙−1(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑡∞
𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑙=1
 
= 𝛾𝑖� (𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑙(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑙�𝐶𝑡−1𝑙−1[𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)]𝑡∞
𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑙=1
 
= 𝛾𝑖� (𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑙(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑙 [𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)]�𝐶𝑡−1𝑙−1[𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)]𝑡−1∞
𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑙=1
 
= 𝛾𝑖� (𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑙(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑙 [𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)]�𝐶𝑡𝑙−1[𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)]𝑡∞
𝑡=0
𝑛
𝑙=1
 
= 𝛾𝑖� (𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑙(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑙 [𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)] � [𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)]𝑙−1(1 − [𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)])𝑙�𝑛
𝑙=1
. 
We have the last equality because (15) holds for a fixed l and any number y, 
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�𝐶𝑡
𝑙𝑦𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
= 𝑦𝑙(1 − 𝑦)𝑙+1 .                                                    (15) 
Then 
𝛾𝑖�
(𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑙(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)𝑙 [𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)] � [𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)]𝑙−1(1 − [𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)])𝑙�𝑛
𝑙=1
= 𝛾𝑖�� 𝛿𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)�𝑙𝑛
𝑙=1
 
= 𝛾𝑖 � 𝛿𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)��1 − � 𝛿𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)�
𝑛
1 − � 𝛿𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)� �. 
Thus, (10) implies 
𝛾𝑖 �
𝛿𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)��1 − � 𝛿𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)�
𝑛
1 − � 𝛿𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)� � ≥ 𝛽𝑖,                               (16) 
And finally 
�
𝛿𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)��1 − � 𝛿𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)�
𝑛
1 − � 𝛿𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)� � ≥ 𝑥𝑖                                 (7) 
                                                                                                                 ■ 
Remark 1: The left part of (7) is a geometric sequence with common ratio 𝛥 =
�
𝛿𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖
1−𝛿(1−𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖)�. The expected loss incurred by node i when node j drops the lth packet 
is 𝛾𝑖𝛥𝑙. The left term of (16) is thus the total expected loss from the n dropped packets. 
Equation (16) can also be written as: 
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𝛾𝑖𝛥
1 + 𝛾𝑖𝛥2 + 𝛾𝑖𝛥3 + 𝛾𝑖𝛥4 + ⋯+ 𝛾𝑖𝛥𝑛 ≥ 𝛽𝑖.                      (17) 
Equation (17) discloses the fact that the future losses of a node after a single deviation 
from the equilibrium strategy are discounted by Δ instead of δ. We call Δ the adjusted 
discount factor. 
4.4 Theoretical Results 
 
Figure 4.4: Adjusted discount factor vs. Discount factor (𝒑𝒊𝒒𝒊 = 𝟏,𝟎.𝟓,𝟎.𝟏) 
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Most works use simulation to support their model due to the complexity of network 
interactions. However, we assert that analytical approaches better describe PONT and 
express more explicit quantitative results. We use a few plots from MATLAB to visualize 
our results. We analyze first the adjusted discount factor followed by the minimum 
discount factor able to force cooperation among selfish nodes. 
An increase in Δ increases the future loss of a node after an opportunistic deviation and 
then reinforces nodes cooperation. Fig. 4.4 indicates that the adjusted discount factor Δ 
increase with the discount factor 𝛿. This is a natural result from the definition of 𝛿. 
 
Figure 4.5: Adjusted discount factor vs. Probability 𝒑𝒊𝒒𝒊(𝜹 = 𝟎.𝟗𝟗, 𝟎.𝟓, 𝟎.𝟏) 
 65 
 
Fig. 4.5 show that Δ increases with the product of probabilities 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖. This testifies that 
cooperation can be facilitated when each node sends its own packets at a higher rate. 
Accordingly, when 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 = 0,Δ = 0, the nodes’ cooperation breaks down. In fact, there is 
no reason for a rational node to cooperate when it does not expect to send its own 
packets. We also observe in Fig. 4.5 that Δ ≤ 𝛿 with equality if and only if 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 = 1. In 
short, for any value of 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 we have 0 ≤ Δ ≤ 𝛿 < 1. 
As explained above, as 𝛿 increases, Δ increases and so does the left part of (7). Therefore, 
if we replace in (7) the superior or equal sign (≥) with the equal sign (=), we find the 
minimum discount factor (𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛) capable of forcing nodes to cooperate. 
Fig. 4.6 represents 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛as a function of the cost over gain ratio xi for the two extreme 
values of n. n=1 for one period punishment and n=infinite for infinite punishment. 
Remember that, in this model, we have 0 ≤ 𝛿 < 1. Thus, 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≥ 1 means that 
cooperation is impossible. In Fig. 4.6, for 𝑛 = 1, 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≥ 1 when 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 1. Consequently, 
for one period of punishment, cooperation is impossible if 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 1 or 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 𝛾𝑖. On the 
contrary, when 𝛽𝑖 ≤ 𝛾𝑖, one period punishment should be enough when nodes have a 
large discount factor. 
In general, it can be proven that the number of punishments n should be greater than the 
cost over gain ratio xi to allow cooperation. For 𝑛 > 𝑥𝑖, cooperation is possible for a large 
enough 𝛿. Accordingly, n does not need to be infinite in order for PONT to force 
cooperation among patient nodes. An infinite n should be avoided to allow the possibility 
of mutual cooperation in the future after a single defection. 
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Figure 4.6: Minimum discount factor 𝜹𝒎𝒊𝒏 vs. Cost over gain ratio xi (𝒏 = 𝟏,𝒏 = ∞,𝒑𝒊 = 𝒒𝒊 = 𝟎.𝟓) 
Fig. 4.6 affirms that for infinite n, 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 1 regardless of how big xi becomes. The graph 
is limited to 𝑥𝑖 = 10 but in fact 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 1 is the horizontal asymptote of this graph. 
Therefore, in the extreme case that n is infinite, cooperation is always possible for a large 
discount factor (close to 1), regardless of how big xi is. Note that the value of xi still needs 
to satisfy (5). According to (5), in the limiting case we have equality; an increase of xi 
implies either an increase of 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 or a decrease of 𝑝𝑗. This means that, for a high value of 
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xi, node i cooperates if it sends its own packet at a high rate while being requested to 
forward costly packets at a lower rate. 
Fig. 4.7 clarifies that 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 decreases as the probability  𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 that a node sends its own 
packet in a time slot, increases. In addition, 𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑛 decreases with the number of 
punishments n. Thus, the number of punishments can be increased when the discount 
factor is low and cannot motivate cooperation. However, n should be just large enough to 
motivate cooperation. 
 
Figure 4.7: Minimum discount factor 𝜹𝒎𝒊𝒏 vs. Probability 𝒑𝒊𝒒𝒊  (𝒏 = 𝟏,𝒏 = ∞,𝒙𝒊 = 𝟎.𝟐) 
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 In summary, the results from Theorem 1 shows that when the nodes in a network use the 
PONT algorithm, cooperation is always possible among sufficiently patient nodes 
(discount factor close to 1) for a finite number of punishments (n) higher than the cost 
over gain ratio (xi) when each node has packets to send �𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 ≠ 1 and 𝑝𝑗𝑞𝑗 ≠ 1�. 
4.5 Conclusion  
In this work, we focused on local interaction to design PONT, a distributed algorithm 
SPE of the packet forwarding game in multi-hop wireless communication. We used the 
mathematical framework of SGT to prove that cooperation is possible among sufficiently 
patient nodes if each node has packets to send. We analyzed in detail the impact on 
cooperation of parameters such as the packet sending rate, the packet forwarding rate, the 
cost to forward a packet, the payoff to the sender when the packet reaches the destination, 
and most importantly the discount factor of the nodes. 
Our game model is a SPD game instead of an Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma (IPD) game. 
The intermediate nodes are not rewarded when forwarding a packet but are punished if 
they drop a packet. In case of defection, the last node to forward the packet has the 
responsibility to punish, not the originator of the packet. Only the sender (or destination) 
of a packet is rewarded. We believe this reward mechanism to be realistic. Moreover, our 
model incorporates the pragmatic case when some nodes do not have a packet to send in 
a number of time slots or do not have uniform traffic demand.  
We based our analysis on two neighboring nodes’ interaction to make reasonable 
predictions for each node in the global network. This way, we avoided a centralized 
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approach to solve the problem of cooperation in distributed networks. In fact,  solving the 
problem of cooperation with equilibrium or the utility function, designed to incorporate 
full network parameters to be calculated, will be demanding but less convenient and most 
likely subject to manipulations. 
The main advantage of this model is that it is fully distributed. This is consistent with the 
nature of multi-hop ad hoc networks. Each node is only required to know its neighbor, 
not the full topology of the network. Each node takes the decision to cooperate or defect 
only from the information that it can determine or monitor itself. This way, our model is 
more robust against selfish and malicious nodes that can attempt to manipulate some 
information for their interests. The full analysis in this model is done at the packet level, 
not at the route or network level. 
In this Chapter we assumed that the interactions between node i and node j are 
independent of the interaction between node i and node k, for instance. In contrast, we 
can have a scenario in which a selfish node i simply refuses to forward messages from 
node j and avoids node j by re-routing all of its traffic through node k. We will investigate 
this scenario in the future. In the next Chapter, we will consider imperfect monitoring 
when there is noise in observing the neighbor’s actions. In the future, we will implement 
PONT on an adequate routing protocol in a real multi-hop network to analyze the impact 
of network flow, network topology, and node mobility. 
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CHAPTER 5 
BELIEF-FREE EQUILIBRIUM OF PACKET FORWARDING GAME IN AD HOC 
NETWORKS UNDER IMPERFECT MONITORING 
Future applications will require autonomous devices to be interconnected and form ad 
hoc networks. In such networks, cooperation will be the first problem to solve at all 
layers of the protocol stack. This work deals with one of the basic functions of a network, 
namely packet forwarding. We model packet forwarding as a stochastic game in which 
each node monitors the behavior of its neighbors. We consider the realistic scenario when 
the monitoring technology used by the nodes is imperfect. In reality, there can be 
inconsistencies between the true action of a node and the observations of its neighbors. 
Therefore, in an ad hoc network, each node receives only noisy private information about 
the past play of its neighbors. We develop a simple one period memory strategy that 
constrains self-interested nodes to cooperate under noise. We use a belief-free approach. 
A belief-free approach delivers a tremendous computational advantage because nodes’ 
belief about the neighbors’ private history does not need to be computed. We support our 
results by mathematical proofs and simulations. 
5.1 Introduction 
Ad hoc networks are networks without infrastructure. Each node is at the same time a 
terminal and a router. As a terminal, each node sends and receives its packets. As a 
router, each node performs different functions such as route discovery, route maintenance 
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and, packet forwarding. In many applications, nodes have the same manager and fully 
cooperate to achieve the common goal of the network. 
However, future applications will require autonomous devices to be interconnected. Each 
node will be its own manager and will act of its own self-interest. Selfish nodes will be 
tempted to drop packets from other nodes to save critical resources such as battery power 
and bandwidth. However, the network collapses if all nodes refuse to relay other nodes’ 
packets; no node benefits from such an outcome. This situation is similar to the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma Game found in game theory. Thus, the PDG will be the basis of our 
model. 
In recent years, researchers have used game theory to model the packet forwarding game 
in ad hoc networks [1-3, 6-11, 13-17]. The basic idea behind the packet forwarding game 
theoretic model is to use repeated interaction among nodes to provide the necessary 
incentive to cooperate. Future packets originating from defectors are dropped to punish 
them. If for each node, at all times the future lose is greater than the current gain from 
defection, the network reaches a Nash equilibrium where all selfish nodes always 
cooperate. In a cooperative Nash equilibrium no node can profit by dropping packet 
unilaterally. Moreover, forwarding costly packets is the best response to the behavior of 
other nodes. 
However, the implicit assumption of perfect monitoring is present in most papers [1-2, 6-
11]. The packet forwarding game equilibrium constructed in those papers are not robust 
when considering noise. A game is of perfect monitoring if the history of chosen actions 
is common knowledge among the players. Perfect monitoring is a strong assumption in a 
 72 
 
distributed network for three primary reasons. First, no node can directly monitor the 
behavior of nodes outside its communication range. Second, generally, in game 
theoretical models, each node is equipped with a watchdog mechanism [32] to monitor 
the actions of other nodes in its communication range and perform the best response 
based on the observed actions. A node’s watchdog mechanism cannot monitor those 
actions at the same time that the node sends or receives packets. Third, even though a 
node decides to cooperate, a packet can be dropped because of transmission errors and 
link breakages. Surely, there will be congestion, interference, collisions, and noise that 
create inconsistency between observed actions and the true actions in a distributed 
network. 
Srivastava and DaSilva [13] relax the assumption of perfect monitoring. They model the 
network packet forwarding game as a game of imperfect public monitoring. In such a 
game, past actions of nodes are imprecise and noisy but it is assumed that nodes 
commonly observe a public signal about the actions of others. However, the availability 
of such signals in a distributed network is not always guaranteed.  
Ji et al. [14-15] use a game of imperfect private monitoring to model noise in the network 
packet forwarding game. A public signal is not needed. Nodes do not have common 
knowledge about the history of the game but each node has a private history of the game. 
Each node needs to infer the private history of other nodes based on their own imperfect 
observations. Those inferences become complicated in the long term and require more 
computational power than our model. This is called a belief-based approach because the 
equilibrium strategy depends on the opponents’ private history. 
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A sequential equilibrium [60] is belief-free if, after every history, each player’s 
continuation strategy is optimal independently of the opponents’ history [60-67]. We use 
a belief-free equilibrium approach because it is easily tractable. The need to infer other 
nodes private history is eliminated and the computation of optimal strategy is simplified. 
The work in [16] is closely related to this Chapter. However, the equilibrium constructed 
in [16] is more complex than ours. A node using our strategy starts by cooperating and 
cooperates for sure after observing (with the possibility of erroneous observation) that the 
opponent cooperated in the last stage. The node cooperates with a probability less than 
one (to be carefully calculated in Section 5.2) if it observed the defection of the opponent 
in the last stage. As, you can see, our strategy depends on a single parameter, the 
probability to cooperate after observing a deviation from the opponent. Also, contrary to 
[16], our strategy does not depend on a node’s own action. Only the last action of the 
opponent is needed. Therefore, our model easily translates from a two nodes game to an n 
nodes game using new research from [67]. Last but not least, our model introduces a 
stochastic dimension to the game to synthesize the randomness of network interaction, 
the traffic load inequality in the network and the border effect. Our game model is a 
stochastic PDG. As such, this Chapter extends the work in the last Chapter [2] while 
considering noise. Our simulation results indicate that our simple strategy enforces 
cooperation among autonomous nodes and is robust to noise with only a small 
performance degradation compared to a network with a central manager. 
Other approaches that address the problem of cooperation in ad hoc networks include 
EGT [4-5], reputation mechanisms [31-34] and virtual currency systems [28-29]. EGT 
 74 
 
relaxes the assumption of rationality used in game theory but relies on the statistical 
distribution of strategies used in the network. Moreover, nodes do not choose strategy in 
EGT models. Nodes are programmed to use certain strategies in the game. Reputation 
mechanisms require each node to monitor its neighbor and compute a reputation for each 
neighbor. Nodes with a low reputation are either avoided [32] or isolated [31, 33-34]. 
Virtual currency systems give a virtual payment to intermediate nodes to relay packets. 
The payment collected by each node can be used to send its own packets. The remainder 
of this Chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents our repeated game model 
with two nodes. The stage game model is similar to the one presented in Chapter 4 in 
Section 4.2. Section 5.3 proposes an extension of the two node model in Section 4.2 for n 
nodes. Section 5.4 presents our simulation results, and Section 5.5 concludes the Chapter. 
5.2 Repeated Game under Imperfect Private Monitoring 
We analyzed the stochastic game in Table 4.2 under perfect monitoring in Chapter 4 and 
in [2]. Recall that after payoff normalization, the gain from deviation 
𝑔𝑖 = 𝑝𝑗𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖𝛾𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗𝛽𝑖 > 0.                                      (1) 
We now consider the impact of noise caused by watchdog imperfection. We can have 
inconsistencies between the observed action of node and the true action. For instance, in 
Fig. 4.1, node j can relay a packet from node i at the same time that node i is receiving a 
packet from node 3. Therefore, node i is not able to observe that node j cooperated. Node 
i will observe a defection from node j even though node j cooperated. Moreover, although 
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a node decides to cooperate, a packet can be dropped because of transmission error and 
link breakage. We now extend that model to an imperfect private monitoring model. 
One of the most important results in repeated games is the folk theorem. That is, self 
interested agents can achieve any individually rational and feasible payoff if they are 
engaged in a long term relationship with repeated and frequent interactions. The folk 
theorem has been proven under perfect monitoring and imperfect public monitoring but 
the folk theorem for imperfect private monitoring is still an active research area [60-68]. 
The main difficulty is that players are not able to coordinate to punish a deviation from 
the equilibrium strategy because players have different observations of other players’ 
actions. The history of the game is private. 
 Bhaskar and Obara [68] prove that the symmetric efficient outcome can be approximated 
in any PDG. Their approach is belief-based. That requires each player to infer the 
opponents’ private history. Their results are applied to ad hoc networks in [14-15]. Our 
model uses the current advances in research presented in [60-67]. Ely and Valimaki [61] 
use a belief-free approach to prove the folk theorem in the two players PDG. Ely et al. 
[62] provide a characterization of the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in all two-
person games for any discount factor and any accuracy of the monitoring technology. 
Yamamoto proves that the payoff of mutual cooperation can be achieved in the n player 
PDG [65] and later proves the folk theorem in n person PDG in the limit as the noise in 
monitoring vanishes and the discount factor is close to one [66]. Takahashi [67] uses a 
belief-free equilibrium approach in the context of community enforcement. A simple 
presentation of belief-free equilibrium is found in [64]. An interested reader is 
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recommended to read [60] and [63] for a detailed presentation on repeated games under 
different forms of monitoring.  
A. Model 
In this Section, we analyze the two node game. The players are nodes i, (i=1, 2). In fact, 
each node is involved in a two node game with each of its neighbors. Each node chooses 
action 𝑎𝑖 from the set 𝐴𝑖={C, D}. C designates cooperation, and D designates defection. 
A profile of actions is a vector 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 = 𝐴𝑖 × 𝐴𝑗 . Also, each node receives a signal 𝑦𝑖 
from the set 𝑌𝑖 = {𝑐𝑖,𝑑𝑖}. 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑑𝑖 are the observation of cooperation and defection by 
node i respectively.  
A monitoring technology is a collection of probability distributions  {𝑚(. |𝑎):𝑎 ∈ 𝐴} 
over 𝑌 = 𝑌𝑖 × 𝑌𝑗. This means that each node receives a signal 𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑌𝑖 , and that each 
signal profile (𝑦𝑖,𝑦𝑗) is obtained with probability 𝑚�𝑦𝑖,𝑦𝑗�𝑎�. The marginal distribution 
over node i’s signal is denoted 𝑚𝑖(. |𝑎). Node i’s realized payoff 𝑟𝑖(𝑎𝑖,𝑦𝑖) depends on the 
action 𝑎𝑖and the private signal 𝑦𝑖. Thus, the expected payoff of node i from action profile  𝑎 is: 
𝑢𝑖(𝑎) = � 𝑚�𝑦𝑖 ,𝑦𝑗�𝑎�
�𝑦𝑖,𝑦𝑗�∈𝑌 𝑟𝑖(𝑎𝑖,𝑦𝑖).                   (2) 
Node i’s private history in the repeated game is ℎ𝑖𝑡 = (𝑎𝑖1,𝑦𝑖1, … , 𝑎𝑖𝑡−1,𝑦𝑖𝑡−1). A profile of 
history is a vector ℎ𝑡 = (ℎ𝑖𝑡, ℎ𝑗𝑡). Node i’s sequence of stage game payoffs is (𝑢𝑖𝑡)𝑡=1∞ . We 
consider that all nodes discount future payoffs by a common discount factor δ with 
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0 < 𝛿 < 1 and want to maximize the expected δ-discounted average of their sequence of 
payoffs. Therefore, the repeated game payoff is:  
(1 − 𝛿)�𝛿𝑡−1∞
𝑡=1
𝑢𝑖
𝑡.                                            (3) 
We presuppose that the monitoring technology or watchdog mechanism in each node is ε-
perfect. A monitoring technology is ε-perfect if 𝑚𝑖�𝑐𝑖�𝑎𝑖,𝐶𝑗� > 1 − 𝜀 and 
𝑚𝑖�𝑐𝑖�𝑎𝑖,𝐷𝑗� < 𝜀 with 𝜀 ≥ 0.  𝑚𝑖�𝑐𝑖�𝑎𝑖,𝐶𝑗� and 𝑚𝑖�𝑐𝑖�𝑎𝑖,𝐷𝑗� represent the probability 
that node i observes a cooperative behavior from node j given that node j cooperated or 
defected respectively. 
This definition gives us the possibility to study the packet forwarding game under several 
forms of monitoring structures. 
• A game will be of perfect monitoring if 𝜀 = 0. 
• A game will be of imperfect public monitoring if nodes’ signals are perfectly 
correlated. 
• Monitoring is conditionally independent if 𝑚𝑖(. |𝑎) and 𝑚𝑗(. |𝑎) are 
independent distributions for each player’s action profile 𝑎. 
We consider that in a network, one node’s observation of an action profile is 
conditionally independent of another node’s observation of that same profile. Also, the 
probability distribution over the signal received by a node depends only on its opponent’s 
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action. Moreover, each node’s history of the game is private. Therefore, we will use a 
conditionally independent ε-perfect private monitoring. Then, we have: 
𝑚𝑖(𝑦𝑖|𝑎) = �1 − 𝜀,   if 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑎𝑗 = 𝐶𝑗 , or             𝑦𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 and 𝑎𝑗 = 𝐷𝑗 ,
𝜀,                    otherwise,                                        (4) 
And 
𝑚𝑗�𝑦𝑗�𝑎� = �1 − 𝜀,   if 𝑦𝑗 = 𝑐𝑗  and 𝑎𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖 , or             𝑦𝑗 = 𝑑𝑗  and 𝑎𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖,
𝜀,                    otherwise,                                     (5) 
The joint probability distribution is given by: 
𝑚(𝑦|𝑎) = 𝑚𝑖(𝑦𝑖|𝑎)𝑚𝑗�𝑦𝑗�𝑎�.                                   (6) 
B. Strategy Description 
A strategy 𝜎𝑖 for node i is a sequence of functions (𝜎𝑖𝑡)𝑡=1∞  where 𝜎𝑖𝑡 maps each ℎ𝑖𝑡to a 
probability distribution over 𝐴𝑖. We consider the strategy σ with one period memory: 
�
𝜎𝑖
1 = 𝐶𝑖  with probability 1,
𝜎𝑖
𝑡 = 𝐶𝑖 with probability 1 if 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑐𝑖,
𝜎𝑖
𝑡 = 𝐶𝑖 with probability 𝜔𝑖 if 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑑𝑖.                                       (7) 
 
With 
𝜔𝑖 = 1 − 𝑔𝑗
𝛿(1 − 2𝜀)�1 + 𝑔𝑗� .                          (8) 
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Figure 5.1: Finite State Machine of the strategy σ when noise in monitoring vanishes 
The finite state machine of σ is represented in Fig. 5.1 for the two node game when noise 
in the monitoring technology vanishes (𝜀 = 0). The states are represented in circles. C 
and D represent the action of each player in a given state. The state (𝐶𝑖 ,𝐶𝑗) is an 
absorbing state. When noise in the monitoring technology vanishes, the players start in 
the state (𝐶𝑖,𝐶𝑗) and remain there forever. In the presence of noise (𝜀 ≠ 0), nodes can 
move to other states. However, there is always a possibility to come back to the state 
(𝐶𝑖 ,𝐶𝑗). If an opponent deviates from σ, σ punishes the opponent by diminishing the 
probability of cooperation from 1 to ω in the next time slot. This diminution is enough to 
𝜎0 
𝜔𝑗  
 
𝐶𝑖,𝐶𝑗  
�1 −𝜔𝑗� 
(1 −𝜔𝑖) 
𝜔𝑖�1 − 𝜔𝑗� 
 
1 
𝜔𝑖𝜔𝑗  
𝜔𝑖  
(1 − 𝜔𝑖)𝜔𝑗  
 
(1 − 𝜔𝑖)�1 − 𝜔𝑗� 
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force selfish nodes to cooperate if the discount factor is close enough to 1. We analyze 
the equilibrium of σ and show how to calculate ω in the next Subsection. 
C. Efficiency Analysis 
We start with the general case as presented in [61] before going on to obtain our specific 
strategy. In the following equation, 𝜋𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑖
𝑗  represents the probability that node j cooperates 
given that in the last time slot node j played the action 𝑎𝑗 and observed 𝑎𝑖 from node i. 
We want to construct the four probabilities 𝜋𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑖
𝑗 such that the history of play becomes 
irrelevant and therefore calculating posterior belief over the private history of the 
opponent is not necessary. This can be represented by dynamic programming equations 
in (9) through (12). Clearly, this means that the four probabilities {𝜋𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑗 :𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑖 ∈ {𝐶,𝐷}2} 
must be such that: 
• If node j plays C in a time slot, node i obtains the average payoff 𝑉𝐶𝑖 and is 
indifferent between playing C and D. This is represented by (9) and (10). 
• If node j plays D in a time slot, node i obtains the average payoff 𝑉𝐷𝑖  and is 
indifferent between playing C and D. This is represented by (11) and (12). 
𝑉𝐶
𝑖 = (1 − 𝛿) + 𝛿𝑉𝐶𝑖�(1 − 𝜀)𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑗 + 𝜀𝜋𝑐𝑑𝑗 � + 𝛿𝑉𝐷𝑖 �𝜀�1 − 𝜋𝑐𝑑𝑗 � + (1 − 𝜀)�1 − 𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑗 ��.      (9) 
𝑉𝐶
𝑖 = (1 − 𝛿)(1 + 𝑔𝑖) + 𝛿𝑉𝐶𝑖�𝜀𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑗 + (1 − 𝜀)𝜋𝑐𝑑𝑗 � 
+𝛿𝑉𝐷𝑖 �(1 − 𝜀)�1 − 𝜋𝑐𝑑𝑗 � + 𝜀�1 − 𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑗 ��.    (10) 
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𝑉𝐷
𝑖 = −𝑔𝑖(1 − 𝛿) + 𝛿𝑉𝐶𝑖�(1 − 𝜀)𝜋𝑑𝑐𝑗 + 𝜀𝜋𝑑𝑑𝑗 � 
+𝛿𝑉𝐷𝑖 �𝜀�1 − 𝜋𝑐𝑑𝑗 � + (1 − 𝜀)�1 − 𝜋𝑑𝑐𝑗 ��.    (11) 
𝑉𝐷
𝑖 = 𝛿𝑉𝐶𝑖�𝜀𝜋𝑑𝑐𝑗 + (1 − 𝜀)𝜋𝑑𝑑𝑗 � + 𝛿𝑉𝐷𝑖 �(1 − 𝜀)�1 − 𝜋𝑑𝑑𝑗 � + 𝜀�1 − 𝜋𝑑𝑐𝑗 ��.                      (12) 
Expressing the probabilities as a function of the two payoffs and the monitoring error, we 
get: 
𝜋𝑐𝑐
𝑗 = �𝑉𝐶𝑖 − 𝛿𝑉𝐷𝑖 �(1 − 2𝜀) + (1 − 𝛿)�𝑔𝑖 + 𝜀 − (1 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝑔𝑖)�
𝛿(1 − 2𝜀)�𝑉𝐶𝑖 − 𝑉𝐷𝑖 � .          (13) 
𝜋𝑐𝑑
𝑗 = �𝑉𝐶𝑖 − 𝛿𝑉𝐷𝑖 �(1 − 2𝜀) + (1 − 𝛿)�𝜀 − (1 − 𝜀)(1 + 𝑔𝑖)�
𝛿(1 − 2𝜀)�𝑉𝐶𝑖 − 𝑉𝐷𝑖 � .                  (14) 
𝜋𝑑𝑐
𝑗 = (1 − 𝛿) �𝑔𝑖(1 − 𝜀) + 𝑉𝐷𝑖 (1 − 2𝜀)�
𝛿(1 − 2𝜀)�𝑉𝐶𝑖 − 𝑉𝐷𝑖 � .                                                   (15) 
𝜋𝑑𝑑
𝑗 = (1 − 𝛿)�𝑉𝐷𝑖 (1 − 2𝜀) − 𝑔𝑖𝜀�
𝛿(1 − 2𝜀)�𝑉𝐶𝑖 − 𝑉𝐷𝑖 � .                                                               (16) 
We can see that (13) through (16) have two-dimensional indeterminacy or two free 
variables. Thus, using the first free variable, we can set:  
𝑉𝐶
𝑖 − 𝑉𝐷
𝑖 = (1 − 𝛿)(1 + 𝑔𝑖),                     (17) 
And it is easy to verify that taking (17) into (13) through (16), we get:  
𝜋𝑐𝑐
𝑗 = 𝜋𝑑𝑐𝑗 = (1 − 2𝜀)𝑉𝐶𝑖 − (1 − 2𝜀)(1 − 𝛿)(1 + 𝑔𝑖) + (1 − 𝜀)𝑔𝑖𝛿(1 − 2𝜀)(1 + 𝑔𝑖) ,         (18) 
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and 
𝜋𝑐𝑑
𝑗 = 𝜋𝑑𝑑𝑗 = (1 − 2𝜀)𝑉𝐶𝑖 − (1 − 2𝜀)(1 − 𝛿)(1 + 𝑔𝑖) − 𝜀𝑔𝑖𝛿(1 − 2𝜀)(1 + 𝑔𝑖) .                    (19) 
Moreover, subtracting (18) and (19) give: 
𝜋𝑐𝑐
𝑗 − 𝜋𝑑𝑑
𝑗 = 𝑔𝑖
𝛿(1 − 2𝜀)(1 + 𝑔𝑖).                 (20) 
Therefore, using the second free variable, we can also set:  
�
𝜋𝑐𝑐
𝑗 = 𝜋𝑑𝑐𝑗 = 1, and
𝜋𝑐𝑑
𝑗 = 𝜋𝑑𝑑𝑗 = 𝜔𝑗 = 1 − 𝑔𝑖𝛿(1 − 2𝜀)(1 + 𝑔𝑖) .                                 (21)   
We can verify that when the discount factor is close to 1 (𝛿 → 1) and noise in the 
monitoring vanishes (𝜀 → 0), we have: 
0 < 𝜔𝑗 = 𝜋𝑐𝑑𝑗 = 𝜋𝑑𝑑𝑗 < 𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑗 = 𝜋𝑑𝑐𝑗 = 1.                     (22) 
Equation (22) indicates that our strategy is well defined. In fact, we must have the four 
probabilities {𝜋𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑗 :𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑖 ∈ {𝐶,𝐷}2} in the interval [0, 1]. The same way, we can have a 
similar strategy for node i. However, since the game is asymmetric, we will have 𝜔𝑖 ≠
𝜔𝑗. Node i’s strategy is a best reply to node j’s strategy. The strategy profile �𝜋𝑖 ,𝜋𝑗� will 
be a sequential equilibrium and thus a belief-free equilibrium by construction since 
player’s belief about the opponent’s private history is irrelevant. Also, from (21), we 
must have for the two nodes 
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𝜀 < 12 − 𝑔2𝛿(1 + 𝑔) < 12.                          (23) 
If 𝜀 > 1
2
, the noise in the monitoring technology is so pervasive that a node’s opponent is 
more likely to observe a defection when the node cooperates. In this case, intelligent 
nodes prefer to always defect. The incentive to cooperate is lost due to noise. 
Moreover, the fact that 𝜋𝑐𝑑
𝑗 = 𝜋𝑑𝑑𝑗 < 𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑗 = 𝜋𝑑𝑐𝑗  provides the incentive to cooperate. A 
deviation by a node from cooperation to defection increases the chance that the opponent 
will defect in the future and thus diminishes its continuation value from 𝑉𝐶𝑖 to 𝑉𝐷𝑖 . The 
difference between those continuation values balances the gain from deviation in any 
time slot (17).  
Finally, after all calculations, we can see that: 
𝑉𝐶
𝑖 = 1 − 𝜀𝑔𝑖1 − 2𝜀 .                                                  (24) 
Therefore, as noise in the monitoring technology vanishes, both nodes get the payoff of 
full cooperation. This shows the efficiency of our belief-free equilibrium strategy. In 
summary, the belief-free equilibrium approach has several advantages [66]. 
• A belief-free equilibrium can be used with any type of monitoring technology, 
from perfect monitoring to the extreme case where the monitoring technology is 
fully noisy and fully private [62]. 
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• A belief-free equilibrium strategy can have one period memory. A memory one 
strategy can be represented by a finite state machine, an automaton or a Markov 
process.  
• Node belief about the opponent’s private history is irrelevant to its best reply. 
This represents a tremendous advantage over a belief-based equilibrium. The 
computational power needed to compute the equilibrium is reduced.  
• Continuing to play a belief-free equilibrium is sequentially rational even if a node 
receives additional information about the opponent’s history. 
• A belief-free equilibrium can be used with a community enforcement mechanism 
as in [67]. We will use a model similar to [67] when extending our model to n 
nodes in the next Section. 
5.3 Extension to N Nodes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Randomly deployed network in a rectangle 
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Figure 5.2 represents 13 nodes randomly deployed in a rectangular area. As we did in 
Section 4.2 with Fig.4.1, we will use the network in Fig. 5.2 to clearly expose some 
complications in modeling the full network packet forwarding game before presenting 
some solutions. 
First of all, the packet forwarding game in a network is not an isolated game. It is part of 
the routing game at the routing layer which also depends on the nodes’ interactions at the 
MAC layer and the transport layer. At the MAC layer, there can be congestion that 
causes nodes to drop packets. A protocol such as TCP at the transport layer recommends 
packet retransmission if a packet is lost. Retransmitting packets will influence the packet 
forwarding game because of the extra cost involved. At the routing layer, routing packets 
in MANETs generally involves four steps (not common to all routing protocols): 
• Route discovery: when a sender wants to communicate with a destination 
outside its communication range, it broadcasts a route request message that is 
relayed until the destination. The destination sends back a route reply for each 
route request received. 
• Route selection: the sender selects one route among the routes available to it. 
• Packet forwarding: the sender sends the packets that are relayed along the 
selected route until the destination. This is our main focus. 
• Route maintenance: when a node observes a link breakage, for instance due to 
node mobility, it reports that to other nodes using a route error message. 
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Each of these steps involves strategic interactions with severe conflict of interest. Each 
step can be modeled by a game. For instance, in the route selection game, when node 1 
wants to send packets to node 9, node 1 may have to choose between several routes. One 
possible route goes through nodes i, j, and l, and the second possible route goes through 
node 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Considering its best interest, node 1 will most likely choose the 
first route because of shorter delay whereas nodes i, j, and l will prefer the second route 
to be used to avoid a higher cost in the packet forwarding game. Moreover, node 1’s 
decision to use the first route instantly increases the probabilities 𝑝𝑖, 𝑞𝑖, 𝑝𝑗, 𝑞𝑗 in the 
interaction between node i and j. This is one of the reasons indicating that a stochastic 
game better models packet forwarding than a repeated game. 
In this Chapter, we focus only on the packet forwarding game and do not consider the 
specifics of any routing protocol or the interactions from other layers. The packet 
forwarding game analysis manifests several difficulties. As we stated before, the first 
complication is that there is less incentive to cooperate with border nodes, such as nodes 
1, 3, and 9 if the network is static. Those nodes are useless to their neighbors in the 
packet forwarding game. Therefore, border nodes can easily be disconnected in a static 
network if we rely only on the two player game. 
The second problem concerns node mobility that creates dynamic changes of neighbors. 
The third problem concerns the monitoring technology in distributed networks. In 
general, a node has no private signal at all about the actions of nodes outside its 
communication range. As a consequence, monitoring cannot be ε-perfect in n node 
interactions. For instance, in Fig.5.2, the action of node 3 is completely unknown to node 
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9. ε-perfect monitoring in the n node game will imply that node 9 can monitor the action 
of node 3 with the probability of observing an erroneous signal being less than ε. This is 
not possible without an external system or database recording each node’s action that is 
accessible to all nodes. 
A. Model Extension Using a Database 
 The existence of an appropriate database where each node submits a report indicating 
other nodes’ actions as the one described in [29] facilitate the game analysis and can 
solve the three problems presented here. In fact, the model described in [29] is cheat-
proof, selfish nodes cannot manipulate the data to their advantage. The database is not a 
central manager; the database does not impose the action to be taken by a node. Each 
node remains free to decide to cooperate or not. Using a belief-free equilibrium approach, 
the database will not store the reputation or the full history of the game but only the last 
action of each node. Recall that node belief about the opponent’s private history is 
irrelevant. In this case, there are three papers [65-67] that provide a formal proof that a 
belief-free equilibrium strategy can enforce cooperation in n player PDGs under 
imperfect private monitoring. The payoff of mutual cooperation is achieved in the limit as 
noise in monitoring and discounting vanishes. 
We use the approach presented in [67] which is a relatively simple approach that can 
easily translate our two node game of Section 5.2 to an n node game. The research from 
that paper allows us to treat the n person PDG under imperfect private monitoring when 
each node observes only the last action of a single node at the beginning of each stage. 
Such mathematical development has a tremendous importance for distributed network 
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packet forwarding game modeling. Only the noisy observation of the opponent’s last 
action is relevant, not the player’s own action. This is consistent with the belief-free 
equilibrium strategy we developed for the two node game in Section 5.2. In fact, 
independent and indifferent equilibria [67] must satisfy the following two properties:  
• Players are indifferent between cooperation and defection at all histories. 
• Players choose actions independently of their own record of play. 
Therefore, our strategy in Section 5.2 is not only a belief-free equilibrium but also an 
independent indifferent equilibrium. 
A mechanism that requires defection to be punished not only by the victim but by any 
other node that observes the defection is called community enforcement. We consider a 
large MANET of 2n nodes. The network topology is dynamically changing and nodes 
interact with different nodes over time. At the beginning of each time slot, neighboring 
nodes are randomly matched in pairs to play the PDG in Table 4.3. Thus, in each time 
slot, there are n pairs of nodes playing the PDG. Without loss of generality, we consider 
symmetric payoff. Moreover, the matching is uniform and independent across time. Note 
that in our game, the incentive a node has to deviate when its opponent cooperates (g) 
equals the loss from cooperating when the opponent deviates. Thus, our game is neither 
strictly submodular nor strictly supermodular. 
Nodes observe past action through direct observation or the database. This means that if a 
node did not directly monitor its current opponent’s last action, possibly because it was 
outside its communication range, it can freely observe that from the database. There can 
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be noise when observing the node’s last actions in the database or when observing an 
opponent’s action directly. 
A database gives the incentive to each node to always cooperate with all nodes regardless 
of node position, node mobility or the network topology. A defection in a time slot 
increases the probability that the next opponent from the next time slot will defect in such 
a way that a node is always indifferent between cooperation and defection. The only 
difference with the two node game is that in the two node game, each node has a single 
opponent and that single opponent will increase its probability of future defection if 
observing a defection. However, in the n node game, any node that defects has its action 
recorded in the database. In the next time slot, its opponent (which may be a different 
node) observes that defection from the database and punishes by increasing the 
probability of defection.  
Another excellent characteristic of our strategy is that the long-run equilibrium is robust 
to one time shock. In fact, if a small percentage of nodes mistakenly defect in a time slot, 
that defection increases the probability the future partners will defect and so on. However 
after all computations [67], the fraction of cooperation in the network remains constant 
over time. 
B. Model Extension without a Database 
When a database is not available in the network, enforcing cooperation in the network is 
more complex. Full cooperation should be achieved if each node cooperates with all of its 
neighbors. In Section 5.2, we have presented a simple belief-free equilibrium strategy for 
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the two node game. Each node in Fig. 5.2 is involved in a two node game with each of its 
neighbors. The total number of such games in an ad hoc network will be equal to the 
number of links or wireless connections between nodes. However, a two node interaction 
is not independent of the other interactions in the network. Those games are correlated 
and the correlations between those games are complex to analyze. These correlations are 
neglected in other papers. 
To illustrate the connections between the two node games, consider that mutual 
cooperation is Pareto efficient between any two neighbors in Fig. 5.2. Thus, as we 
showed previously, a sequential equilibrium can enforce cooperation in the two player 
game between node i and node j. However, node i has the option to end cooperation with 
node j, and to avoid punishment, reroutes all its packets through node k. As a result, the 
rate at which node i requests node k to relay packets increases (𝑝𝑖 increases) and so does 
the cost to node k to continue to cooperate with node j. Then, node k may decide to stop 
cooperation with node i if cooperation is no longer Pareto efficient ( 𝑔𝑘 < 0). As a 
consequence, the traffic at node 5 increases dramatically. Node 5 may also stop 
cooperating with node 4 resulting in a network disconnection, which has a worse 
outcome for node i compared to the initial one. Therefore, rational nodes in distributed 
networks can behave optimally from local and incomplete information, but the final 
outcome becomes damaging for them. A very small change of decision from a single 
node can destabilize the network cooperative equilibrium.  
One may argue that the above scenario is impossible using a backward induction 
argument. That is, node i may have anticipated this sequence of action and not stopped 
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cooperating with node j in the first place. Node i is worse off after network disconnection 
than before since it can now transmit its messages to only a small portion of the network. 
However, a backward induction argument does not work here because in distributed self 
organized MANETs without a database, the network topology is not common knowledge 
among the nodes. Each node knows only its neighbors but not their neighbors’ neighbors. 
A rational node cannot predict the effect that its actions would have on the actions of 
other rational nodes. 
Nevertheless, a belief-free equilibrium like the one we present in this Chapter is more 
robust against such a dramatic scenario compared to a belief based approach because the 
history of the game is irrelevant. In fact, when two nodes reach an outcome that is worse 
for the two, they can easily start to cooperate again and increase the number of available 
routes in the network. Using a belief-based approach [14-15], a node that defects 
successively for a few time slots causes its neighbors to correctly infer its private history 
and switch to defection forever. Our strategy can forgive after any number of defections. 
Lastly, we can improve the network performance by recommending that, in the 
punishment phase (cooperation with probability less than 1), a node drops only the next 
packet originating from the punished neighbor. This way, packets from other nodes in the 
network are not affected while at the same time each node has the incentive to cooperate 
since it fears having some of its packets dropped in the future. However, this will extend 
the memory length of our strategy and increase its complexity. 
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5.4 Simulation Results 
 
Figure 5.3: Variation of ω with ε and q 
In this Section, we analyze by simulation the impact of noise on our belief-free 
equilibrium strategy. We also consider the traffic load inequality by considering different 
values for the probability 𝑞𝑖defined before. In our simulation, we set 𝛾 = 10𝛽. This 
implies that it is globally efficient to relay a packet up to a maximum of 10 hops. Also, 
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we set 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑗. Thus, from (1), we have  𝑔𝑖 = 110𝑞𝑖−1. Also, 𝛿 = 0.999 is the default 
value. 
Figure 5.3 shows the variation of the probability with which a node cooperates after 
observing the opponent’s defection (ω) as a function of the observation error (ε) and the 
probability q (21). We can see that ω decreases with ε and also decreases with q. There is 
a maximum value of ε above which 𝜔 < 0.  
When the observation error increases, nodes are more tempted to defect because the 
probability that their opponent will not observe that defection increases. To balance that 
temptation, a node should punish more severely after observing a defection by decreasing 
its probability of cooperation. The same way, a decrease in q increases g (1) which makes 
defection more profitable and cooperation among nodes more difficult. Therefore, we can 
say that a decrease of ω when q decreases is required to provide the necessary incentive 
for nodes to cooperate. 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 represent the variation of the probability of node cooperation as a 
function of time in the interaction between two nodes. That probability can be obtained 
analytically by a Markov analysis since our strategy obeys the Markov property. 
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Figure 5.4: Variation of the probability of cooperation with time and ε. 
In Fig. 5.4, we fix 𝑞 = 0.25 and focus on the impact of noise. 𝑞 = 0.25  will be a node 
for which 3 out of 4 packets it requests to forward come from other nodes. For different 
values of noise, the probability of cooperation quickly converges to the steady state after 
less than twenty time slots. Moreover, the probability of cooperation in the steady state is 
close to one in the limit as noise in monitoring vanishes.  
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Figure 5.5: Variation of the probability of cooperation with time and q. 
In Fig. 5.5, we fix 𝜀 = 0.1 and observe the change with q. The case 𝑞 = 1 corresponds to 
a border node that requests only the packets it originates to be forwarded. Similarly,  𝑞 = 0.125 will be a node close to the center for which 7 out of 8 packets it requests to 
forward come from other nodes. Recall that q can represent the proportion of packets that 
a node originates among the total packets a node requests to forward. As we can see, the 
probability of cooperation will not be the same for all nodes in the network with the same 
noise level. Saturated nodes will cooperate less. 
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We analyze our belief-free equilibrium strategy (BFES) in multi-hop communication. 
There are h hops between the sender and the destination (ℎ ∈ [1,10]). We consider a 
channel lost probability of 𝜇 = 0.01. 
 
Figure 5.6: Variation of the normalized session throughput with the number of hop 
and noise for static nodes 
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Figure 5.7: Variation of the normalized session throughput with the number of hop 
and noise for mobile nodes 
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 represent the variation of the normalized session throughput with the 
number of hops in the route and noise for static and mobile nodes respectively. In the 
graph, full cooperation corresponds to a network with a central manager where node 
cooperates unconditionally. We can see that, with up to 5 hops, and 5% observation error, 
the normalized throughput decreases with BFES is less than 5% compared to that of 
unconditional cooperators both for static and mobile nodes.  
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In the game theoretical perspective, node mobility decreases the discount factor. This is 
because the expected number of future interactions decreases with node mobility. In fact, 
the expected number of future interactions is exponentially distributed with mean 1
1−𝛿
. In 
the case of static nodes, 𝛿 = 0.999 means that at the beginning of each time slot, each 
node expects the packet forwarding game to be repeated 1000 times. For mobile nodes, 
we decrease δ,  𝛿 = 0.8. 
5.5 Conclusion  
We used the belief-free equilibrium concept to develop a packet forwarding game model. 
We took into account the fact that some inconsistency between a node’s true action and 
its neighbors’ observation of that action exists in a network. Our model is presented 
under imperfect private monitoring. A stochastic dimension is introduced to consider the 
different packet forwarding rates among nodes in ad hoc networks. Our two node model 
can easily be extended to a MANET of n nodes. Simulation results show that our model 
is robust to noise, traffic inequalities, and node mobility. 
The model presented is simple and our packet forwarding game equilibrium relied on a 
single parameter: the probability of cooperation after observing a defection. That 
probability was adjusted such that the history of the game became irrelevant. However, it 
is not sure that the belief-free equilibrium approach will be robust if there is private 
payoff information. In fact, in the two node game for instance, each player needs to know 
its opponent payoff to perfectly balance the probability of cooperation after observing a 
defection in such a way that its opponent is indifferent between cooperation and defection 
 99 
 
after all histories. Considering private payoff information under a belief-free equilibrium 
approach is still an open research problem. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MITIGATING ROUTING MISBEHAVIOR IN MULTI-HOP NETWORKS USING 
EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY 
Multi-hop wireless networks have been an active research area for decades; however, the 
solutions proposed to solve routing misbehaviors are still not robust. In this Chapter, we 
use the EGT framework to address one issue of routing misbehavior, the problem of 
selfishness. We propose the use of distributed algorithms that are able to force selfish 
nodes to cooperate and forward packets from other nodes, despite their desire to 
“conserve energy” by not forwarding external packets. 
6.1 Introduction 
The lack of circumscribed infrastructure is a defining feature of the multi-hop wireless 
network, as practically all of the nodes in such a network must function as both a router 
and a client. For multi-hop traffic, in which the sender and receiver are not adjacent, 
communication depends upon the cooperation of intermediate nodes. This type of multi-
hop wireless communication is an essential ingredient in WSN, ad hoc networks, P2P 
networks and wireless mesh networks (WMN). However, without a common routing 
authority, cooperation and trust between nodes cannot be guaranteed, and may result in 
network breakdown.  
Nodes, in many application domains, including military applications, do share a manager 
in order to properly route traffic; however, this is not always the case. For example, 
networks made up of sensors embedded in devices to form a ubiquitous computing 
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environment, such as health monitoring networks or VANET may provide an 
infrastructure where each vehicle or node can be equipped with one or more autonomous 
sensors without a common manager. In order for these networks to operate, each sensor 
(node) must forward packets from the others. Any node, especially a selfish node, could 
refuse to forward any packets except its own. If all nodes operate in this manner, the 
network will not function.  
Packet forwarding failure is far more critical in multi-hop networks, as has been 
demonstrated by Tanachaiwiwat et al [69] where the research indicates that only a small 
percentage of misbehaving nodes has a large impact on the network. In their research, 
Tanachaiwiwat et al. [69] found that if 5% of the nodes in a grid-sensor network are 
misbehaving, 60% of routes are affected. In a randomly placed sensor network, 35% of 
routes are affected. If the number of misbehaving nodes increases to only 10%, the 
number of affected routes rises to an incredible 88% in a grid-sensor network and 54% in 
a randomly placed sensor network. In a mobile ad hoc network, throughput is reduced by 
20% if 10% of the nodes in that network misbehave [32]. From the above data, it 
becomes obvious that a small number of misbehaving nodes creates large problems in the 
network. 
In general, there are three types of misbehaving nodes in a multi-hop wireless network: 
faulty nodes, selfish nodes, and malicious nodes. Faulty nodes have defects that do not 
allow them to follow the recommendations of the protocol. Selfish nodes do not forward 
packets to save resources such as battery and bandwidth. Malicious nodes launch various 
attacks such as DoS. 
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In this Chapter, we focus on selfish nodes and present a model based on EGT in which 
we demonstrate that the model is able to encourage selfish nodes to cooperate and 
forward packets from others with only one period of punishment if nodes are sufficiently 
patient. For the case of impatient selfish players, we recommend more sophisticated 
algorithms with limited punishments.  
In Section 6.2, we present our game model. Next, in Section 6.3, we describe some 
strategies from other researches that are useful in refining the model and which 
complement the model by their analysis as outlined in Section 6.4. In Section 6.5 we 
present our simulation results and in Section 6.6 our conclusions. 
6.2 Game Model 
The assumptions presented in Section 3.3 apply here. In multi-hop networks, sending, 
receiving, or forwarding packets are random processes. If all nodes cooperate by 
forwarding other nodes’ packets, all nodes will benefit, but each of them will have to 
expend some energy to forward others’ packets. Also, a selfish node in a network of 
cooperating nodes benefits even more because it does not expend any energy to forward 
packets from others. In fact, each node is better off choosing defect rather than cooperate 
regardless of the number of nodes who choose to cooperate. However, the network 
collapses if all nodes behave selfishly and then all nodes loose. 
This situation is similar to the Prisoners’ Dilemma game found in game theory and we 
use it as the base of our model. In this game, the players are the n nodes, n >> 1. Pairs of 
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nodes are repeatedly drawn with equal probability to play the Prisoners’ Dilemma game. 
The nodes are programmed to play the same pure or mixed strategy. For the stage game, 
the pure strategies of a node are: Cooperate (C) or Defect (D). For the repeated game, the 
strategies of a node are any deterministic or random combination of C and D depending 
on the history of the game. 
From the previous assumptions and for consistence with the notation in the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma game, the payoff of the stage game is calculated as follows. We assume that all 
nodes spend the same energy at the cost of β to send or forward a packet. All nodes have 
packets to send and the expected gain for cooperation, γ, is equal for all nodes. When a 
node drops a packet as a result of defection, we assume that there is no cost or gain for 
that node. Thus, if both players cooperate, each of them gets the reward price   R= γ - β. 
This is because each node gains γ for having its packet forwarded, but has to spend the 
energy of cost β to send a packet for the others. Nodes get the punishment price P = 0 for 
mutual defection. This is justified by the fact that no nodes spend or gain anything. When 
one defects and the other cooperates, the defector gets the temptation price T = γ when 
the cooperator gets the sucker price S = -β. 
We assume that the following inequalities hold: γ>β>0. In fact, it will not be globally 
more efficient to forward packet than to discard packets when γ<β. We can observe that 
T>R>P>S. Moreover, we have: 2R>T+S. This makes two runs of mutual cooperation 
collectively more efficient than an alternation of cooperation and defection. The stage 
game of our model is represented in Table 6.1. 
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We can see that Cooperate is strictly dominated by Defect. Therefore, the only Nash 
equilibrium is Defect. The two players get the punishment prize P. However, if the two 
players choose to cooperate, the two players will get the Pareto efficient outcome R. We 
can see that when rational intelligent players play the game, they will achieve a non-
efficient outcome. This illustrates that the Nash equilibrium is not always Pareto efficient. 
Nevertheless, when the game is played repeatedly, cooperation among players can 
emerge. Players could cooperate expecting future gain and reach an efficient equilibrium 
while all players cooperate.  
In our game model, we assume that no single node knows the end of the game and that at 
any time; all nodes believe that there is a large probability ω that the game will continue. 
Then, future payoffs are discounted by ω. Also, at any time, the expected duration of the 
game is 1
1−𝜔
 time slots. Consequently, the game is infinite if ω=1. ω < 1 in our model. 
TABLE 6.1: THE STAGE GAME MODEL IN STRATEGIC FORM 
 Player j 
Cooperate Defect 
Player i Cooperate {γ - β, γ – β} {-β, γ} 
Defect {γ, -β} {0,0} 
 
6.3 Strategy Description 
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is the Prisoner’s Dilemma repeated over time. This has 
been used to model similar situations found in other fields of science such as biology and 
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economics, where researchers from multi-disciplinary fields have investigated 
cooperative behavior [70-72]. Memory one strategies, such as these in which present 
actions depend only on the most recent action, are suitable for wireless networks due to 
the nodes’ limited battery and computational power. Moreover, memory one strategies 
are easier to model, as they can be described by a finite state machine, a Markov Process 
or an automaton. The ultimate goal is to find the best strategy that will result in 
cooperation in the network without being exploited by defectors.  
Axelrod [72] simulated the IPD in a tournament using different strategies. In his 
simulation, TFT was the winner. A TFT player begins with cooperation and then repeats 
the opponent’s action in the last move. However, TFT is a strategy vulnerable to error in 
perception or stochastic perturbation. When two players use TFT, if one cooperates and 
the other, because of noise perceives a defection, the result will be an alternating cycle of 
cooperation and defection resulting in a non-efficient payoff. 
Nowak and Sigmund [70] simulated all randomly generated strategies with memory one 
in the presence of noise and identified the emergence in the long run of a strategy called 
Pavlov. This strategy outperforms TFT. A Pavlov player cooperates if and only if the 
player and the opponent used the same move in the previous round. Unlike TFT, Pavlov 
is immune to errors in perception. 
Boerlijst et al. [71] improved Pavlov using tagging to produce pPavlov. pPavlov is a 
memory one strategy like Pavlov and TFT. However, pPavlov applies two periods of 
punishment instead of one in Pavlov. pPavlov follows Pavlov in most case. However, 
pPavlov has two taggings for defect: D0 and D1. pPavlov normally plays D1, and plays D0 
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only after a mutual defection or an erroneous defection. In a game between two pPavlov 
players, an erroneous defection is followed by two rounds of mutual defection and then 
mutual cooperation. In this case, the successive states are: (C, D0), (D1, D1), (D0, D0), (C, 
C). pPavlov, like other memory one deterministic strategies, can be represented by a 
finite state machine. 
 
Figure 6.1: Finite state machine of pPavlov.[71] 
Fig. 6.1 gives the finite state machine of pPavlov. The vertices of the graph represent the 
states. The pPavlov player state is at the lower position and the opponent state is in the 
upper position. The opponent can choose to Cooperate (C) or Defect (D). Therefore, from 
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each state, we have two transitions. The arrows indicate the transitions. Solid lines 
indicate the moves specified by the pPavlov strategy; dotted lines indicate the alternative 
moves. One advantage of pPavlov is that pPavlov only monitors its own tagging and is 
immune to errors in perception. Since pPavlov applies two periods of punishment instead 
of one, a strategy based on pPavlov is safer against defectors than those based on the 
classic Pavlov. An opponent who always chooses Defect takes advantage of Pavlov every 
two rounds but only exploits pPavlov every three rounds. Similar memory one strategies 
can be designed using the appropriate tagging to provide any number of punishments 
before returning to mutual cooperation. The extreme case is Grim which punishes forever 
after a defection. 
6.4 Analysis 
We will use the framework of EGT to analyze the previous strategy. EGT has its 
foundation in game theory and evolutionary biology. Evolutionary biology studies the 
processes of change in populations of organisms. Selection and mutation are two 
important mechanisms of change in evolutionary biology. Mutation provides diversity in 
the population, whereas selection promotes some characteristics over others. Therefore, 
two key concepts of EGT are ESS that deals with mutation mechanisms and the replicator 
dynamic that deals with selection mechanisms. The assumptions of rationality and 
common knowledge used in game theory are relaxed in EGT. Unlike game theory, where 
players are intelligent, rational and choose strategies, in EGT, players are programmed to 
perform some strategies in the game. Players are randomly and repeatedly drawn from 
large populations and play the same pure or mixed strategies. The payoff is the individual 
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fitness or expected number of surviving offspring. Now, let us be more formal in our 
analysis. We start with the ESS concept followed by the replicator dynamic. 
A strategy x is an ESS if and only if: 
𝑢[𝑥, 𝜀𝑦 + (1 − 𝜀)𝑥] > 𝑢[𝑦, 𝜀𝑦 + (1 − 𝜀)𝑥],                           (1) 
for a small proportion of mutant 𝜀. 
u is the utility function or payoff 
x and y are the incumbent and mutant strategy, respectively. 
Definition 1: A strategy x is an ESS if for every strategy y ≠x there exist some 𝜀?̅?  ∈ (0,1) 
such that inequality (1) holds for all 𝜀 ∈ (0, 𝜀?̅?). 
Considering the linearity of u, (1) can be written as:  
(1 − 𝜀)𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥) + 𝜀𝑢(𝑥,𝑦) > (1 − 𝜀)𝑢(𝑦, 𝑥) + 𝜀𝑢(𝑦,𝑦) 
For small values of 𝜀, (1) is equivalent to either 
𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥) > 𝑢(𝑦, 𝑥) ∀𝑦,                                                                                                                (2) 
or 
𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥) = 𝑢(𝑦, 𝑥) and 𝑢(𝑥,𝑦) > 𝑢(𝑦, 𝑦) ∀𝑦 ≠ 𝑥.                                                             (3) 
Equations (2) and (3) represent ESS as first formulated by Smith in [73]. 
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A population of individuals programmed to play an ESS resist against mutation. This 
means that such a population cannot disappear in the long run evolution. 
Let us turn our attention to the replicator dynamic. As described previously, ESS focuses 
on mutation while the replicator dynamic highlights the role of selection. This model was 
first proposed by Taylor and Jonker [74]. Formally, the population dynamics for the 
population shares xi is given by: 
?̇?𝑖 = �𝑢�𝑒𝑖 , 𝑥� − 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥)�𝑥𝑖.                                                         (4) 
𝑢�𝑒𝑖, 𝑥� is the expected payoff to pure strategy i at a random match. 
𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥) is the payoff of an individual drawn at random in the population or the average 
payoff per individual. 
𝑥𝑖 is the proportion of individuals programmed to pure strategy i and its time derivative is 
?̇?𝑖. 
Equation (4) is a system of differential equations that allows us to draw an important 
conclusion. Subpopulations programmed with better than average strategies grow 
whereas   subpopulations programmed with worse than average strategies sink. Another 
important factor to note is that an ESS is stable in the replicator dynamic (4). In the next 
Section, our simulator implements the discrete time version of the replicator dynamic. 
In [71], the authors proved that Pavlov is an ESS when the probability ω of a next round 
is such that: 
R +  ωR > 𝑇 +  𝜔𝑃.                                                                     (5) 
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Pavlov is ESS, meaning here that if there is a small, but non-zero probability of mis-
executing a move, every strategy that departs from what a Pavlov rule would command 
will gain less against a Pavlov player than it would have by following the Pavlov rule. 
Now, let us see why pPavlov is also ESS. pPavlov is ESS if in the finite state machine of 
pPavlov in Fig. 6.1, the payoff discounted step by step following the branch of pPavlov is 
always higher than any alternative payoff. This is the case if: 
R +  ωR +  ω2R > 𝑇 +  𝜔𝑃 + ω2P.                                        (6) 
The probability ω is less for pPavlov compared to that of Pavlov. This is good because 
players can cooperate even if a next round is less probable or when players are less 
patient. To better comprehend (5) and (6), take P=0 as it is in our game model. In fact, the 
more severely a strategy punishes, the lower the value of the discount factor ω needed for 
that strategy to be ESS. Thus, when Pavlov is ESS, pPavlov is also ESS under the same 
condition. Furthermore, in the extreme case of infinite punishment, Grim is ESS if: 
𝑅1 − ω > 𝑇.                                                                                       (7) 
Equation (7) shows us that in the extreme case of Grim, we can have an ESS if ω is very 
close to 1. However, Grim is not a wise solution in wireless networks because occasional 
noise or congestion can damage cooperation forever. TFT can also mitigate selfishness 
but TFT is not ESS. In fact, TFT can be invaded by unconditional cooperators which in 
turn are invaded by defectors. 
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To summarize, Pavlov and pPavlov are ESS. This implies first that they cannot be 
invaded. Second, Pavlov and pPavlov are also dynamically stable in the replicator 
dynamic. Third, in a network of nodes following Pavlov or pPavlov, no selfish node will 
benefit by dropping packets and saving energy if (5) and (6) hold respectively. Thus, 
selfish nodes will be constrained to cooperate and cooperation will be maintained for the 
good of each node. For the three reasons above, we first recommend Pavlov to mitigate 
selfish behavior in multi-hop networks. However, when the probability ω is not high 
enough for (5) to hold, a memory one strategy, using tagging which applies more than 
one period of punishment, like pPavlov, must be used. 
6.5 Simulations 
TABLE 6.2: THE STAGE GAME PAYOFF 
 Player j 
Cooperate Defect 
Player i Cooperate {4,4} {-1,5} 
Defect {5,-1} {0,0} 
 
In this Section, we use the simulator from [75] to present our simulation result. This 
simulator implements a round robin tournament combined with the discrete time version 
of the replicator dynamic (4). The vertical axis in all figures shows the population share 
that is related to the payoff by (4). The stage game payoff is shown in Table 6.2. Those 
payoffs are for β = 1and γ = 5. This can be justified since a packet will go through more 
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than five intermediates nodes before reaching the destination in a multi-hop network, on 
average. Thus, for global efficiency we should have at least γ = 5β. Let us analyze a few 
scenarios. 
A. Cooperator vs Defector 
In this scenario, we have two types of nodes. The first type is preprogrammed to the pure 
strategy that always defects whereas the second type always cooperates. Originally, there 
are 25 defectors and 75 cooperators. Following the payoffs in Table 6.2, we have: 
 u(Cooperate, Cooperate) = 4 and  
u(Defect, Cooperate) = 5 . Then,  
u(Cooperate, Cooperate) <  u(Defect, Cooperate) 
 
Figure 6.2 Dynamic of Cooperator vs Defector 
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It follows from (2) that Always Cooperates is not an ESS. Fig. 6.2 shows that 
Cooperators are invaded by Defectors. The population and payoff of Defectors increase 
whereas that of Cooperators decrease and become extinct after six generations. Next, 
confrontations only happen between Defectors which yield a payoff of zero. That 
explains the fall back to zero after the maximum. 
B. Pavlov vs Defector 
 
Figure 6.3 Dynamic of Pavlov vs Defector 
In this scenario and the following analysis, we consider the performance of Pavlov, 
which as we discus in Section 6.4, is similar to pPavlov. Fig. 6.3 shows the increase in 
payoff and populations of Pavlov. At the same time, the payoff of Defectors converges to 
zero after only 20 generations. 
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C. Pavlov, Defector and cooperator 
 
Figure 6.4: Dynamic of Pavlov, Defector and Cooperator 
At the beginning, we have a mixture of 35 Cooperators, 35 Defectors, and only 30 
Pavlov. After 25 generations, only Pavlov and Cooperator survive. A few Cooperators 
survive because Defectors vanish due to interactions with Pavlov. Note that interaction 
between Pavlov and Cooperators yield mutual cooperation and then the same payoff for 
both strategies. This is the reason why a few Cooperators can survive. In case of noise or 
stochastic perturbation that make monitoring imperfect, no Cooperator can survive. This 
is because Pavlov exploits unconditional Cooperators by defecting when they cooperate. 
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D. Pavlov, Defector, cooperator and Random 
This scenario tests the effect of faulty and malicious nodes. Faulty nodes play randomly 
because they are damaged. Malicious nodes can play Always Defect to perform a DoS. 
The simulation result in Fig. 6.5 shows a complete domination of Pavlov. With an initial 
population of 25 each, only Pavlov survives. The payoff and population share of 
Defectors starts increasing until the Cooperators and the Random are extinct. Then, 
Defectors only oppose Pavlov resulting in the decrease of payoff and population share of 
Defectors. 
 
Figure 6.5 Pavlov, Defector, Cooperator, and Random 
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E. Pavlov, Defector, cooperator, Random, TFT 
 
Figure 6.6: Pavlov, Defector, Cooperator, Random, TFT 
We repeat the previous scenario adding TFT. The result in Fig. 6.6 shows Pavlov 
outperforming TFT as shown by Nowak and Sigmund in [70]. 
6.6 Conclusion 
We have used EGT to recommend Pavlov and its extension pPavlov for multi-hop 
networks. Both are ESS and then a Nash equilibrium of the packet forwarding game. 
Mathematical and simulation results show that both promote cooperation among selfish 
nodes. Pavlov and its extension are distributed algorithms and therefore require only local 
information. Those algorithms do not require a common knowledge of the network or any 
rationality of the nodes, as do models based on traditional game theory. pPavlov has an 
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advantage over Pavlov because it can force nodes to cooperate even though the discount 
factor is smaller.  
In the future, we will implement Pavlov and pPavlov in a real multi-hop network 
environment and evaluate their performance for different network flows and topology. We 
will also consider asymmetric links in the network. 
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CHAPTER 7 
GAME THEORETIC MODELING AND EVOLUTION OF TRUST IN 
AUTONOMOUS NETWORKS: APPLICATION TO NETWORK SECURITY AND 
PRIVACY  
Future applications will require autonomous devices to be interconnected to form a 
network. Such networks will not have a central manager; each node will manage itself and 
will be free to decide participation in any network function. As with traditional networks, 
these networks need to be secured to authenticate the nodes, prevent misuse, detect 
anomalies and protect user privacy. Network security and privacy protection without a 
central manager will be challenging. Several security mechanisms and privacy protections 
will require the cooperation of several nodes to defend the network from malicious 
attacks. We particularly investigate when, for each node, it is cost-effective to freely 
participate in the security mechanism or protect its privacy depending if that node believes 
or trusts that all other nodes, or at least a minimum number of other nodes, will do the 
same. In this case, each node will be involved in a trust dilemma that we will model using 
the mathematical framework of game theory and evolutionary game theory. The well 
known stag hunt game will be our basic game model. This Chapter will clearly present the 
interconnection between cooperation, trust, privacy, and security in a network. 
7.1 Introduction 
Multi-hop networks include ad hoc networks, sensor networks, peer-to-peer networks, and 
WMN. The main challenges in such networks are limited battery power, limited 
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computational power, the lack of infrastructure (or limited infrastructure for WMN), and 
node mobility. In these networks, the sender and the destination directly communicate if 
they are in the power range of each other, otherwise, the sender and destinations 
communicate via multi-hop communication. Generally, a packet goes through several 
intermediate nodes before reaching the destination. All of these constraints make security 
and privacy protection in autonomous multi-hop networks more complicated compared to 
traditional networks. 
Network security is closely related to trust. Security mechanisms in traditional networks 
rely on trusted systems like certificate authorities to operate. One of the differences is that 
security mechanisms can use efficient cryptographic algorithms to guarantee access 
control in the networks, but cannot detect and eliminate a malicious node that already 
participates in the network with all keys in its possession. To do that, we sometimes need a 
trusted system supported by a reputation system that requires each node to track the past 
behavior of its neighbors [31-34]. 
The nodes are autonomous if they have the freedom to choose their action and pursue 
only their self-interest. Autonomous nodes do not have a common manager. This is the 
case when autonomous devices are interconnected to form a network. For instance, in 
VANET, each car is equipped with a node. Nodes from different cars can communicate, 
but each node manages itself and is in charge of its own security in the network. Securing 
this autonomous network is a challenging problem because there is no central and trusted 
manager to protect the whole network. Thus, only distributed security mechanisms are 
viable in autonomous networks such as VANET. 
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Network security must rely on the cooperation of all nodes (or at least the majority of 
nodes) to protect the network. In many attack scenarios, a single node will not be able to 
defend itself if other nodes do not participate in the defense mechanism. However, a node 
will be protected if it defends itself and a minimum number of other nodes (the threshold) 
participate in the defense mechanism. If the threshold is not reached, a node that defends 
itself is worse off compared to a node that does not defend itself. This is because a node 
that defends itself wastes resources and ends up not being protected. However, if the 
threshold is reached, it is better for all nodes to participate in the defense mechanism to 
protect itself; thus, the network will be secured. As a result, if a node has a high 
expectation (trust) that the other nodes will participate in the security mechanism, it will 
also participate. A node should not participate otherwise. 
This scenario describes the strong connection between trust, cooperation and security. In 
multi-hop network, trust is the confident expectation that the other nodes will cooperate 
and participate in the security mechanism or any other network function. Trust can help 
facilitate cooperation and security. Moreover, when the interactions are repeated, 
cooperation increases a node’s reputation and therefore its trustworthiness. Privacy 
relates to security in the sense that security mechanisms need to be implemented and 
enforced to protect user privacy. 
As we can see, network security and privacy in autonomous networks can be modeled as 
a strategic interaction. Any node’s decision to participate or not in the security 
mechanism affects the decision of other nodes and the final result i.e., a secure or 
insecure network, protected or unprotected private information. Game theory is the 
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branch of applied mathematics that formalizes strategic interaction among autonomous 
rational agents. If the agents are not assumed to be rational, EGT applies. We will use the 
game theoretic framework to model trust and use EGT to capture the dynamic evolution 
of trust behavior in the network. We will apply our result to network security and 
privacy. 
Trust is a fundamental concept that has been studied across several disciplines including 
sociology, psychology, anthropology, philosophy, economy, political science, and 
theology. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that models trust in multi-
hop networks in the framework of game theory and EGT.  
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows:  in Section 7.2, we present some 
basic principles on applying game theory to network security. In Section 7.3, we present 
a few scenarios where a network requires mutual trust to be effective, and model them as 
a game. In Section 7.4, we analyze the evolution of trust using EGT. Section 7.5 presents 
our simulation results and Section 7.6 concludes the Chapter. 
7.2 Background on Game Theory and Evolutionary Game Theory Applied to 
Network Security 
Most of the previous works that apply game theory to network security assume a network 
with a central manager. In those works, network security is modeled as a game between 
the central manager and an attacker. The attacker has several strategies at each layer.  
At the physical layer, an attacker can create interference or jam the wireless media. At the 
MAC layer, an attacker can perpetrate a MAC address spoofing, an address resolution 
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protocol (ARP) attack, or a dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) starvation. At 
the routing layer, the attacker strategies can be address spoofing, Internet protocol (IP) 
fragmentation attack, man in the middle attack, sinkhole attack, selective forwarding, 
DoS and distributed denial of service (DDoS). At the transport layer, the attacker can 
employ user datagram protocol (UDP) flooding, internet control message protocol 
(ICMP) flooding, TCP session poisoning, and TCP SYN flooding. At the application 
layer, the attacker can use  domain name server (DNS) poisoning, introduction of viruses, 
worms and Trojans, introduction of sniffers, read, add, delete or modify data, or guest 
username and password. An attacker can also use a combination of these strategies. 
Moreover, there can be several attackers. 
To protect the network, the strategies available to the manager are for instance: use 
antivirus software, use cryptographic techniques, install an intrusion detection system 
(IDS) and/or an intrusion prevention system (IPS), move critical data between different 
hosts, reconfigure the network, shut down the network, or a combination of these 
strategies. The network vulnerabilities and the defense mechanisms are presented in more 
detail in [76].  
The utility function of the network security game maps each attacker and defender 
strategy to a payoff. This payoff depends on the cost to implement each strategy, the 
damage that a successful attack can create to the network, and the benefit of a successful 
attack to the attacker.  
In the game presented in [40], the strategy and the payoffs are assumed to be common 
knowledge. In this case, the network security game is a game of complete information. 
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Otherwise, we have a game of incomplete information that can be formulated as a 
Bayesian game as in [41]. The network security game can also be modeled as a static 
game [40-41], a repeated game, or more generally as a stochastic game [38, 42]. A 
stochastic game is a generalization of a repeated game. In a repeated game, players play 
the same stage game in all periods, whereas in a stochastic game, the stage game can 
randomly change from one period to the next. 
In all these games, the main objective of the attacker is to intelligently choose its strategy 
to maximize the damage to the network while the manager tries to minimize the damage. 
The attacker’s and the defender’s objective are strictly opposed. This justifies the use of a 
zero-sum game to model network security [38]. When each player applies the best 
response to its opponent strategy, the game reaches the well known Nash equilibrium. 
Neither the attacker nor the manager can unilaterally make a profitable deviation from the 
Nash equilibrium. Other models relax the assumption of rationality used in game theory 
and use the mathematical framework of EGT to model network security [39].  
In an autonomous network, packet forwarding is a challenging problem because of the 
cost associated with forwarding packets. If not well addressed, the result will be selective 
forwarding and DoS, which are both important security concerns. A few works attempt to 
mitigate selfish routing misbehavior in the framework of game theory [1-3, 6-11, 13-18] 
and evolutionary game theory [4-5]. Game theory also provides a solid framework to 
model intrusion detection in a network [41, 43]. A survey of game theory as applied to 
network security is provided in [44]. A detailed presentation of game theory and EGT is 
found in [35, 60] and [45] respectively. 
 124 
 
To summarize, game theory and EGT provide useful mathematical tools to analyze 
network security. If the game has a unique equilibrium, the manager can easily predict 
the attacker’s behavior. However, besides selective packet forwarding, the very important 
case of security and privacy protection for autonomous nodes where there is no central 
manager is not yet well investigated. This is investigated in the next Section. Specifically, 
the main contribution of this Chapter [21] is to investigate security mechanisms and 
privacy protection schemes that require the cooperation of several nodes or agents to be 
effective and highlight the importance of trust in such a scenario. 
7.3 Network Security and Privacy Protection in Autonomous Networks  
Security in autonomous networks no longer depends on a central manager as was the case 
in the previous Section. Moreover, a node alone cannot defend itself from some of the 
attacks presented in the last Section. To achieve network security, autonomous nodes need 
to cooperate with and trust other nodes. Cooperation and trust will also be required for 
privacy protection. We give two examples here to motivate our model. 
The first example is about privacy protection. In autonomous networks such as VANET, a 
subset of users can decide to share their private information. As in social networks such as 
Facebook, each user will at first decide to share its private information with another or not. 
Sharing private information with a friend has several benefits. For instance, a friend can 
have quick information about your location, your destination, or your daily and weekly 
schedule. You can also get from your friend private and useful information freely that 
otherwise would be costly to get. However, a malicious user or an enemy can undermine 
your reputation or cause several other damages from your private information. Protecting 
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your privacy is successful if and only if you and all other persons or agents in possession 
of your private information also protect it. Moreover, private information protection in a 
network is costly. Not only do you need to buy expensive antivirus and authentication 
software to protect your privacy but also all your friends need to do the same. It will be 
cost effective to protect your private information if and only if you trust that all of your 
friends are also protecting that information. The decision to protect your private 
information or not will depend on how much you value your privacy, the cost to protect it, 
and foremost, the trust you have in others already in possession of that private 
information. We will later formalize those relationships. 
The second example comes from the work of Gupta et al. [23] extended by He et al. [22]. 
Gupta et al. [23] and He et al. [22] present a light weight cryptographic technique, a 
distributed authenticated key establishment scheme for WMN [22] and cellular-based 
heterogeneous wireless ad hoc networks [23] based on hierarchical multi-variable 
symmetric functions. They provide a method to generate a symmetric secret key to allow 
encrypted communication and authentication among any two nodes. Other interesting 
properties of their algorithm are: key independence, random generation, mobility, and 
handoff management. However, their algorithm uses a polynomial of degree k and is 
therefore k-secure [22-23]. This means that if k nodes do not protect their key, an attacker 
can break the security mechanism and have access to all encrypted communication. If that 
happens, there is no need for a node to encrypt the message because they can easily be 
decrypted. A rational node may even prefer not to encrypt because encrypting a message 
will have no other purpose than creating a useless and costly message overhead. This is 
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just an illustration. In fact, several security mechanisms in distributed autonomous 
networks need the solidarity, cooperation and trust of several nodes to be implemented. 
In the two examples above, the dilemma that each autonomous node faces when freely 
deciding to protect its private information or to participate in the security mechanism can 
be formalized as a game. This is a well known dilemma first presented by the French 
philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The dilemma is called the stag hunt game. We will 
first present the two players stag hunt game before generalizing it to n players. 
A. The two nodes’ trust game 
Let us consider a network with two autonomous nodes, node i and node j. Each node has 
two strategies, protect (P) or not protect (NP). The network is secured or both nodes’ 
privacy is protected if and only if both nodes choose P. The reward from security or 
privacy for each node is γ. The cost to a node to protect itself is β. We make the 
reasonable assumption that the reward from security or privacy exceeds the cost to 
protect itself. Thus, we have 𝛾 > 𝛽 > 0. The nodes decide simultaneously. Table 7.1 
represents the strategic form of this game. 
TABLE 7.1: TWO NODES TRUST GAME 
 Node j 
Protect Not Protect 
Node i Protect {γ-β, γ-β} {-β, 0} 
Not Protect {0, -β} {0; 0} 
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If both players play P, each player gets the payoff γ-β because they spend resources to 
protect themselves at the cost of β and get the reward γ from being protected. On the 
contrary, if both players play NP, each player gets the payoff of zero because no player 
spends any resource and no player is rewarded. Finally, if the two players adopt different 
strategy, the player that plays NP gets zero and the one that plays P gets the negative 
payoff –β. This is because playing P needs both players to be successful. 
This game is the stag hunt game. Contrary to the Prisoners’ dilemma game which has a 
unique Nash equilibrium, The stag hunt game presents two pure strategies Nash 
equilibrium, (P, P) and (NP, NP) and a mixed strategy equilibrium where each node 
plays P with probability 𝛽
𝛾
 and plays NP with probability 1 − 𝛽
𝛾
. The equilibrium (P, P) is 
Pareto efficient with both players protects and each player gets the payoff γ-β. The other 
equilibrium, (NP, NP) is less efficient, no node protects and each node gets zero. Recall 
that an allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no other allocation that can make at least 
one individual better off without making any other individual worse off. We can also say 
that the equilibrium (P, P) payoff dominates [35] the equilibrium (NP, NP) because 𝛾 −
𝛽 > 0.  
Let 𝑢𝑖 represents the utility function of node i. The resistance [35] of the equilibrium 
(NP, NP) against the equilibrium (P, P) is the largest number λ such that 0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 1 and 
𝑢𝑖 ��𝜆𝑃𝑗 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑁𝑃𝑗�,𝑁𝑃𝑖� ≥ 𝑢𝑖 ��𝜆𝑃𝑗 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑁𝑃𝑗�,𝑃𝑖�, 
⇒ 𝜆𝑢𝑖�𝑃𝑗 ,𝑁𝑃𝑖� + (1 − 𝜆)𝑢𝑖�𝑁𝑃𝑗 ,𝑁𝑃𝑖� ≥ 𝜆𝑢𝑖�𝑃𝑗 ,𝑃𝑖� + (1 − 𝜆)𝑢𝑖�𝑁𝑃𝑗 ,𝑃𝑖�, 
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⇒ 0 ≥ 𝜆(𝛾 − 𝛽) + (1 − 𝜆)(−𝛽), 
⇒ 𝜆 ≤
𝛽
𝛾
.                                        (1) 
Taking the largest number λ, the resistance of (NP, NP) against (P, P) is 𝜆 = 𝛽
𝛾
. Similarly, 
the resistance of the equilibrium (P, P) against the equilibrium (NP, NP) is 1 − 𝜆 = 𝛾−𝛽
𝛾
. 
The equilibrium (NP, NP) risk dominates the equilibrium (P, P) if and only if the 
resistance of (NP, NP) against (P, P) is greater than the resistance of (P, P) against (NP, 
NP). This means that 𝛽
𝛾
> 1
2
. Also, 𝛽
𝛾
 is called the risk factor for the equilibrium (P, P). 
Another way to understand the risk factor and trust is as follows. Node i is uncertain 
about what node j will do but believes that some distribution over node j’s strategies 
predicts its behavior. Consequently, node i will choose its own strategy to maximize its 
own expected utility payoff. For instance, if node i assigns the probability 𝜋𝑖𝑗 to the event 
that node j will play P. We can say that  𝜋𝑖𝑗 is the trust that node i has for node j. The 
expected payoff of node i when playing P against node j is: 
𝐸[𝑢𝑖(𝑃𝑖)] = 𝜋𝑖𝑗(𝛾 − 𝛽) + �1 − 𝜋𝑖𝑗�(−𝛽).                (2) 
On the other hand, node i always gets zero when playing NP against node j. Thus, 
𝐸[𝑢𝑖(𝑁𝑃𝑖)] = 0.                           (3) 
Therefore, node i, acting rationally will maximize its expected utility and play P if and 
only if: 
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𝐸[𝑢𝑖(𝑃𝑖)] ≥ 𝐸[𝑢𝑖(𝑁𝑃𝑖)] ⇒ 𝜋𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝛽𝛾 .                 (4) 
Therefore, even though the equilibrium (P, P) payoff dominates the equilibrium (NP, NP) 
in this game, the two players may fail to protect the network or their privacy if one of 
them does not trust the others to play P. In other words, it is risky for a node to play P 
because that node may lose β if the other node does not also play P. For that reason, both 
nodes may end up playing NP resulting in the equilibrium (NP, NP). In short, the more 
efficient equilibrium where each node protects itself and consequently protects the entire 
network is reached only if the two nodes trust each other.  
We acknowledge that the possibility of future interactions in other game models can 
promote cooperation and trusting behavior because nodes want to maximize the long 
term utility [1-20]. However, in the privacy game example, once players’ privacy is 
compromised, they may not be interested in protecting it in the future. Other models of 
trust in the network use a reputation system [31-34]. A node reputation is calculated as a 
function of the past behavior. A node’s trustworthiness is the expected value of its 
reputation. In our model, traditional mechanisms based on past or future interactions that 
create trust are not available. Nevertheless, trust can denote the disposition to engage in 
uncertain and risky interactions with others with the possibility of reward or lost.  
B. The n nodes’ trust game 
There are several possible extensions of this basic two-node game to n nodes in an 
autonomous network. Let us start with the privacy protection game. We consider a subset 
of n nodes sharing private information. For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that the 
 130 
 
game only has two outcomes: full privacy if all agents sharing the private information play 
P and no privacy if one of them plays NP. As in the two-node game, nodes that play P 
receive a payoff γ-β if the n-1 other nodes also play P and receive a payoff –β otherwise. 
Nodes that play NP always receive a payoff of zero. 
Therefore, a node will prefer to play P if and only if it believes that n-1 other nodes will 
also play P. Otherwise, a node prefers to play NP. To simplify the analysis, we present the 
symmetric case when the trust that the nodes have for each other is the same. We note the 
value of that trust π. Formally, after similar development as in (2), (3), (4) a node prefers 
to play P if and only if: 
𝜋𝑛−1 ≥
𝛽
𝛾
.                                         (5) 
After the privacy game, let us analyze the security game. We consider n nodes in a 
distributed autonomous network. We also consider a security mechanism that requires the 
cooperation of a fraction of nodes to be successful. We note that fraction α,  0 < 𝛼 ≤ 1. 
Let us consider a k-secure algorithm in a network of n nodes. If 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛, the fraction of 
nodes that need to cooperate for the algorithm to be successful is  𝛼 = 𝑛−𝑘
𝑛
. Similarly to 
the privacy game, it is better for a node to play P if and only if it believes that at least αn-1 
other nodes will also play P. If the belief on the cooperation of one node is π, the belief on 
the cooperation of m nodes among n-1 other nodes is: 
�
𝑚
𝑛 − 1� 𝜋𝑚(1 − 𝜋)𝑛−𝑚−1.                                      (6) 
Moreover, for a node, playing P is optimum if: 
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� �
𝑚
𝑛 − 1�𝑛−1
𝑚=⌈𝛼𝑛−1⌉
𝜋𝑚(1 − 𝜋)𝑛−𝑚−1 ≥ 𝛽
𝛾
.                           (7) 
Or 
� �
𝑚
𝑛 − 1�⌊𝛼𝑛−1⌋
𝑚=0
𝜋𝑚(1 − 𝜋)𝑛−𝑚−1 ≤ 𝛾 − 𝛽
𝛾
.                       (8) 
⌊𝛼𝑛 − 1⌋ and ⌈𝛼𝑛 − 1⌉ are the Floor and Ceiling function respectively. 
7.4 Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis of Trust 
In the last Section, we saw that individual rational choices can result in trusting behavior. 
In this Section, we study how trusting and distrusting behaviors interact. We present in 
what condition trusting behavior can be the result of a long term evolutionary process. 
EGT is the application of game theory to evolution. Game theoretic concepts easily 
translate to evolution because the effectiveness of one animal’s behavior depends on the 
proportion of other animals genetically programmed to use that behavior or other 
behaviors. The main difference between EGT and game theory is that EGT does not 
assume the rationality of the players. Evolution is driven by two main mechanisms: 
random mutation that provides diversity in the population and a selection mechanism that 
promotes some variety over others. Equivalently, EGT has two main solution concepts: 
ESS that deals with mutation and the replicator dynamic that examines the selection 
mechanism. 
 132 
 
A strategy x is an ESS [73] if for every strategy y ≠x there exist some 𝜀?̅?  ∈ (0,1) such 
that for all 𝜀 ∈ �0, 𝜀?̅?�, either 
𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥) > 𝑢(𝑦, 𝑥) ∀𝑦,                                                                    (9) 
Or 
𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥) = 𝑢(𝑦, 𝑥) and 𝑢(𝑥,𝑦) > 𝑢(𝑦,𝑦) ∀𝑦 ≠ 𝑥.               (10) 
ESS resists against mutation. Moreover, from (9) and (10), strict Nash equilibrium are 
ESS and ESS are Nash equilibrium. However, some Nash equilibrium may not be ESS. 
Thus, ESS requires a strategy not only to be rational (Nash equilibrium) but also to be 
stable. 
The replicator dynamic [74] gives the population dynamics for the population shares of 
xi. The replicator dynamic is given by the differential equation: 
?̇?𝑖 = �𝑢�𝑒𝑖, 𝑥� − 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥)�𝑥𝑖.                                                      (11) 
𝑢�𝑒𝑖, 𝑥� is the expected payoff to pure strategy i (i= P or NP) at a random match. 
𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥) is the payoff of an individual drawn at random in the population or the average 
payoff per individual. 
𝑥𝑖 is the proportion of individuals programmed to pure strategy i and its time derivative is 
?̇?𝑖. 
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Figure 7.1: Dynamic of the population share of 𝒙𝑷 
The replicator dynamic indicates that subpopulations programmed with better than 
average strategies growth whereas subpopulations programmed with worse than average 
strategies vanish.  
We indicated before that our trust game of Table 7.1 has three Nash equilibria. Two are 
in pure strategies and one is in a mixed strategy. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is 
neither ESS nor stable in the replicator dynamic. The two pure strategies Nash 
equilibrium are strict Nash equilibrium and therefore ESS. Moreover, those two strict 
Nash equilibria are stable in the replicator dynamic. As represented in Fig. 7.1, the basing 
of attraction of the two pure strategies Nash equilibrium intersect at the mixed strategy 
Nash equilibrium. 
Figure 7.1 shows that it is impossible to move from the low trust equilibrium (NP, NP) to 
the high trust equilibrium (P, P) through an evolutionary process. The final state depends 
entirely on the initial condition. Clearly, if starting with a low proportion of nodes 
playing P (𝑥𝑃 < 𝜆), the final state will have all nodes playing NP (𝑥𝑃 = 0). The same 
way, if starting with a high proportion of nodes playing P (𝑥𝑃 > 𝜆), the final state will 
have all nodes playing P (𝑥𝑃 = 1). The work in [77] analyzes the dynamic of the n 
players stag hunt game. 
0 1 λ 
 
 134 
 
7.5 Simulation Results  
In all these simulations, we fix 𝜆 = 𝛽
𝛾
= 1
2
. Thus, in the two player trust game of Table 7.1, 
the high trust equilibrium (P, P) does not risk dominate the low trust equilibrium (NP, NP) 
and vice versa. 
The replicator dynamic (11) is implemented in Fig. 7.2 and 7.3. In Fig. 7.2, the initial 
population is constituted of 51% of agent playing P and 49% of agent playing NP. 
Therefore, this initial composition is in the basing of attraction of the high trust 
equilibrium (P, P). We can see that the number of agents playing P increases whereas the 
number of agents playing NP decreases. The agents playing NP vanish after only twelve 
generations. 
 
Figure 7.2: Evolution of trust in a two population’s model when the initial condition 
favors the emergence of trust 
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Figure 7.3: Evolution of trust in a two population’s model when the initial condition 
does not favor the emergence of trust 
In Fig. 7.3, we reverse the initial proportion of agents playing P and NP. As a 
consequence, the initial condition becomes in the basing of attraction of the low trust 
equilibrium (NP, NP). The number of agents playing P sinks. 
Figure 7.4 represents the minimum trust requirement to protect your privacy as a function 
of the number of agents sharing the private information (5). From this graph, we can 
mention that, if a vast number of agents share private information, protection of that 
private information is cost effective if and only if there is a complete mutual trust among 
the agents (π close to 1). 
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Figure 7.4: Minimum trust requirement to protect your privacy as a function of the 
number of agents sharing the private information 
7.6 Conclusion 
In this work, we investigated network security and privacy in autonomous multi-hop 
network as a game between the nodes in the network. Each node has the freedom to 
participate in the privacy protection or security mechanism to protect itself or not. We 
examined the applications that require the cooperation of others to be successful and 
modeled it as trust dilemma. We first performed an analysis of trust then captured the 
EGT implication. Both the game theoretic and EGT analysis indicated that mutual trust is 
necessary to cooperate and reach the efficient equilibrium where all nodes protect the 
network or protect their privacy. In the replicator dynamic model, the initial condition 
fully determines the final state (trusting behavior or not).  
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In the future, we will consider the case of incomplete information when each node payoff 
from security or privacy is not common knowledge but private information. We will also 
investigate other game theoretic models of trust in a network. 
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CHAPTER 8 
GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF USERS AND PROVIDERS BEHAVIOR IN 
NETWORK UNDER SCARCE RESOURCES 
The demand on mobile data usage is exponentially increasing since the introduction of 
iPhones in 2007. The network became congested as millions of users tried to browse 
website and social networks, send e-mail, stream multimedia, and transfer file 
simultaneously. An immediate solution for the providers will be to change their pricing 
strategy with the goal to slow down heavy users and then decrease the bandwidth demand. 
From the users’ standpoint, network providers must constantly upgrade their infrastructure 
to accommodate new applications and devises. However, upgrading the infrastructure will 
be costly for the provider. A provider would prefer a minimum investment to upgrade the 
network while attracting the maximum number of customers. On the other hand, without 
regular upgrade of the network from the provider, there may be more congestion, more 
delay and generally a low QoS at the user dissatisfaction. Moreover, users that experience 
bad connection will be tempted to switch providers. We analyze the dynamic 
communication market and the users and providers’ interaction in the framework of 
repeated game theory. We consider noise in user’s monitoring. We also compare two 
scenarios: individual and independent action of users as opposed to the collective action of 
users. 
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8.1 Introduction 
In recent years, we have observed an increase of the number of smart phones, iPhones, 
PDAs, and other mobile devices. Moreover, the number of users is increasing in countries 
all over the world. Beside voice communication, those mobile devices support multimedia 
applications such as videos and TV that consume a tremendous amount of bandwidth. The 
number of new multimedia applications exponentially increases each year. Those 
multimedia applications become part of our everyday life. The users are more and more 
interested in new applications. However, the increase of the number of users and the 
number of applications coupled with the high bandwidth requirement of those applications 
tend to saturate the network. All network carriers are striving to keep their network 
capacity above the data demand. In fact, for the last four years, the demand in data 
network has been doubling each year. However, we do not observe a similar growth in 
network capacity. As a consequence, networks become more congested over the years as 
the demand in bandwidth from the users grows faster than network capacity. Network 
providers are slow to increase the network capacity because of the cost involved. Clearly, 
there is a conflict of interest between the network provider’s profit and the user’s 
satisfaction. We will model this conflict of interest in the framework of game theory. 
Recall that game theory is the branch of applied mathematics that models and analyzes 
strategic interaction among rational decision makers. 
One cause of the high increase in bandwidth demand was the pricing mechanism practiced 
by the provider. Service provider used to practice a flat rate model instead of a usage- 
based one. As a consequence, for most operators, a very small percentage of users are 
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responsible for the majority of traffic. For instance, in December 2009, the AT&T CEO 
confirmed that 3 percent of its Smartphone’s users generate about 40 percent of its data 
traffic [78]. This is at the disadvantage of both the majority of users and the providers. The 
low traffic users in a flat price model subsidize the high traffic users. 
Several providers quickly realized the drawback of a flat rate pricing mechanism and 
adopted a tiered pricing model. As an example, AT&T adopted a tiered pricing model in 
June 2010. Verizon followed. Sprint, and others will certainly follow soon. This is a 
strategic move on the providers’ part. The benefits to a provider of tiered pricing model 
are three fold. First, the demand of bandwidth is reduced. In fact, higher price for higher 
tiers enforce low bandwidth usage. Second, the necessary investment to keep up with a 
good QoS is reduced and can even be eliminated. Last but not least, the providers can 
increase their profit. 
There is rich literature on game theoretic modeling of user provider interactions. Hassan et 
al [46] show that the user can use a brinkmanship technique to provide credible threats to 
the provider and therefore compel the provider to allocate more resources to users. 
Sengupta et al [47] investigate a market in which multiple service providers compete to 
get a large portion of the spectrum and sell it to a maximum number of users. Other works 
analyzing provider price competition to attract users include [48-50]. The work in [51] 
examines one provider’s Nash equilibrium price under asymmetric information. A 
comprehensive survey of wireless service providers and user’s interactions can be found 
in [52]. An application of game theory to packet forwarding is found in [1-3]. 
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This Chapter considers one provider and multiple users. User/provider interaction will be 
modeled as a repeated game. The threat available to a user is based solely on repeated 
interactions. The prospects of future loss of customers will oblige the providers to invest 
in the network. A customer will monitor the channel condition and QoS and leave a 
service provider that does not invest in the network to provide a good QoS. We will also 
consider the impact of noise on monitoring. It is possible that a service provider invests to 
improve the QoS while a customer still experience congestion and delay due to the non-
reliability of the wireless channel. 
We will consider two scenarios in our analysis. The first scenario deals with independent 
users that observe the provider’s action (act) separately. The second case is about the users 
who observe and react collectively. We will show that collective monitoring is better in 
the sense that it increases the monitoring accuracy. Thus, a more efficient equilibrium is 
reached under collective monitoring. Moreover, acting collectively increases the 
bargaining power of users and can force the provider to make substantial investments and 
increase the supply of bandwidth. Certainly, the best solution to mobile data explosion 
should not be solely based on price increase, to decrease the demand on bandwidth, but 
also on adequate investment to increase the bandwidth supply. This research focuses on 
increasing the bandwidth supply. 
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 is about the stage game 
model between a user and a provider. Section 8.3 analyzes repeated interactions under 
perfect monitoring. Section 8.4 considers noise in monitoring. Section 8.5 extends the one 
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user model to n independent users. Section 8.6 analyzes the collective action of the n 
users. Section 8.7 presents the numerical results and Section 8.8 concludes the Chapter. 
8.2 Stage Game Model      
We consider a service provider with several users. The service provider owns the network 
infrastructure. The service provider is responsible for the network administration and 
maintenance. We assume that the demand in bandwidth from the users’ devices and 
applications increases with time. Then, the users experience more congestion and delay if 
the provider does not increase the network capacity. Therefore, the service provider should 
periodically invest in the network infrastructure to accommodate the extra network traffic 
demand and maintain the same QoS. The new investment in network infrastructure can be 
in the form of new cell towers, change from cable to fiber optic to increase the capacity in 
the backbone of the network, or simply change in modulation techniques or software 
upgrades.  
We assume that time is divided in periods. The length of a period is T. A period T can be a 
month to correspond with the billing cycle. At the end of each period, the service provider 
has two strategies or choices: Invest in the network (I) or cooperate or Not to Invest (NI) 
or defect. On the other hand, at the end of each period, a user can either Keep the Provider 
(KP) or cooperate if satisfied with the QoS or Change the Provider (CP) or defect if not 
satisfied. We consider that a user is free to change the provider at the end of each period if 
not satisfied. This means that there is no contract that prevents the user from switching the 
provider. We assume that there is no monopoly or there are several service providers that 
the users can choose from.  
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TABLE 8.1 STAGE GAME IN STRATEGIC FORM 
 Provider 
I NI 
User KP A, a C, b 
CP B, c D, d 
For the sake of simplicity, we start by presenting a two players’ game between one user 
and a service provider. The n user’s case will be the subject of Section 8.5. In this Section, 
we assume perfect monitoring and will consider imperfect monitoring in Section 8.4. 
Therefore, we presuppose that a user experiences a good QoS if the provider has invested 
and experiences a bad QoS otherwise. The user and the provider decide simultaneously. 
The strategic form of the user/provider game is represented in Table 8.1. 
Let us examine the payoff structure of the game. The payoff or utility function 
characterizes the players’ satisfaction given a profile of action. For the user, we need to 
establish an ordinal relation between the payoff A, B, C and D. The user prefers the 
provider to invest than not to invest, thus 𝐴,𝐵 ≥ 𝐶,𝐷. Also, if the provider chooses to 
invest (I), the user has a good QoS and prefers KP to CP. In other words, we have 𝐴 > 𝐵. 
However, if the provider chooses NI, the user will prefer CP to KP. This means that 𝐷 >
𝐶. Finally, we have for the user: 𝐴 > 𝐵 ≥ 𝐷 > 𝐶. 
Without loss of generality, we assign a quantitative value to the user payoffs. We consider 
that when a user changes the provider, he is indifferent to the past provider’s behavior and 
did not incur any gain or loss from that provider’s action. Then, we have 𝐵 = 𝐷 = 0 . Let 
f be the periodic fee the user pays to the provider. Let v be the value to the user of the 
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service received from the provider. The two possible values of v will be 𝑣 if the user 
receives a good QoS and 𝑣 if the QoS is bad. We assume that 𝑣 > 𝑓 > 𝑣. Thus, we have: 
𝐴 = 𝑣 − 𝑓 > 0 and 𝐶 = 𝑣 − 𝑓 < 0. When we normalize the payoffs to that of mutual 
cooperation (KP,I), we have 1 = 𝐴 = 𝑣 − 𝑓 > 0 > 𝑣−𝑓
𝑣−𝑓
= 𝐶
𝑣−𝑓
= −𝑙. Here, l represents 
the loss due to bad service. 
We now analyze the provider payoff. If the user cooperates or keeps the provider (KP), the 
provider prefers not to invest (NI) to invest (I). This is obvious since investing is costly. 
Then, we have 𝑏 > 𝑎. Similarly, if the user plays CP, the provider again prefers NI to I. 
Then, we have 𝑑 > 𝑐. As we can see, for one-shot games, the provider always prefers NI 
to I regardless of what the user does. Therefore, cooperation (I) is dominated by defection 
(NI). We assume that the market conditions are such that the service provider prefers to 
invest in the network and keeps its user than not to invest and loose them. Thus, we must 
have 𝑎 > 𝑑. Finally, we have for the provider: 𝑏 > 𝑎 > 𝑑 > 𝑐. 
As for the user, let us find the quantitative values of the provider’s payoff. Let e be the 
average expense required to accommodate a user with a good QoS and f be the periodic 
fee the user pays to the provider. We assume that 𝑓 > 𝑒 > 0. Thus, we have: 𝑓 = 𝑏 >
𝑎 = 𝑓 − 𝑒 > 0 = 𝑑 > 𝑐 = −𝑒. When we normalize the payoffs to that of mutual 
cooperation (KP, I), we have: 𝑔 > 1 > 0 > 1 − 𝑔 with 𝑔 = 𝑓
𝑓−𝑒
. Table 8.2 shows the 
strategic form of the game with normalized payoff. We can see that Table 8.2 represents 
an asymmetric game. 
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TABLE 8.2: STAGE GAME WITH NORMALIZED PAYOFFS 
 Provider 
I NI 
User KP 1, 1 -l, g 
CP 0, 1-g 0, 0 
This stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium. Mutual defection (CP, NI) is the Nash 
equilibrium. At the Nash equilibrium, the provider will not invest and the user will change 
provider. At a Nash equilibrium profile, no player can increase its payoff by a unilateral 
deviation. Moreover, each player plays a best response to the behavior of other players. 
However, the Nash equilibrium in this game is not Pareto efficient. Recall that an 
allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no other allocation that can make at least one player 
better off without making any other player worse off. The Pareto efficient outcome is 
mutual cooperation (KP, I) where provider invests and the user stays. We show in the next 
Section that the provider and the user can reach the Pareto efficient outcome when the 
interactions are repeated. 
8.3 Repeated Game Model 
There are two players: a user and a provider. The stage game in Table 8.2 is repeated 
over time. The provider discounts future payoff by a common discount factor δ and we 
have 0 ≤ 𝛿 < 1. Player i (𝑖 ∈ {User, Provider}) sequence of stage game payoffs 
is (𝑢𝑖𝑡)𝑡=1∞ . The provider is a long-lived player [60] and wants to maximize the expected 
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δ-discounted average of its sequence of payoffs. Therefore, the provider’s repeated game 
payoff is given by:  
(1 − 𝛿)�𝛿𝑡−1∞
𝑡=1
𝑢𝑖
𝑡.                                            (1) 
The users are short-lived players and are concerned only with the payoff in the current 
period. This means that the user plays the myopic best reply to the provider’s action. We 
consider the following strategy for the user: Start by cooperating and continue to 
cooperate until you observe a defection, defect forever after a defection. This simple 
strategy is called Grim Trigger strategy. The strategy is grim because it does not forgive. 
Also, it needs a trigger (a defection) to defect forever. 
The main concept used to analyze a repeated game under perfect monitoring is the SPE 
[60]. A strategy profile is a SPE of the repeated game if it represents a Nash equilibrium 
after every history or subgame of the repeated game. SPE is a stronger criterion than the 
Nash equilibrium. SPE eliminates Nash equilibrium in which players’ threats are not 
credible. 
Theorem 1: The strategy profile where both the user and the provider use grim trigger is 
SPE if and only if:  
𝛿 ≥
𝑔 − 1
𝑔
.                            (2) 
Proof: A strategy profile is SPE if and only if there are no profitable one-shot deviations 
[60]. One –shot deviation of the provider is not profitable if: 
 147 
 
1 ≥ (1 − 𝛿) �𝑔 + �𝛿𝑡−10∞
𝑡=1
� = (1 − 𝛿)𝑔 
⇒ 𝛿 ≥
𝑔 − 1
𝑔
. 
Moreover, when the provider cooperates, the best response of the user is to cooperate. 
Also, when the provider defects, the best response of the user is to defect                          ▄ 
8.4 Imperfect Monitoring Game 
Up to now, we did not consider noise when a player monitors the opponent behavior. In 
fact, it is not realistic to assume that a user can perfectly monitor the provider behavior. 
Even if the provider invests in the in the network infrastructure, a user can still experience 
a low QoS due to the non-reliability of the wireless channel. Random events such as 
weather conditions can impose performance degradation on the wireless network. On the 
other hand, it is reasonable to assume that a provider knows for sure when a user decides 
to stay or to leave. Therefore, the user’s action will be public while the provider’s action 
will be private. However, there is a public signal 𝑦2 ∈ �𝑦,𝑦� indicating the past action of 
the provider. Thus, we have a game of imperfect public monitoring.  
Let 𝑎1 ∈ {𝐾𝑃,𝐶𝑃} and 𝑎2 ∈ {𝐼,𝑁𝐼} be the user and provider’s action respectively. Also, ε 
denotes the error in user’s monitoring. The distribution of the public signal 𝑦2 is given by: 
𝑚2(𝑦|𝑎) = � 1 − 𝜀,   if 𝑎2 = 𝐼        𝜀,   if 𝑎2 = 𝑁𝐼                                     (3) 
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We assume that 0 < 𝜀 < 1 − 𝜀 < 1. This ensures that it is more likely that the user 
observes the high quality signal 𝑦 when the provider plays I and observes the low quality 
signal 𝑦 when the provider plays NI. As before, we consider that the user plays KP when 
observing the good signal 𝑦 and plays CP forever when observing the bad signal 𝑦. 
Let 𝑉𝑎1,𝑎2(𝜀, 𝛿) represents the repeated game payoff of the provider given the action 
profile (𝑎1,𝑎2). We have the following Bellman equation [79], 
𝑉𝐾𝑃,𝐼 = (1 − 𝛿) + 𝛿�(1 − 𝜀)𝑉𝐾𝑃,𝐼 + 𝜀𝑉𝐶𝑃,𝑁𝐼�,                       (4) 
𝑉𝐾𝑃,𝑁𝐼 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑔 + 𝛿�𝜀𝑉𝐾𝑃,𝐼 + (1 − 𝜀)𝑉𝐶𝑃,𝑁𝐼�.                         (5) 
Equation (4) and (5) represent the repeated game payoff as a function of the initial payoff 
and future payoff. The future payoffs depend on the signal observed and take noise into 
account with the possibility of good and bad observations. 
In any period, the provider prefers cooperation to defection if: 
𝑉𝐾𝑃,𝐼 ≥ 𝑉𝐾𝑃,𝑁𝐼 ⇒ 
(1 − 𝛿) + 𝛿�(1 − 𝜀)𝑉𝐾𝑃,𝐼 + 𝜀𝑉𝐶𝑃,𝑁𝐼� ≥ (1 − 𝛿)𝑔 + 𝛿�𝜀𝑉𝐾𝑃,𝐼 + (1 − 𝜀)𝑉𝐶𝑃,𝑁𝐼� ⇒ 
𝑉𝐾𝑃,𝐼 ≥ 𝑉𝐶𝑃,𝑁𝐼 + (1 − 𝛿)(𝑔 − 1)𝛿(1 − 2𝜀) .                            (6) 
Equation (6) shows that the provider is willing to cooperate if the payoff of mutual 
cooperation 𝑉𝐾𝑃,𝐼 exceeds that of mutual defection 𝑉𝐶𝑃,𝑁𝐼 by at least (1−𝛿)(𝑔−1)𝛿(1−2𝜀) . This 
difference in payoff vanishes as noise decreases and the discount factor becomes close to 
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1. As a consequence, the provider will invest in the network at any given period under two 
conditions. First, the provider must be sufficiently patient. Future gain will have almost 
the same value as current payoff. Second, the provider must be convinced that the users 
are able to accurately monitor its behavior. For instance, the provider will find its 
investment in the network useless if that investment does not translate into a better QoS to 
a vast majority of users. 
Let us evaluate the maximum value of 𝑉𝐾𝑃,𝐼. From (4), the maximum value of 𝑉𝐾𝑃,𝐼 is 
achieved when 𝑉𝐶𝑃,𝑁𝐼is maximum. Then, taking (6) with equality, we have: 
𝑉𝐶𝑃,𝑁𝐼 = 𝑉𝐾𝑃,𝐼 − (1 − 𝛿)(𝑔 − 1)𝛿(1 − 2𝜀) .                                                  (7) 
Replacing (7) into (4) gives us: 
𝑉𝐾𝑃,𝐼𝑀𝑎𝑥 = 1 − 𝜀(𝑔 − 1)(1 − 2𝜀) .                                                               (8) 
A necessary condition for the provider to cooperate is to have 𝑉𝐾𝑃,𝐼𝑀𝑎𝑥 ≥ 0. This means 
that: 
𝜀 ≤
11 + 𝑔 .                                                        (9) 
Equation (9) indicates that monitoring must be more precise when the temptation to defect 
or g increases. 
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8.5 Extention to N Independent Users 
We consider a service provider with n users in a dynamic market. Each user independently 
monitors the channel condition to infer the provider’s action. A user leaves the provider 
forever after experiencing a bad QoS or observing a low quality signal 𝑦. A user stays 
with the provider otherwise. Let x denotes the total investment required from the provider 
to accommodate the n users and f the periodic fee paid by each user.  
In a given period, when the provider chooses to invest in the network, the expected 
revenue of the provider in the next period will be: 
𝐸 � �
𝑘
𝑛
� (1 − 𝜀)𝑘𝜀𝑛−𝑘𝑘𝑓𝑛
𝑘=0
� = (1 − 𝜀)𝑛𝑓.                                     (10) 
k is the number of users observing a good signal. 0 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛. 
Equation (10) takes into account the noise level and all combination of subsets of users 
that may experience good or bad signal. The k users that observe the good signal will stay 
with the provider and pay the fee f in the next period. On the other hand, n-k users will 
quit and not pay any fee. This translates into a binomial distribution and the corresponding 
expected value is represented in the right hand side of (10). 
Similarly, when the provider chooses not to invest in the network, its expected revenue in 
the next period will be: 
𝐸 � �
𝑘
𝑛
� 𝜀𝑘(1 − 𝜀)𝑛−𝑘𝑘𝑓𝑛
𝑘=0
� = 𝜀𝑛𝑓.                                          (11) 
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Therefore, the provider’s cooperation can be enforced if: 
−𝑥 + 𝛿(1 − 𝜀)𝑛𝑓 ≥ 𝛿𝜀𝑛𝑓                                                    (12) 
⇒ 𝛿 ≥
𝑥(1 − 2𝜀)𝑛𝑓 .                                                           (13) 
If the total investment x is proportional to the number of users and e is the average 
investment per user. Then (13) becomes: 
𝛿 ≥
𝑛𝑒(1 − 2𝜀)𝑛𝑓 = 𝑒(1 − 2𝜀)𝑓. 
Consequently, when noise in monitoring vanishes and the revenue per users f exceeds the 
required investment per user e, there exists 𝛿,0 < 𝛿 < 1 such that the provider is better off 
cooperating when its discount factor is 𝛿 ≥ 𝛿. 
Note that the number of users can fluctuate from one period to the next due to the 
acquisition or loss of customers. Thus, we did not include the total sequence of payoffs. 
However, this analysis captures the essence of the game and players’ interaction. 
8.6 Collective Action of the N Users 
In the last Section, each user independently monitors the channel condition to infer the 
provider action. Moreover, the users decide to stay or to quit the provider independently. 
In this Section, we investigate what should happen if the users coordinate their actions. 
We consider a tamperproof resistant database that helps to coordinate the users’ action and 
observation. At the end of each period, each user sends its observation to the database. 
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There are only two possible observations a user can report depending on the QoS: a good 
observation for a good QoS and a bad observation otherwise. The users agree to 
collectively leave the provider if the ratio of users experiencing a good QoS in a given 
period is below a pre-established cutoff score. Let us call that cutoff score α, 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1. 
Similar reasoning as in the last Section indicates that the provider cooperates when 
−𝑥 + 𝛿𝑛𝑓𝐸 � � �𝑘
𝑛
� (1 − 𝜀)𝑘𝜀𝑛−𝑘𝑛
𝑘=𝛼𝑛
� ≥ 𝛿𝑛𝑓𝐸 � � �
𝑘
𝑛
� 𝜀𝑘(1 − 𝜀)𝑛−𝑘𝑛
𝑘=𝛼𝑛
� .                    (14) 
The difference here compared to the last Section is that the provider will receive the full 
revenue nf or zero depending on if αn users report a good signal or not. Assuming that the 
provider has a large number of users, which is generally the case, the Binomial 
distribution can be approximated by a Normal distribution. Then, (14) becomes: 
−𝑥 + 𝛿𝑛𝑓 �1 − Φ�𝛼𝑛 − 𝑛(1 − 𝜀)
�𝑛𝜀(1 − 𝜀) �� ≥ 𝛿𝑛𝑓 �1 − Φ� 𝛼𝑛 − 𝑛𝜀�𝑛𝜀(1 − 𝜀)�� 
⇒ 𝛿 ≥
𝑥
�Φ�
𝛼𝑛 − 𝑛𝜀
�𝑛𝜀(1 − 𝜀)� − Φ�𝛼𝑛 − 𝑛(1 − 𝜀)�𝑛𝜀(1 − 𝜀) ��𝑛𝑓 .                             (15) 
Φ represents the cumulative distribution function of the Normal distribution. 
Generally, a solution that enforces cooperation with the lowest discount factor is 
preferable. The discount factor measures the patience of the provider. Also, considering 
the interest rate per period r, the discount factor will be 𝛿 = 1
1+𝑟
. Thus, a high interest rate 
per period implies a low discount factor. Therefore, in a competitive wireless 
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communication market, we want even the least patient provider or those with a high 
interest rate per period to invest in the network for the collective benefit of its users. To 
achieve that, we need to maximize the denominator of (15). 
A straightforward analysis shows that, for 𝜀 ≠ 0 the difference 
�Φ�
𝛼𝑛 − 𝑛𝜀
�𝑛𝜀(1 − 𝜀)� − Φ�𝛼𝑛 − 𝑛(1 − 𝜀)�𝑛𝜀(1 − 𝜀) �� 
is maximized when 𝛼 = 0.5.  
The message is that when α is too big, the provider will find it risky to invest. In fact, few 
users may report a bad QoS due to noise and cause the provider to lose its entire customer 
base when the users act collectively. On the other hand, if the ratio α is too small, the 
provider may not invest and expect few users to still report a good QoS. Recall that there 
is noise in users’ observation. As a result, a fair value of one half is adequate.  
When we take 𝛼 = 0.5, we have: 
Φ�
𝛼𝑛 − 𝑛𝜀
�𝑛𝜀(1 − 𝜀)� − Φ�𝛼𝑛 − 𝑛(1 − 𝜀)�𝑛𝜀(1 − 𝜀) � 
= Φ� 𝑛(1 − 2𝜀)2�𝑛𝜀(1 − 𝜀)� − Φ�− 𝑛(1 − 2𝜀)2�𝑛𝜀(1 − 𝜀)� 
= Φ� 𝑛(1 − 2𝜀)2�𝑛𝜀(1 − 𝜀)� − �1 − Φ� 𝑛(1 − 2𝜀)2�𝑛𝜀(1 − 𝜀)�� 
= 2Φ� 𝑛(1 − 2𝜀)2�𝑛𝜀(1 − 𝜀)� − 1. 
 154 
 
Therefore, when we take the average investment per user, (15) becomes: 
𝛿 ≥
𝑒
�2Φ� 𝑛(1 − 2𝜀)2�𝑛𝜀(1 − 𝜀)� − 1� 𝑓 .                                     (16) 
8.7 Numerical Results 
In this Section, we compare the provider’s behavior when the users act independently to 
when the users act collectively. We consider a service provider with a large number of 
customers; say 10,000 users in a local area, a ZIP code for instance. Users are divided in 
subsets. Subsets of users belong to the same area with similar channel conditions. We also 
assume that the provider uses 20% of its revenue in administrative and operational cost. 
Thus, 
𝑒
𝑓
= 0.8. 
Figure 8.1 compares the minimum discount factor that enforces cooperation in two 
scenarios: individual and independent decision and collective decision. In the case of 
independent user, the minimum discount factor required for the provider cooperation 
equals 1 when the noise level ε reaches 0.1. Therefore, it becomes impossible for the users 
to enforce the provider cooperation with a probability of observation error above 0.1. The 
result is a mutual defection which is not an efficient outcome. The incentive to cooperate 
is lost due to noise.  
However, when the users observe and decide collectively, the provider still has an 
incentive to cooperate with a noise level of 0.49. This is clearly in the advantage of both 
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the provider and the users. Introducing a database that records all users’ observations has, 
as a consequence, the increase of the monitoring accuracy. Moreover, the database gives 
more bargaining power to users. The n+1 player’s game becomes strategically equivalent 
to a two player game. The provider is one of the players and the n users represent the 
second player. 
 
Figure 8.1: Comparison between individual and collective actions of users. α=0.5 
Figure 8.2 shows what will happen if the users are intransigent and request a cutoff score 
of 95%. The provider will cooperate under perfect monitoring or when the noise level is 
below 5%. Therefore, a fair cutoff score of 50% is better that the 95%. This is because the 
provider’s investment becomes unprofitable under noise. 
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Figure 8.2: Comparison of high and fair values of Alpha 
Figure 8.3 analyzes the provider’s action under noise and several other cutoff scores. We 
can see that the provider’s behavior is symmetric on a cut off score of 0.5. Therefore, 
recommending that 75% of users report a good QoS is identical to a request of 25%. 
A straightforward statistical analysis indicates that, for a 3 standard deviation confidence, 
we must have: 
𝑛𝜀 + 3�𝑛𝜀(1 − 𝜀) ≤ 𝛼𝑛 ≤ 𝑛(1 − 𝜀) − 3�𝑛𝜀(1 − 𝜀) ⇒ 
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𝜀 + 3�𝜀(1 − 𝜀)
𝑛
≤ 𝛼 ≤ (1 − 𝜀) − 3�𝜀(1 − 𝜀)
𝑛
.                                    (17) 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Comparison between different values of Alpha 
8.8 Conclusion 
This analysis shows that recording the provider’s behavior in a database can have a 
valuable effect for users. The provider is forced to cooperate even with a high observation 
error (close to 0.5!). Collective observation increases the accuracy in monitoring and the 
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bargaining power of users. Previous researches [47-50] have emphasized the competition 
between service providers to guarantee market efficiency. This Chapter focuses on the 
power of repeated interactions and recording the provider’s action. 
Similar results can be obtained if the user does not use the grim trigger strategy presented 
here, but instead decides based on the provider’s reputation. The provider’s reputation will 
depend on the history of percentage of user satisfaction. The mechanism described here is 
easy to implement. An application on a Smartphone can automatically monitor the QoS, 
report it at the end of each period to the database, read other users’ observations, and 
recommend to switch the provider or not, depending on its past behavior or reputation. 
We believe that this recording mechanism combined with the change of pricing strategy 
from flat rate to tiered pricing should avoid network congestion. The tiered pricing should 
decrease the demand in data traffic, whereas recording the provider’s behavior should 
increase the network capacity. 
All along this Chapter, we made the implicit assumption that the provider uses flat rate 
pricing. In the future, we will consider different pricing strategies. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
This Chapter concludes this dissertation. Our contributions are recapitulated and the 
directions for future research are proposed. 
9.1 Conclusion 
This dissertation addresses several concerns that are universal in social science. Those 
enigmas include rationality, cooperation, selfishness, trust, security, privacy, as well as 
independent and collective decision. Game theory and EGT have been used in this work to 
propose novel solutions to those problems with rigorous mathematical analyses. Those 
dilemmas will become more consequential as nodes in a network have more freedom, 
autonomy, independence, intelligence, and learning capability. 
Repeated interaction has been used to model different scenarios in wireless networks 
including packet forwarding at the routing layers, network security, user and service 
provider interaction. When dealing with packet forwarding, we have presented the 
advantage of repeated interaction over reputation mechanisms and virtual currency 
systems. We have considered both rational and irrational nodes as well as perfect and 
imperfect monitoring. 
With respect to security mechanisms in our analysis, the trust in a central authority, like a 
certificate authority, has been replaced with trust among nodes. Nodes need to trust each 
other to secure the network. 
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The major contributions of this dissertation are summarized as follow: 
1. Mitigation of selfish behavior in autonomous ad hoc networks considering both 
rational and irrational nodes. 
2. Use of repeated, stochastic, and evolutionary games to design distributed 
cooperation algorithm. 
3. Use of community enforcement mechanisms to compel node cooperation under 
non-uniform traffic load distribution. 
4. Analysis of node cooperation in ad hoc network under noise and imperfect private 
monitoring. 
5. Investigate network security and its connection to trust in wireless networks. 
6. Interpret users’ and service providers’ optimal behavior alongside an exponential 
increase in bandwidth demand. 
To place our work in a wider context, it is worth mentioning that the strategies developed 
from Chapter 3 to Chapter 6 can also apply to file sharing in peer-to-peer networks and to 
inter-domain routing. 
9.2 Future Works 
The first part of this PhD research mainly involves enforcing cooperation to forward 
packets at the routing layer. A comprehensive model for an autonomous network can then 
be developed. Clearly, cross layer optimization techniques in the framework of game 
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theory and EGT can be the subject of future research. The incorporation of information 
from other layers in the models developed in this work would be an improvement. For 
instance, MAC and transport layer information can be aggregated to consider network 
congestion, packet loss, and packet retransmission. Also, our model extension without a 
database in Section 5.3 needs further investigation. It is still not clear how the network 
topology will influence the game. Moreover, a general framework for packet forwarding 
games should have both imperfect private monitoring and private payoff information. 
However, as mentioned in Section 5.5, even though belief-free equilibrium strategies are 
robust to imperfect private monitoring, they may not resist private payoff information.  
Additionally, introducing incomplete information to the network security game introduced 
in Chapter 7 can be the subject of future research. In fact, each node payoff, from security 
or privacy, is not common knowledge but private information. 
Finally, in Chapter 8, the users switch to a new service provider if the current service 
provider does not invest sufficient resources to improve the quality of service for the 
users. However, the behavior dynamic of other service providers has not yet been 
considered. Some users may leave a provider while new users join that provider. A 
complete market analysis can be done to investigate the optimum user and service 
provider behavior. It is well known that the market model proposes a simple and almost 
optimum solution to complex resource allocation problems for large scales. Market 
interaction consists of several agents with limited knowledge of the system involved in 
decentralized interaction. Each agent makes its decision in a distributed way. The market’s 
interactions converge to equilibrium that is, for the most part, close to the optimum 
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solution. Moreover, there is a strategic effect in market interaction. The behavior of any 
agent affects the payoff and the behavior of others. Therefore, market interaction can be 
modeled as a game. Furthermore, compared to centralized resource allocation schemes, 
distributed mechanisms based on market principles are robust against strategic 
manipulations from selfish users. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 163 
 
APPENDIX 
GAME THEORY AND EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY OVERVIEW 
According to Myerson [35], game theory can be defined as the study of mathematical 
models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers. A 
rational player makes decisions to satisfy his or her self interest. A game can be 
represented in different forms. Most of the time, it is represented in extensive form or in 
strategic (or normal) form. The extensive form of a game is used to formalize sequential 
action of players. In those games, the order in which players act in the game is important. 
On the other hand, a strategic form of a game is formalized as: 
𝛤 = (𝑁, (𝑆𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 , (𝑢𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁). 
N is the set of players of game Г, i is a player in N, 𝑆𝑖 is the set of pure strategies that 
players i can choose from, ui is the utility function of player i. A mixed strategy is a 
random combination of two or more pure strategies. A strategy profile is a combination 
of strategies that the players can choose. The set of all possible strategy profiles is 𝑆 =
𝑋𝑗∈𝑁𝑆𝑗. ui is a function defined from the set of strategy profiles S to the set of real 
numbers 𝑅. At any strategy profile, the utility function associates the expected utility 
payoff that player i would get. A game in strategic form can also be represented by a 
matrix as in table A.1. 
For two strategies A and B, A strictly dominates B if A always earns a higher payoff than 
B. A weakly dominates B if A never earns a lower payoff than B and A is superior to B for 
at least one strategy. 
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A. 1. Nash Equilibrium 
A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if and only if no player can gain by changing its 
strategy when the other players do not change. Moreover, in a Nash equilibrium, each 
player’s equilibrium strategy is a best-response to other player’s equilibrium strategies. 
Definition 1: A mixed strategy profile σ* is a Nash Equilibrium if, for all players i 
𝑢𝑖(𝜎𝑖∗,𝜎−𝑖∗ ) ≥ 𝑢𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝜎−𝑖∗ ) for all 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑊𝑖                                                                          (1) 
We have a strict Nash equilibrium if inequality (1) is strict. 
Theorem 1: Given any finite game Г in strategic form, there exists at least one Nash 
equilibrium. 
Proposition 1: The Nash equilibrium is not always unique. 
Theorem 2: A strictly dominated strategy is never a Nash equilibrium. 
This comes from the fact that a strictly dominated strategy can never be optimal. 
An allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no other allocation that can make at least one 
individual better off without making any other individual worse off. 
Proposition 2: A Nash equilibrium is not always Pareto efficient. 
We will illustrate proposition 2 in the following Subsection.  
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A.2. Prisoners’ Dilemma Game 
Table A.1 shows the Prisoners’ Dilemma game in strategic form. In this game, if both 
players cooperate, they get the reward price R. They get the punishment price P if both 
defect. But if one defects when the other cooperates, the defector gets the temptations 
price T while the cooperator gets the suck price S. We also have: T>R>P>S. For the one 
stage game, player can choose to cooperate or to defect. Cooperate is strictly dominated 
by defect. The only Nash equilibrium is both players defect. The 2 players get the 
punishment prize P. However, if the 2 players choose to cooperate, the 2 players will get 
the Pareto efficient outcome R. We can see that when rational intelligent players play the 
game, they will get a non efficient outcome. This illustrates that the Nash equilibrium is 
not always Pareto efficient. We see in the next Section that when the game is played 
repeatedly, cooperation among players can emerge. Players could cooperate expecting 
future gain and reach an efficient equilibrium while all players cooperate.  
TABLE A.1: PRISONNERS’ DILLEMA GAME IN STRATEGIC FORM 
 Player 2 
Cooperate Defect 
Player 1 Cooperate R,R S,T 
Defect T,S P,P 
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A.3. Repeated Game 
A repeated game is some number of repetitions of a base game called the stage game. A 
repeated game is of perfect monitoring if at the end of each period, each player observes 
the strategies chosen by other players. A history of the repeated game at period t ht is the 
list of all players’ actions in all periods before t. A pure strategy for a player in the 
repeated game is a mapping from all possible histories to a stage game strategy. The 
number of repetitions can be finite or infinite. When the end of the game is fixed and 
known to all players, a backward induction argument shows that it is optimum to play a 
Nash equilibrium strategy of the stage game in all periods even though that may not be 
Pareto efficient. For the infinitely repeated game, the payoff of player i   is the infinite 
sequence of payoffs 
 (𝑢𝑖0 + 𝑢𝑖1 + 𝑢𝑖2 + 𝑢𝑖3 … ).  
The average δ-discounted payoff of that sequence is: 
(1 − 𝛿)�𝛿𝑡∞
𝑡=0
𝑢𝑖
𝑡.                                                             (2) 
δ is the discount factor. 0 ≤ 𝛿 < 1. 
The payoff of a pure strategy profile σ is defined as: 
𝑈𝑖(𝜎) = (1 − 𝛿)�𝛿𝑡∞
𝑡=0
𝑢𝑖  �𝑎𝑡(𝜎)�.                             (3) 
𝑎𝑡(𝜎) is the pure action profile in period t. 
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Definition 2: A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it represents a Nash 
equilibrium of every subgame of the original game. 
Proposition 3: A strategy profile σ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if 
there is no profitable one – shot deviation. 
This proposition is the one – shot deviation principle. 
SPE is a stronger criterion than the Nash equilibrium in repeated game. SPE imposes the 
behavior to be sequentially rational. This means that the behavior must be optimum even 
out of the Nash equilibrium path. 
The minmax payoff of a player is a payoff that minimizes his maximum possible loss. 
Theorem 3: For every pure action profile whose payoff strictly dominates the pure action 
minmax payoff, there exists a SPE of the repeated game in which that action profile is 
played in every period if the players are sufficiently patient. 
This theorem is called the folk theorem. Player’s patience means that the discount factor 
is large. It is one of the most important results in repeated game. It implies that Pareto 
efficient payoff can be achieved in repeated game equilibrium. 
A.4. Stochastic Game 
Stochastic games are also called dynamic games. They are generalizations of repeated 
game. In the repeated game, the same stage game is repeated in all periods. However, in 
stochastic games, the stage game can change randomly or deterministically from period 
to period depending on the history for a fix set of players. A game state of the stochastic 
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game is one of the possible stage games. A description of the stochastic game specifies 
how the game states vary from period to period. In general, the probability of the current 
state depends on the previous state and players’ actions. In the special case that the 
current state is independent of the previous state and players’ actions, we have a repeated 
game with random states that is the base of our model in Chapter 4.  
A.5. Game of Imperfect Monitoring 
Recall that a repeated game is of perfect monitoring if at the end of each period, each 
player observes the strategies chosen by other players. In perfect monitoring game, each 
player precisely observes the past action of all other players without any ambiguity. 
When the action of other players cannot be absolutely observed, players have only noisy 
signal about past plays. The signal observed is randomly correlated to the actions of other 
players. We then have a game of imperfect monitoring. There are two classes of 
imperfect monitoring game: imperfect public monitoring game and imperfect private 
monitoring game. A game is of imperfect public monitoring if the signal of past plays, 
however imprecise and noisy are invariably observed by all players [60]. However, in 
imperfect private monitoring game, the signal of past plays observed by a player is not 
observable by others. A detailed presentation of game theory is done by Myerson [35]. 
Mailath and Samuelsson [60] emphasize repeated games and stochastic games. 
A.6. Evolutionary Game Theory 
EGT has its foundation in game theory and evolutionary biology. Evolutionary biology 
studies the processes of change in populations of organisms. Selection and mutation are 
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two important factors of change in Evolutionary biology. Mutation provides diversity in 
the population while selection promotes some variety over others. The assumption of 
rationality used in game theory is relaxed in EGT. Unlike game theory where players are 
intelligent rational and choose strategies, in EGT, players’ are programmed to some 
strategies in the game. Players’ are randomly and repeatedly drawn from large 
populations. They are not assumed to have common knowledge of the game. The payoff 
is the individual fitness or expected number of surviving offsprings. Two key concepts of 
EGT are ESS and the replicator dynamic.  
A.7. Evolutionary Stable Strategy 
Suppose that the individuals in the initial population are programmed to play the same 
pure or mixed incumbent strategy x. Then, a small group of mutants in proportion 
𝜀 ∈ (0,1), all programmed to play the same pure or mixed strategy y, appear in the 
population. Pairs of individuals are repeatedly drawn with equal probability to play the 
game. Therefore, if an individual is drawn to play the game, the probability that the 
opponent will play the strategy y    is ε, and the probability that the opponent will play the 
strategy x is 1- ε. As a result, the payoff in a match is equivalent to that in the match 
where an individual plays the mixed strategy 𝑤 = 𝜀 𝑦 + (1 − 𝜀)𝑥. It follows that the 
payoff of the incumbent strategy is 𝑢(𝑥,𝑤) or 𝑢[𝑥, 𝜀 𝑦 + (1 − 𝜀)𝑥 ], and that of the 
mutant strategy is 𝑢(𝑦,𝑤) or 𝑢[𝑦, 𝜀 𝑦 + (1 − 𝜀)𝑥 ]. A strategy x is an ESS if and only if: 
𝑢[𝑥, 𝜀 𝑦 + (1 − 𝜀)𝑥 ] > 𝑢[𝑦, 𝜀 𝑦 + (1 − 𝜀)𝑥 ].                                                                        (4) 
for a small proportion of mutant 𝜀. 
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Definition 3: A strategy x is an evolutionary stable strategy if for every strategy y ≠x 
there exists some 𝜀?̅? ∈ (0,1) such that inequality (4) holds for all 𝜀 ∈ �0, 𝜀?̅?�. 
Considering the linearity of u, equation (4) can be written as: 
(1 − 𝜀)𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥) + 𝜀𝑢(𝑥,𝑦) > (1 − 𝜀)𝑢(𝑦, 𝑥) + 𝜀𝑢(𝑦, 𝑦).                (5) 
For small values of 𝜀, equation (4) is equivalent to either 
𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥) > 𝑢(𝑦, 𝑥) ∀ 𝑦,                                                                                                                    (6) 
Or 
𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥) = 𝑢(𝑦, 𝑥) and 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑢(𝑦,𝑦) ∀ 𝑦 ≠ 𝑥,                                                                 (7) 
as first formulated by John Maynard Smith in [73]. 
Proposition 4: If x is an ESS then x is a NE 
This is because otherwise, inequality (6) should not hold. ESS is a stronger criterion than 
Nash equilibrium. 
Proposition 5: Any strict Nash equilibrium is an ESS. 
This is because strict Nash equilibrium always satisfies equation (6) 
Proposition 6: An ESS does not always exist in a game. 
A population of individuals programmed to play an ESS resist against mutation. This 
means that such a population cannot disappear in the long run evolution. 
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A.8. Replicator Dynamic 
As described before, ESS focuses on mutation. Actually, the replicator dynamic 
highlights the role of selection. This model was first proposed by Taylor and Jonker [74]. 
Assume we have a large but finite population of individuals. Assume also that all 
individuals are programmed to a pure strategy 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾 in a symmetric two player’s game. 
Let u be the payoff function. Let 𝑝𝑖(𝑡) ≥ 0 be the number of individuals programmed to 
pure strategy 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾 at time t. Thus, the total population is 𝑝(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑝𝑖(𝑡) > 0𝑖∈𝐾 . Let the 
proportion of individuals programmed to pure strategy i be: 
𝑥𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑝𝑖(𝑡) 𝑝(𝑡)⁄ .                                                     (8) 
The associated population state is defined as the vector 𝑥(𝑡) = [𝑥1(𝑡), 𝑥2(𝑡), … , 𝑥𝑘(𝑡) ]. 
Therefore, when the population is in state x, the expected payoff to pure strategy i at a 
random match is 𝑢�𝑒𝑖 , 𝑥� and the payoff of an individual drawn at random in the 
population is 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥) = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑢�𝑒𝑖, 𝑥� 𝑘𝑖=1 . Assume that payoffs are individual’s fitness 
representing the number of offsprings per unit of time and that strategy is inherited by a 
continuous time reproduction. We obtain the following population dynamic using time 
derivative: 
?̇?𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖𝑢�𝑒𝑖 , 𝑥�.                                                        (9) 
Moreover, equation (8) gives us 𝑝(𝑡). 𝑥𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑝𝑖(𝑡) and taking the time derivative on 
both sides gives: 
?̇?𝑥𝑖 + 𝑝?̇?𝑖 = ?̇?𝑖 ⇒ 𝑝?̇?𝑖 = ?̇?𝑖 − ?̇?𝑥𝑖. 
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Also, if we derive 𝑝(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝑖∈𝐾  on both side and use 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥) = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑢�𝑒𝑖, 𝑥� 𝑘𝑖=1 we 
get, after iteration, 
?̇? = 𝑝𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥). 
Thus, 𝑝?̇?𝑖 = ?̇?𝑖 − ?̇?𝑥𝑖 ⇒ 𝑝?̇?𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖𝑢�𝑒𝑖, 𝑥� − 𝑝𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥)𝑥𝑖, 
and dividing both side by p we finally obtain the population dynamics for the population 
shares 𝑥𝑖 
?̇?𝑖 = �𝑢�𝑒𝑖, 𝑥� − 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑥)�𝑥𝑖.                                                        (10) 
Equation (10) gives the replicator dynamic, this system of differential equation allow us 
to draw an important conclusion. Subpopulations programmed with better than average 
strategies grow whereas supbpopulations programmed with worse than average strategies 
sink. 
Let ξ (t, x0) represent the population state at time t when the initial state is x0. 
Proposition 7: If a pure strategy i is strictly dominated, then ξi (t, x0) t→∞ →0 for any x0. 
Properly, strictly dominated strategies perish in the replicator dynamic. 
Weibull [45] provides a more detailed presentation of EGT. 
A.9. Conclusion 
In short, we presented in this Section three important concepts; Nash equilibrium, ESS, 
and the replicator dynamic. We emphasized their similarities and differences. Nash 
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equilibrium is associated with rational players; on the other hand, ESS and the replicator 
dynamic consider programmed players without any assumption of rationality. However, 
all three eliminate strictly dominated strategies. Only Nash equilibrium strategies can 
pass ESS criterions. Also, in the long run, the stationary and stable states in the replicator 
dynamic correspond to aggregate Nash equilibrium behavior. Thus, a population or a 
strategy resists an evolutionary process only if it is rational. Finally, EGT and game 
theory deliver comparable results with different assumptions.  
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